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Abstract 
Femininity Under Threat: 
How Women Respond to Feedback about Their Physical Appearance 
Natalie Markowitz Wittlin 
2021 
 In recent decades, it has become increasingly normative—at times, even desirable—
for women to possess traditionally masculine personality traits. The pressure on women to 
maintain a feminine physical appearance, however, has not waned. Past research has 
demonstrated that unlike men, women do not experience distress when their psychological 
gender stereotypicality has been threatened. This does not mean, however, that they are 
immune from the harms of gender stereotypicality threats altogether. In this dissertation, I 
explore the possibility that women experience distress when their physical femininity has been 
threatened. 
In Chapter 1, I lay the foundation for my empirical work. I provide an overview of 
the constructs at the center of this dissertation: gender stereotypes, gender identity, gender 
stereotypicality threats, and identity invalidation. Further, I highlight three major gaps in the 
existing literature on gender stereotypicality threats: attention to women, consideration of 
physical appearances, and exploration of underlying mechanisms.  
In Chapter 2, I present four studies that test my hypothesis that physical femininity 
threats are distressing for women. I find that women experience anxiety and reduced self-
esteem in response to information indicating that their appearance is less feminine than 
average (versus more feminine than average). Further, I find that these effects are not simply 
the result of women interpreting this information to mean they are unattractive. I also find 
that these effects are indeed domain specific, such that physical, but not psychological, 
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threats produce anxiety and reduced self-esteem in women. In men, in contrast, masculinity 
threats produce anxiety across domains. Finally, I find preliminary evidence that identity 
invalidation—and specifically, a discrepancy between the feedback one received and one’s 
internal sense of self—can help to explain the effects of gender stereotypicality threats on 
both anxiety and self-esteem. 
In Chapter 3, I describe the unique contributions of these studies to the psychology 
of gender and propose three directions for future research. I suggest that additional studies 
be conducted to explore the null effects of psychological femininity threats. Additionally, I 
propose that future research approach the subject of femininity threats from an 
intersectional perspective, considering whether and how experiences with these threats differ 
between dominant and minoritized social group members. Finally, I highlight the importance 
of considering the broader consequences of femininity threats, both for women who have 
been threatened and for people in general. 
In sum, this dissertation explores a highly consequential phenomenon that has been 
largely overlooked in the literature: femininity threats. In doing so, it highlights unique ways 
in which gender stereotypes can harm women and paves the way for further research on this 
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In 1985, Anne Hopkins sued the accounting firm Price Waterhouse, her former 
employer, for denying her partnership. Partners at the firm had referred to Hopkins as 
“macho” and had suggested that she might be considered for promotion if she were to 
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry" (Fiske et al., 1991, p. 1117; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
1989). Hopkins argued, and with input from prominent social psychologists, the U.S. 
Supreme Court agreed that this denial constituted sex discrimination, as it was driven by 
Hopkins’ non-adherence to gender stereotypes. Although this landmark Supreme Court 
decision occurred over thirty years ago, if women in the twenty-first century are to be liked 
and considered adequately feminine, they are still expected to maintain a feminine physical 
appearance. Indeed, in 2019, media reports revealed that Ernst & Young, another large 
accounting firm, had held a workshop in which female employees were encouraged to come 
to work with a “good haircut, manicured nails, and well-cut attire that complements [their] 
body type” (Peck, 2019). Furthermore, since Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, other courts 
have ruled that employers can legally fire female employees for not adhering to gender-
specific dress and grooming codes that require them to wear their hair down, style it, and 
wear makeup (Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 2002). Despite women’s increased 
presence in traditionally masculine spheres and roles (England et al., 2020; Geiger & Parker, 
2018; Parker et al., 2017), the mandate for women to appear hegemonically physically 
feminine—that is, in accordance with Eurocentric conceptualizations of femininity (Collins, 
2004), to have light, smooth, and hairless skin, a slim build, long, silky hair, and a youthful 
appearance—has clearly persisted. As a consequence of this mandate, women who do not 
live up to—or who believe they do not live up—these standards of physical femininity may 
experience acute psychological distress.  
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In this dissertation, I examine psychological consequences of threats to women’s 
physical femininity. In this introductory chapter, I provide a brief overview of the 
psychological constructs that are central to this dissertation: gender stereotypes, gender 
identity, gender stereotypicality threats, and identity invalidation. I also highlight areas in 
need of reconsideration and additional attention. Further, I make the case that research on 
gender stereotypicality threats has been limited by its inattention to women, to physical 
appearances, and to the mechanisms by which these threats translate into psychological 
distress. I assert that a comprehensive understanding of the consequences of gender 
stereotypicality threats requires attention to all three. 
At times, different bodies of literature use different terms to describe related or even 
identical constructs and phenomena. Likewise, different literatures sometimes use the same 
term to describe constructs and phenomena that are theoretically distinct from one another. 
Thus, to limit confusion and ensure conceptual clarity throughout this dissertation, in this 
chapter, I indicate which terms I will be using and describe how they overlap with and differ 
from similar and related terms. An overview of all of the terms defined in this chapter is 
presented in Table 1.2. This table is meant to serve as a reference should readers wish to 
refer back to the definitions provided in this chapter.  
Gender Stereotypes 
The studies presented in this dissertation examine psychological responses to 
feedback about one’s gender stereotypicality. Here, I situate these studies within current 
understandings of gender stereotypes and describe one important limitation of the existing 
literature on this topic: inattention to physical appearances. 
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Defining Gender Stereotypes 
The term gender stereotypes refers, broadly, to people’s beliefs about the attributes of 
females and males1,2 (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979, 1981; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; 
Rosenkrantz et al., 1968). It does not, however, refer to people’s definitions of what it means 
to be female or male, which tend to refer to genitals and/or chromosomes (Schudson et al., 
2019). Although stereotypes are often described as expectations about members of a group 
(Swim & Hyers, 2009. p. 411), it is perhaps more accurate to describe them as beliefs about 
groups that inform expectations about individual members of those groups (Dovidio et al., 
2010).  
Gender stereotypes comprise not only descriptive elements—that is, beliefs about what 
women (and girls) and men (and boys) are like—but also injunctive elements—that is, beliefs 
about what women and men should be like (in the case of prescriptive stereotypes) and should not 
be like (in the case of proscriptive stereotypes) (e.g., Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Heilman, 2001; 
Eagly & Karau, 2002; Fiske & Stevens, 1993; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Descriptive and 
injunctive stereotypes are largely but not entirely overlapping (Koenig, 2019; Prentice & 
Carranza, 2002). 
 
1 Although many psychologists reserve the terms “female” and “male” for references to 
biological sex (Muehlenhard & Peterson, 2011), in this dissertation I use them to refer to 
gender. In doing so, I ensure inclusivity of individuals who identify as “women,” “men,” 
“girls,” “boys,” and “guys,” which is particularly important when studying young women, 
who may identify as “girls” (Chrisler, 2013). Accordingly, I use the terms “female” and 
“male” not only as adjectives (as in “female participants” and “male participants”) but also as 
nouns (American Psychological Association, 2020). This decision has precedent in the 
literature (Hyde, 2005). 
 
2 The term gender stereotypes could theoretically refer to beliefs about cisgender women/girls, 
cisgender men/boys, transgender women/girls, transgender men/boys, and nonbinary 
individuals. It is typically used more narrowly, however, to refer to beliefs about cisgender 
women/girls and cisgender men/boys. 
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When discussing gender stereotypes throughout this dissertation, I use the terms 
feminine and femininity to refer to characteristics that are descriptively and/or prescriptively 
stereotypical of women (and which are also often self-reported by women more than men; 
Bem, 1974; Spence et al., 1975). Correspondingly, I use the terms masculine and masculinity to 
refer to characteristics that are stereotypical of men (and which are also often self-reported 
by men more than women; Bem, 1974; Spence et al., 1975). These definitions align with 
Bem’s (1974) description of feminine characteristics as those “judged to be more desirable 
[in American society]3 for a woman than a man” and masculine characteristics as those 
“judged to be more desirable in American society for a man than for a woman” (pp. 155-
156). Understandings of the terms feminine and masculine vary considerably, however, among 
lay people (Schudson et al., 2019) and psychologists (Constantinople, 1973; Spence, 1984) 
alike. As Spence (1984) explains, they can be used in (a) the “empirical” sense—as labels for 
characteristics associated with and prescribed for members of one gender group or the other 
(p. 66) or (b) the “theoretical” sense—to refer to a perhaps undefinable, “fundamental 
property or aspect of the individual’s self-concept that is not directly observable” (p. 90). 
When using these terms in the context of gender stereotypes, I use them in the empirical 
sense.  
Descriptive (though not necessarily prescriptive) gender stereotypes are often 
conceptualized as inherently comparative (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). In other words, 
characteristics are classified as feminine if women are thought to possess them at higher 
rates than men, whereas they are classified as masculine if men are thought to possess them 
at higher rates than women (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Notably, however, generic beliefs 
 
3 The empirical research presented in this dissertation was indeed conducted in—and 
primarily informed by other research conducted in—the United States. 
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(e.g., “Men are intelligent,” “Women are emotional”) seem to be more central than statistical 
beliefs (e.g., “Men are more likely than women to be intelligent”) to the cognitive structure 
of descriptive stereotypes, as they are more predictive of expectations about individual 
women and men (Hammond & Cimpian, 2017). Therefore, women being more likely than 
men to report a particular characteristic (e.g., Bem, 1974; Spence et al., 1975) is not an 
indication that the stereotype that women possess that characteristic is accurate (since 
stereotypes are largely cognitively represented as “women possess this characteristic” rather 
than “women are more likely than men to possess this characteristic”). It is also not an 
indication that the belief that women possess that characteristic is not a stereotype (Swim, 
1994). This point is important in the context of the research presented in this dissertation, 
which focuses on physical gender stereotypes, because some would likely argue that women 
and men indeed look different from one another. Average differences between women and 
men on a particular characteristic, however, do not prevent that characteristic from being a 
stereotype. 
Descriptive gender stereotypes are also largely bipolar (Biernat, 1991; Foushee et al., 
1979; Spence, 1984); in other words, adults tend to conceptualize femininity and masculinity 
as two ends of a single spectrum—or, in other words, as polar opposites. As described in 
Chapter 2, the manipulations used in this dissertation capitalize on this lay understanding of 
femininity and masculinity. 
Distinguishing Gender Stereotypes 
The term gender stereotypes is closely related to several other terms, including gender 
prototypes, sex (or gender) roles, gender norms, and sex-typed characteristics. Each of these terms, 
however, has a slightly different meaning. To clarify the logic behind my decision to frame 
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this dissertation in terms of stereotypes, here, I define each of these terms and distinguish it 
from gender stereotypes. 
Gender prototypes refers to mental representations of highly typical or representative 
instances of a gender category (Brewer et al., 1981; Helgeson, 1994; Smith & Zarate, 1990). 
Whereas prototypicality can be thought of as existing along a single dimension, degree of 
prototypicality, stereotypicality can be thought of as existing along two dimensions, degree 
and direction of stereotypicality. For example, if being kind is part of what it means to be a 
prototypical woman, then both unusually kind and unusually unkind women are non-
prototypical. If being kind is part of what it means to be a stereotypical woman, on the other 
hand, then unusually kind women are highly stereotypical, whereas unusually unkind women 
are counter-stereotypical. Because in this dissertation I am interested in comparing women’s 
responses to feedback indicating that they are high in femininity (and low in masculinity) 
versus high in masculinity (and low in femininity), I frame this work in terms of gender 
stereotypes, rather than prototypes. 
The term social roles is typically used to refer to sets of shared expectations about 
people with a specific social position or in a specific social category (Eagly & Karau, 2002; 
Gouldner, 1957). Examples of social roles include friend, parent, co-worker, boss, teacher, 
lawyer, construction worker, and nurse. Sex (or gender) roles are specific types of social roles 
thought to stem from women’s and men’s uneven occupation of other social roles (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002). More specifically, a sex (or gender) role refers to the collection of stereotypes 
associated with one gender or the other (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Putting effort into one’s 
appearance, for example, is a gender stereotype and constitutes one element of the female 
gender role; it does not, however, constitute the female gender role in its entirety 
(Broverman et al., 1972; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). 
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The term social norms refers to “rules and standards that are understood by members 
of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws” 
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p. 152). Both the term gender stereotypes and the term gender norms have 
been used to refer to both descriptive and prescriptive beliefs about women, men, girls, and 
boys; thus, they can be considered synonymous and used interchangeably (Diekman & 
Goodfriend, 2006). In the context of gender norms, however, the term normative is 
sometimes used to refer exclusively to prescriptive stereotypes (Eagly, 1987, p. 13). 
Additionally, in line with the above definition of social norms, the term gender norms could be 
understood to refer specifically to behaviors and not to other components of gender 
stereotypes. Therefore, in this dissertation, I refrain from using this term. 
Finally, the term sex-typed has several different meanings: (a) prescriptively 
stereotypical of one gender group or the other (as in “sex-typed norms” or “sex-typed 
standards;” Wood et al., 1997); (b) possessing characteristics that are prescriptively 
stereotypical of one’s gender group and not possessing characteristics that are prescriptively 
stereotypical of the other primary gender group (as in “sex-typed women” and “sex-typed 
men;” Bem, 1974; Spence & Helmreich, 1980); and (c) aligned with a particular gender 
identity, a term that will be discussed below (as in “sex-typed behaviors;” Bailey & Zucker, 
1995). Therefore, although in some cases the terms sex-typed and stereotypical can be used 
interchangeably (e.g., communality is a sex-typed trait or a trait that is stereotypical of 
women), to avoid any confusion, throughout this dissertation, I solely use the term 
stereotypical. 
Gender Stereotypes and Physical Appearance 
Research on gender stereotypes has been limited by its prioritization of certain 
domains. It has focused largely on personality traits—with competence, agency, and 
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instrumentality constituting masculine stereotypes and warmth, expressiveness, and 
communality constituting feminine stereotypes (Broverman et al., 1972; Rosenkrantz et al., 
1968; Heilman, 2001, 2012), as well as on cognitive ability—with math ability constituting a 
masculine stereotype and verbal ability constituting a feminine stereotype (Cejka & Eagly, 
1999; Eccles et al., 1990; Nosek et al., 2009). Gender stereotypes, however, are 
multidimensional and include not only beliefs about people’s psychological traits but also 
beliefs about their physical appearances (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Lewis, 1983, 1984; 
Helgeson, 1994; Kagan, 1964). Indeed, women and men are thought to be more physically 
than psychologically different (Deaux & Lewis, 1984). And in studies on lay understandings of 
femininity and masculinity, physical attributes are often mentioned more frequently than 
personality traits, cognitive abilities, roles, speech, movement, and behavior (Myers & 
Gonda, 1982; Spence & Sawin, 1985; but see Helgeson, 1994). 
The inattention to physical appearance in research on gender stereotypes may have 
led researchers to overlook important consequences of these stereotypes—especially for 
women. Evidence suggests that physical appearances are more central to conceptualizations 
of femininity in women than masculinity in men. In one study, for example, in which 
participants were asked what characteristics come to mind when they think of a “very 
feminine woman” or “very masculine man,” descriptions of feminine women included a 
greater proportion of physical descriptors than descriptions of masculine men did (Spence & 
Sawin, 1985). When asked about a feminine woman, 54% of women and 45% of men 
mentioned physical attributes. When asked about a masculine man, on the other hand, only 
37% of women and 29% of men mentioned physical attributes. Similarly, when participants 
in another study were asked which characteristics they associate with being a feminine 
female, nearly half of the descriptors used referred to “physical attributes and mannerisms” 
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(Aube et al., 1995). When asked which characteristics they associate with being a masculine 
female (38%), masculine male (34%), or feminine male (41%), however, participants 
included fewer physical descriptors and instead focused more on personality traits, role 
behaviors (i.e., activities within the family and the home), and interests. Results from one 
study deviated from this pattern, finding that physical appearance is more central to how 
people think about masculinity in women than femininity in men and women and masculinity 
in men (Helgeson, 1994). Still, this study is consistent with the others in that participants 
mentioned appearances more when describing stereotypicality (or rather counter-
stereotypicality) in women than stereotypicality in men.  
The frequent neglect of physical appearance in research on gender stereotypes might 
help to explain why psychologists have generally concluded that women are given more 
leeway to be masculine than men are given to be feminine (Kimmel, 2004, p. 147-148; 
Thompson & Pleck, 1986). It indeed seems to be the case that within the domains of 
personality traits, role behaviors, and occupations, counter-stereotypicality is judged more 
harshly in males than it is in females (Feinman, 1981; Koenig, 2019; Martin, 1990; McCreary, 
1994; Sirin et al., 2004)—or, in other words, that whereas men and boys are subjected to a 
clear and pervasive anti-femininity mandate, women and girls are not subjected to a 
comparable anti-masculinity mandate. And this asymmetry may exist at least in part because 
masculinity is more highly valued and higher-status than femininity is (Feinman, 1981; Parker 
et al., 2017). Within the domain of physical appearance, however, counter-stereotypicality 
may not be judged more harshly in males than it is in females. In fact, physical stereotypicality 
may be particularly prized and counter-stereotypicality particularly discouraged in women. 
Although research on gender stereotypes has often overlooked physical appearances, 
when appearances have been attended to, the focus has typically been on psychological or 
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behavioral investment in appearances, rather than appearances themselves. For example, in 
their studies of prescriptive gender stereotypes, Prentice and Carranza (2002) found that 
paying attention to one’s appearances is generally considered desirable but that it is 
considered more desirable for women than people in general and less desirable for men than 
people in general. Additionally, research has suggested that physical attractiveness may 
constitute a particularly strong prescription for women. In a 2017 nationally representative 
survey of U.S. adults, for example, participants were asked “what traits society values most in 
men and women” (Parker et al., 2017). In reference to women, the plurality of responses 
(35%) focused on what the authors classified as physical attractiveness, whereas in reference 
to men, the plurality (33%) focused on honesty and morality. Furthermore, 71% of 
participants said that women face a lot of pressure to be physically attractive, whereas only 
27% said that men face such pressure.  
The large overlap between that which is considered physically attractive in women 
and that which is considered physically feminine (Keating, 1985; Penton-Voak et al., 2004; 
Rhodes et al., 2000; Rhodes et al., 2003) suggests that physically feminine features (e.g., 
hairless skin, an unpronounced brow ridge and jawline, and large lips; Rhodes, 2006) are 
highly prescribed for women. Indeed, the most common “beautification” practices in which 
women engage—eyebrow shaping, body and facial hair removal, use of anti-aging creams, 
and application of eye and lip makeup—increase physical femininity and reduce physical 
masculinity (Russell, 2010). The apparent emphasis on physical stereotypicality in women 
may help to explain why even though women, but not men, are increasingly identifying with 
counter-stereotypical personality traits and decreasingly identifying with stereotypical 
personality traits (Donnelly & Twenge, 2017; Twenge, 1997), women report that it is very 
important for them to be viewed as “womanly or feminine” to a greater extent than men 
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report that it is very important for them to be viewed as “manly or masculine” (20% versus 
9%; Parker et al., 2017). 
A full understanding of the consequences of prescriptive gender stereotypes requires 
consideration of the pressure on women to appear physically feminine—and in particular, on 
what happens when women believe they have failed to live up to ideals of physical 
femininity. This question is the focus on the studies presented in Chapter 2. Furthermore, an 
understanding of what happens in these instances requires consideration of the extent to 
which women experience threats to their gender stereotypicality as threats to their identity. 
In the next section of this chapter, I therefore provide a brief introduction to the 
psychological construct of gender identity and clarify how I will use this term throughout the 
remainder of the dissertation. 
Gender Identity 
 In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I examine the relationship between feedback about 
one’s gender stereotypicality and beliefs about one’s identity. In particular, I investigate the 
effect of this feedback on both the strength of one’s gender identity and the sense that one’s 
identity is being denied. Here, I lay out existing understandings of the construct of gender 
identity, clarify how I will use this term throughout the dissertation, and describe the 
relationship between gender identity and physical appearance. 
Defining Gender Identity 
In its broadest sense, gender identity refers to “the quality and strength of the cognitive 
connections...that a person makes between the self and a gender category” (Tobin et al., 
2010). Definitions and understandings of this term, however, vary (Wood & Eagly, 2015). 
Gender identity has been used to refer, in whole or in part, to all of the following: 
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i. children’s “membership knowledge”—or awareness of the gender category 
to which they belong by virtue of their genitals and thus assigned sex (Bussey 
& Bandura, 1999; Egan & Perry, 2001; Kohlberg, 1966, p. 103; Tobin et al., 
2010) 
ii. identification with a gender category, often determined by an alignment 
between one’s internal sense of self and an individual understanding of what 
membership in that category entails (i.e., self-categorization; Factor & 
Rothblum, 2008; Kuper et al., 2012; Spence, 1993; Spence & Sawin, 1985; 
Tate, 2014; Tate et al., 2014); 
iii. identification with other people of one’s gender group (Becker & Wagner, 
2009; Gurin & Townsend, 1986); 
iv. centrality of gender membership to one’s overall sense of self (Ashmore et 
al., 2004; Becker & Wagner, 2009; Gurin & Townsend, 1986; Tobin et al., 
2010) (i.e., gender identity centrality; Rogers et al., 2015 or gender identification; 
Schmader, 2002); 
v. felt pressure (internal and/or external) to conform to gender stereotypes 
(Egan & Perry, 2001; Tobin et al., 2010; Witt & Wood, 2010); 
vi. self-perceived gender typicality, or adherence to gender stereotypes (Gurin & 
Townsend, 1986; Tobin et al., 2010; Martin et al., 2017; Witt & Wood, 2010; 
in the tradition of Bem, 1974 and Spence et al., 1974, 1975); 
vii. identification with femininity and/or masculinity, determined by an 
alignment between one’s internal sense of self and one’s individual 
understanding of these constructs (Constantinople, 1973; Oswald & 
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Lindstedt, 2006; Spence, 1984; Spence, 1993; Spence & Buckner, 2000; 
Spence & Sawin, 1985). 
Whereas the first three conceptualizations of gender identity refer to identification as 
female or male, the latter three refer to identification as feminine or masculine. Throughout 
this dissertation, I therefore use the term gender identity to refer to a two-dimensional 
construct consisting of: (a) one’s internal sense of femaleness or maleness; and (b) one’s 
internal sense of femininity and masculinity.4 Here, following the final conceptualization of 
gender identity listed above, I use the terms femininity and masculinity in the “theoretical,” 
rather than the “empirical” sense (Spence, 1984)—that is, to refer to an element of one’s 
sense of self that is “incapable of being put into words” (Spence, 1984, p. 80) and whose 
meaning can vary from person to person. 
Although identification with a gender category is frequently operationalized as a 
categorical variable (with individuals identifying as either female or male or nonbinary, etc.), in 
this dissertation I operationalize it as a continuous variable representing the degree of one’s 
internal identification with a gender category. This operationalization allows for 
differentiation among individuals with a shared gender self-categorization (Tate, 2014), as 
well as potential contextual malleability—or, in this dissertation, the ability to shift in 
response to feedback about one’s gender stereotypicality. This operationalization is also 
consistent with research that assesses gender identity using an implicit association task 
(Ashmore et al., 2004; Olson et al., 2015). I similarly operationalize identification with 
femininity and masculinity as continuous variables (Wood & Eagly, 2009). 
 
4 When assessing participants’ gender category membership at the beginning of the empirical 
studies, however, I ask them to report their “gender identity” as female, male, nonbinary, or 
“other,” in line with a basic self-categorization approach to measuring gender identity. 
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The two dimensions of gender identity described above may, in fact, be redundant 
with one another in cisgender individuals (that is, individuals who identify with the sex 
assigned to them at birth). It may also be the case that when asked about their internal sense 
of femaleness, maleness, femininity, and masculinity, cisgender women and men understand 
the former two terms as referring to their fundamental self-concept and the latter two as 
referring to their adherence to gender stereotypes. However, cisgender individuals’ 
interpretation of these terms—and the extent to which they overlap—likely vary from 
person to person. Thus, when assessing gender identity, I ask participants to report on both 
their internal femaleness (or maleness) and their internal femininity and masculinity. 
Furthermore, I intentionally avoid defining female, male, femininity, and masculinity for 
participants and remain agnostic as to their interpretations of these terms. This approach is 
consistent with theorizing that understands gender identity to represent “a sense of belonging 
to an abstract category of persons in the world irrespective of social similarities to them that 
is likely difficult to articulate” (Tate et al., 2014). 
Gender Identity and Physical Appearance 
Although physical appearance is a key component of gender stereotypes (Deaux & 
Lewis, 1984) and femininity in particular (Parker et al., 2017; Spence & Sawin, 1985), its 
relevance to gender identity is less clear—and thus explored in Chapter 2. In their study that 
demonstrated that physical attributes are central to descriptive gender stereotypes—and 
femininity in particular—Spence and Sawin (1985) found that such attributes are actually not 
particularly central to gender identities. In this study, participants were asked, “When you 
think in terms of being a woman (man) and your own femininity (masculinity), what defines 
your womanhood (manhood) as far as your own self-image is concerned?” The plurality of 
male participants (26%) spontaneously mentioned their role as a provider, whereas only 5% 
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spontaneously mentioned physical attributes. A near majority of female participants (46.5%) 
spontaneously mentioned their role as a wife or mother, whereas only 8% spontaneously 
mentioned physical attributes. However, the participants in this study were members of 
married couples with young children and therefore might have been more focused on family 
roles than the average woman or man would have been. Similarly, in their study of the 
relationship between participants’ physical attributes, as coded by an outside observer, and 
gender identity, Aube and colleagues’ (1995) found that gender identity was not associated 
with physical femininity among women. It was, however, associated with physical masculinity 
among men, such that those who identified as more masculine were also rated as more 
physically masculine (according to physical gender stereotypes). Together, the results from 
these two studies suggest that physical appearance may be more central to stereotypes about 
women than women’s gender identities. 
Not all studies, however, have suggested that this discrepancy exists. Twenge (1999) 
asked women and men to self-report on their personality traits, occupational interests, 
interest in sports, femininity of physical appearance, number of friends of each gender, 
number of sex partners, attitudes towards women and feminism, and finally, femininity and 
masculinity (each measured using a single item). They found that among women, the 
measure most closely related to global femininity, other than global masculinity (which was 
negatively correlated with femininity), was “feminine-valued appearance behaviors,” which 
consisted of “spending time on appearance, wearing perfume or cologne, having long hair, 
owning a large number of shoes, wearing jewelry, and wearing earrings in both ears.”  
If physical appearances are central to women’s gender identities, as Twenge’s (1999) 
work suggests, information suggesting that a woman is not physically feminine might 
influence her overall sense of self. If, on the other hand, physical appearances are central to 
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gender stereotypicality—especially femininity—but not women’s gender identities, as Spence 
and Sawin’s (1985) and Aube and colleagues’ (1995) work suggests, women might experience 
information suggesting that they are not physically feminine as discordant with their internal 
sense of self—particularly if they identify as highly globally feminine. In other words, women 
might experience physical gender stereotypicality threats as a form of identity invalidation. 
This possibility, and these key constructs, are discussed in more depth in the following 
section. 
Gender Stereotypicality Threats and Identity Invalidation 
 Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines the consequences of gender stereotypicality 
threats for women. Here, I describe how this research fills gaps in the literature on both the 
negative consequences of gender stereotypes for women and the psychological effects of 
gender stereotypicality threats. 
How Gender Stereotypes Harm Women 
Gender stereotypes can harm women through their effects on both others’ 
impressions of women and women’s impressions of themselves. They can also be harmful 
both when women are thought to possess stereotypical characteristics (and/or lack counter-
stereotypical characteristics) and when they are thought to lack stereotypical characteristics 
(and/or possess counter-stereotypical characteristics). In other words, the types of situations 
in which gender stereotypes harm women can be divided into four categories (see Table 1.1): 
(a) situations in which others believe a woman possesses stereotypical characteristics 
(and/or lacks counter-stereotypical characteristics); 
(b) situations in which others believe a woman lacks stereotypical characteristics 
(and/or possesses counter-stereotypical characteristics); 
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(c) situations in which a woman believes she possesses stereotypical characteristics 
(and/or lacks counter-stereotypical characteristics); and 
(d) situations in which a woman believes she lacks stereotypical characteristics 
(and/or possesses counter-stereotypical characteristics). 
Whereas situations (a) and (c) result from descriptive stereotypes (which inform perceptions 
of women), situations (b) and (d) result from prescriptive stereotypes (which inform 
evaluations of women). 
Table 1.1 






impressions of women) 
(a) Lack of fit / role 
incongruity (Eagly & Karau, 
2002; Heilman, 1983) 
(b) Backlash (Eagly & Karau, 
2002; Rudman & Glick, 2001) 
Internal (Women’s 
impressions of themselves) 
(c) Stereotype threat (Spencer 
et al., 1999) 
(d) Femininity threat 
(Dissertation) 
 
A great deal of research has examined the first three types of situations. When 
women are assumed to possess stereotypical characteristics and/or lack counter-stereotypical 
characteristics—particularly in the workplace—they are often seen as “lacking fit” with the 
positions they seek and therefore denied career advancement opportunities (Eagly & Karau, 
2002; Heilman, 1983). When women are thought to lack stereotypical characteristics and/or 
possess counter-stereotypical characteristics, they often experience backlash, which similarly 
limits the likelihood that they will be hired or promoted (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Rudman & 
Glick, 2001). Finally, when women attempt to perform well in a domain in which they are 
stereotyped as untalented (e.g., math), they often experience stereotype threat—or a concern 
that they will confirm this negative stereotype, which can lead to underperformance (Spencer 
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et al., 1999). Minimal research, however, has examined the final category: situations in which 
women believe they lack stereotypical characteristics and/or possess counter-stereotypical 
characteristics. Chapter 2 of this dissertation begins to fill this gap in the literature by 
examining women’s psychological responses to this type of situation. 
Gender Stereotypicality Threats 
Situations that suggest that a person does not possess characteristics that are 
expected of members of their gender group and instead possesses characteristics that are 
expected of members of the other primary gender group have been referred to as gender 
identity threats5(Sinclair & Carlsson, 2013; Willer et al., 2013), gender role threats (Bosson et al., 
2009), and [gender] prototypicality threats (Alonso, 2018; Maass et al., 2003; Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2001). In this dissertation, however, I refer to them as gender stereotypicality 
threats. I opt not to use the term gender identity threats in the context of my research because, as 
discussed later in this section, a threat to one’s gender stereotypicality may—but does not 
necessarily—serve as a threat to one’s gender identity. And indeed, determining whether 
gender stereotypicality threats affect identity is one aim of this dissertation. Additionally, I 
opt not to use the term gender role threats because, as discussed earlier, physical appearances 
may or may not constitute an element of gender roles and certainly do not constitute the 
entirety of these roles. Finally, I opt not to use the term [gender] prototypicality threats because in 
 
5 Note that the term threat has at times been used to refer to the stress, anxiety, fear, and/or 
discomfort that may result from particular situations, in which case these situations may be 
referred to as threat inductions, rather than as threats (Branscombe et al., 1999). The term has 
also been used to refer to situations with which people do not believe they have the 
necessary resources to cope (Mendes et al., 2002). Here, however, I use it simply to refer to 
situations that may produce stress, anxiety, fear, and/or discomfort and with which people 
may or may not believe they have the necessary resources to cope. 
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these studies, all participants receive feedback indicating that they are atypical—but that they 
are atypical in either a stereotypical or counter-stereotypical direction. 
There is no perfect term to describe these sorts of threats. In most studies that 
explore this phenomenon, participants are informed that there is some dimension on which 
women and men differ. They are then told that their score on an assessment of that 
dimension is either more gender-congruent (in the affirmation condition) or less gender-
congruent (in the threat condition) than the average person in their gender group. In other 
words, in the affirmation condition, they are told that they are more different from gender 
outgroup members than most gender ingroup members are. In the threat condition, they are 
told that they are more similar to gender outgroup members than most gender ingroup 









Figure 1.2. Example of threatening feedback 
 
 
Because descriptive gender stereotypes represent beliefs about what women and men are 
like—and how they differ, situations indicating that a person is lower than the average 
gender ingroup member on a dimension that ingroup members are typically higher than 
outgroup members on can be understood as a threat to that person’s gender stereotypicality. 
(And situations indicating that a person is higher than the average gender ingroup member 
on a dimension that ingroup members are typically higher than outgroup members on can be 
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understood as an affirmation of that person’s gender stereotypicality.) Accordingly, 
throughout this dissertation, I refer to these situations as gender stereotypicality threats—or, more 
simply, as femininity threats for women and masculinity threats for men.6 
Beyond Masculinity Threats 
In addition to filling a gap in the literature on how gender stereotypes hurt women, 
this dissertation also challenges prevailing understandings of whom gender stereotypicality 
threats harm. Over the past fifteen years, research on masculinity threat has abounded. An 
APA PsycINFO search for “masculinity threat” in peer-reviewed journal articles published 
through 2020 produces 155 results, all but one of which (Babl, 1979) were published after 
2006. A search for “femininity threat,” on the other hand, produces a mere 2 results 
(Gordon & Glass, 1970; António et al., 2017). Similarly, Google Scholar searches, which 
include publications outside the field of psychology, produce 750 results for “masculinity 
threat” and only 21 for “femininity threat.” Clearly, whereas men’s responses to gender 
stereotypicality threats has become a topic of great interest, women’s responses to such 
threats have been all but ignored. 
 
6 The concept of gender stereotypicality threat is closely related but not identical to the concept of 
gender role stress. Gender role stress refers to the stress experienced in situations that are thought 
to be more stressful for one gender group than another (Eisler & Skidmore, 1987; Gillespie 
& Eisler, 1992)—or, in other words, to the stress associated with being a member of a 
particular gender group. Although gender stereotypicality threats can trigger gender role stress (e.g., 
being told that one is “sweet” might be more stressful for men than women), so too can 
other situations (such as expressing vulnerable emotions, which might be more stressful for 
men than for women, or thinking that one is being followed, which might be more stressful 
for women than for men; Eisler & Skidmore, 1987; Gillespie & Eisler, 1992). Additionally, 
although gender stereotypicality threats can produce stress, they do not necessarily produce 
stress. Finally, the term gender role stress tends to refer to one’s experiences across a variety of 
situations, rather than one’s response to a specific situation. Therefore, throughout the 
remainder of this dissertation I focus on gender stereotypicality threats and the psychological 
consequences thereof, rather than on gender role stress more broadly. 
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Fully explaining this asymmetry would require a deep dive into the history of the 
psychology of gender, which is outside the scope of this dissertation. Here, however, I 
provide a very brief overview of this history to situate this dissertation within the overall 
trajectory of research on gender stereotypicality threats. 
Research and theorizing on the psychology of women emerged in the 1970s in 
response to concerns about androcentrism and other gender biases that had plagued the field 
of psychology since its inception (Deaux, 1985; Eagly et al., 2012). Marking the psychology 
of women as just that—the psychology of women, however, has the potential to reinforce the 
androcentric understanding of men as normative, neutral, and generic and women as 
marked, gendered, and other (Bailey et al., 2019; Parlee, 1975). In the following decades, 
researchers therefore increasingly recognized the importance of studying men as men—as 
gendered, rather than neutral, people (Cochran, 2010; Peretz, 2016). 
The psychological study of men and masculinity was firmly established in the 90s, 
when the first issues of Journal of Men’s Studies, Masculinities (which became Men and 
Masculinities), and Psychology of Men & Masculinity (which became Psychology of Men & 
Masculinities) were published and when the American Psychological Association’s Society for 
the Psychological Study of Men and Masculinity (Division 51) was founded (Cochran, 2010). 
This solidification of men as men as a discrete and important object of psychological inquiry 
largely coincided with a broader shift in the social sciences and humanities from “women’s 
studies” to “gender studies” (or “women’s and gender studies;” Richardson & Robinson, 
1994). 
Research on the psychology of men and masculinity has continued to grow since the 
90s, and an APA PsycINFO search for “masculinity” as a key concept in peer-reviewed 
journals reveals that it is currently in its heyday. This search produces 63 results for all years 
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through 1960, 233 for 1961-1980, 557 for 1981-2000, and 4147 for 2001-2020 (compared to 
55, 257, 507, and 1333, respectively, for “femininity”). Given this trend in the field, it is not 
surprising that research on gender stereotypicality threats has focused primarily on threats to 
men’s masculinity, rather than threats to women’s femininity. This asymmetry was also likely 
reinforced by the 2008 finding that men, but not women, experience anxiety in response to 
threats to their gender stereotypicality (Vandello et al., 2008). The heightened attention to 
the psychology of men and masculinity, however, may have come at a cost. 
Shining a light on the experiences of dominant group members (in this case, men) as 
dominant group members—and thus eliminating the practice of considering dominant group 
members to be neutral—is a critical element of any effort to make psychology more 
equitable and comprehensive. Investigating the experiences of subordinated group members 
(in this case, women), however, also remains vital. In other words, fully understanding the 
psychology of gender requires research focused on the experiences of men, as well as 
research focused on the experiences of women. And fully understanding the psychology of 
gender stereotypicality threats requires research on masculinity threats, as well as research on 
femininity threats. The large majority of research on this phenomenon, however, has 
focused on the former. Chapter 2 of this dissertation begins to remedy the asymmetry in the 
literature on gender stereotypicality threats by focusing specifically on women’s responses to 
femininity threats.  
Chapter 2 also examines mechanisms by which gender stereotypicality threats might 
produce negative psychological consequences. Understanding these mechanisms is critical to 
truly understanding the effects of gender stereotypicality threats on both women and men. 
Specifically, in the final study of Chapter 2, I test whether women and men interpret threats 
to their gender stereotypicality as threats to their gender identity—that is, as identity 
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invalidation—and whether this sense of identity invalidation can help to explain the broader 
effects of these threats. In other words, I test whether gender stereotypicality threats indeed 
feel like gender identity threats when gender identity is understood as one’s internal sense of 
femaleness/maleness, femininity, and masculinity. 
Identity Invalidation 
Identity invalidation refers to the rejection, denial, or lack of recognition of one’s 
internal sense of self or one’s membership in a social group of which one considers oneself a 
part (Campbell & Troyer, 2007; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Franco & O’Brien, 2018). 
Although the term identity denial is more common in the literature, I use invalidation to 
encompass both identity denial (e.g., “You are not a woman;” Albuja, Sanchez et al., 2019) 
and more subtle forms of invalidation, such as identity questioning (e.g., “Are you sure you’re a 
woman?”; Albuja, Sanchez et al., 2019). Identity invalidation can have negative psychological 
consequences (Cheryan & Monin, 2005), especially when the invalidated identity is central to 
one’s overall sense of self (Bosson et al., 2012; McLemore, 2018; Prewitt-Freilino et al., 
2012). For example, American Indian adults who outsiders perceive as belonging to another 
race (not American Indian) experience higher rates of depression and suicidality than those 
who are recognized as American Indian (Campbell & Troyer, 2007). Multiracial individuals 
who are forced to indicate a single racial identity on a demographic form show lower self-
esteem than those who are allowed to select multiple racial identities (Townsend et al., 2009). 
Biracial (White and another race) individuals report stress after their White identity is denied 
(Albuja, Gaither, et al., 2019). And bicultural (Asian American) individuals whose American 
identity is denied experience heightened levels of stress, as indicated by both self-report and 
cortisol reactivity (Albuja, Gaither, et al., 2019). 
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Identity invalidation is a form of social identity threat, a relatively broad construct that 
refers to any situation that puts one’s social identity (e.g., gender, race, religious group, etc.) 
in jeopardy (Reese et al., 2014) and that includes categorization threats (when one wants to be 
thought of as individual but is instead thought of in terms of one’s group membership), 
distinctiveness threats (when one believes another group is “too” similar to one’s ingroup), 
threats to the value of social identity (when one’s ingroup is disparaged), and acceptance threats (when 
one is thought not to be a member of one’s ingroup) (Branscombe et al., 1999). Notably, in 
some instances of acceptance threat, an individual’s group membership is not denied outright; 
rather, that individual may simply be thought of as an atypical group member (Branscombe 
et al., 1999). Although acceptance threat was originally conceptualized as an intragroup 
phenomenon (perpetrated by ingroup members), both ingroup and outgroup members can 
threaten one’s group membership. Additionally, although identity invalidation has previously 
been classified as a form of categorization threat (Townsend et al., 2009), it does not typically 
involve thinking of a person as a group member, rather than an individual. Rather, it 
involves not thinking of a person as a member—or a typical member—of a particular group. 
I therefore assert that identity invalidation falls into the category of acceptance threat (Scaptura & 
Boyle, 2020)—regardless of whether the perpetrator is an ingroup or outgroup member. 
As mentioned earlier, although little work on femininity threats exists, research that 
has looked at such threats—and that has compared them to masculinity threats—suggests 
that gender stereotypicality threats are more consequential (i.e., psychologically distressing) 
for men than women. Although both women and men experience fear of backlash 
(repercussions for nonconformity to gender stereotypes) and reduced self-esteem in 
response to psychological gender stereotypicality threats, these effects are stronger and more 
consistent for men than women (Rudman et al., 2007; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). 
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Additionally, men, but not women, experience anxiety in response to psychological gender 
stereotypicality threats (Vandello et al., 2008)—a disparity that has been attributed to a 
concept called precarious manhood (Vandello & Bosson, 2013). According to the theory of 
precarious manhood, manhood is a social status that must constantly be striven for, achieved, 
and maintained through actions, whereas womanhood is a physical status that once obtained, 
is permanent (Weaver et al., 2010).  
However, women not being as negatively affected as men are by psychological 
gender stereotypicality threats does not necessarily mean that women are not as negatively 
affected as men are by all types of gender stereotypicality threats. Rather, as tested in Chapter 
2, women and men might simply experience anxiety in response to gender stereotypicality 
threats in distinct domains. If when it comes to other people, but not oneself (as discussed 
earlier), femininity is defined largely in terms of physical appearance and masculinity largely 
in terms of behaviors and social roles, then one would expect women to experience threats 
to their physical femininity as threats to their identity and men to experience threats to their 
psychological masculinity as threats to their identity. In other words, if physical femininity is 
a core component of judgments of women’s overall femininity, as the evidence suggests, 
then if a woman identifies as feminine but does not have a feminine physical appearance, there 
will likely be a discrepancy between how feminine she is evaluated as and how feminine she 
feels. Similarly, if psychological masculinity is a core component of judgments of men’s 
overall masculinity, then if a man identifies as masculine but does not have a masculine 
personality, there will likely be a discrepancy between how masculine he is evaluated as and 
how masculine he feels. Given the research on consequences of identity invalidation (Albuja, 
Gaither, et al., 2019), these discrepancies will likely produce anxiety and reduced self-esteem. 
The final study in Chapter 2 of this dissertation investigates this prediction by examining 
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whether physical, but not psychological, gender stereotypicality threats produce a feeling of 
identity invalidation and therefore increased anxiety and reduced self-esteem in women 
whereas psychological, but not physical, gender stereotypicality threats produce a sense of 
identity invalidation and therefore increased anxiety and reduced self-esteem in men.   
Summary 
In this chapter, I have laid the groundwork for my dissertation research on women’s 
responses to physical femininity threats by clarifying key terms and mapping out the 
landscape of existing research on gender stereotypes, gender identity, identity invalidation, 
and physical appearance. Further, I have suggested that research on gender stereotypicality 
threats should broaden its scope to include threats to women’s physical gender stereotypicality 
and deepen its contribution by examining the mechanisms by which these threats may 
produce psychological distress. 
The majority of literature on gender stereotypes has focused on personality traits, 
social roles, and occupations and has revealed that within these domains, masculinity is 
prescribed (and femininity proscribed) for men and boys to a greater extent than femininity 
is prescribed (and masculinity proscribed) for women and girls. Accordingly, when men—
but not women—receive feedback that they are counter-stereotypical, they experience stress 
and anxiety. 
In this chapter, I have suggested that consideration of an often-neglected domain of 
gender stereotypes—physical appearance—could lead to a re-evaluation of this discrepancy 
between women and men. Physical appearances, I have suggested, are more central to lay 
conceptions of women’s femininity than men’s masculinity. Furthermore, women are 
expected to appear and are valued for appearing physically feminine. Accordingly, women 
may become distressed when their physical—but not their psychological—femininity has 
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been threatened. I have also suggested that women and men alike may experience identity 
invalidation when their gender stereotypicality has been threatened and that this felt 
discrepancy between internal identity and external feedback may help to explain experiences 
of increased anxiety and reduced self-esteem in the wake of such threats.  
Overview of Dissertation 
In this dissertation, I present four experimental studies. The goal of these studies, 
presented in Chapter 2, was to: (a) examine women’s psychological responses to physical 
femininity threats; (b) determine whether women and men experience psychological distress 
in response to threats to their gender stereotypicality within distinct—or overlapping—
domains; and (c) determine whether felt identity invalidation can help to explain why threats 
to gender stereotypicality cause psychological distress in the form of increased anxiety and 
reduced self-esteem. 
Across these four studies, I found that: (a) women experience increased anxiety and 
reduced self-esteem in response to threats to their physical femininity, as compared to 
affirmations of their physical femininity; (b) whereas men experience anxiety in response to 
masculinity threats, compared to affirmations, across the domains of physical appearance 
and personality, women only experience anxiety in response to femininity threats, compared 
to affirmations, within the domain of physical appearance; and (c) felt identity invalidation—
in the form of a discrepancy between an external evaluation of one’s gender stereotypicality 
and one’s internal identity—mediates the observed relationships between gender 
stereotypicality feedback and both anxiety and self-esteem. 
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I explore the theoretical and practical implications 
of this work and highlight key directions for future research. Overall, this dissertation 
highlights the importance of centering the experiences of women in psychological research. 
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Women may not experience distress in response to the exact same types of gender 
stereotypicality threats that men do; this does not mean, however, that they do not 
experience distress in response to any types of gender stereotypicality threats. Additionally, 
this work highlights the need for more research on the content and consequences of gender 
stereotypes within a frequently neglected domain: physical appearance. Finally, these studies 
indicate that psychological research on gender and physical appearance ought to move 
beyond its traditional focus on attractiveness and examine other facets of appearance, 
including gender stereotypicality, that may be highly consequential for both women’s and 
men’s psychological well-being. 
Table 1.2 
Key Terms 
feminine (as used when 
discussing gender 
stereotypes) 
descriptively or prescriptively stereotypical of women 
and/or girls  
femininity (as used when 
discussing gender 
stereotypes) 
Possession of an individual characteristic or set of 
characteristics that are descriptively or prescriptively 
stereotypical of women and/or girls 
gender identity “the quality and strength of the cognitive 
connections...that a person makes between the self and a 
gender category” (Tobin et al., 2010); as used here, a two-
dimensional construct consisting of: (a) one’s internal 
sense of one’s femaleness and maleness; and (b) one’s 
internal sense of one’s femininity and masculinity.  
gender prototype a mental representation of a highly typical or 
representative instance of a gender category (Brewer et 
al., 1981; Helgeson, 1994; Smith & Zarate, 1990) 
gender norms prescriptive (and potentially descriptive) beliefs about 
women, men, girls, and boys; can be used to refer 
specifically to beliefs about behaviors 
gender role stress  the stress experienced in situations that are thought to be 
more stressful for one gender group than another (Eisler 
& Skidmore, 1987; Gillespie & Eisler, 1992)—or, in other 
words, to the stress associated with being a member of a 
particular gender group 
 32 
gender stereotypes “consensual beliefs about the differing characteristics of 
men and women in our society” (Rosenkrantz et al., 
1968, p. 287) 
gender stereotypicality threats situations that suggest that a person is counter-
stereotypical—that is, non-adherent to descriptive and/or 
injunctive beliefs about their gender group and instead 
adherent to descriptive and/or injunctive beliefs about 
the other primary gender group; sometimes referred to as 
gender identity threats (Sinclair & Carlsson, 2013; Willer et 
al., 2013) or gender role threats (Bosson et al., 2009)  
identity invalidation the rejection, denial, or lack of recognition of one’s 
internal sense of self or one’s membership in a social 
group of which one considers oneself a part (Campbell & 
Troyer, 2007; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Franco & 
O’Brien, 2018); also known as identity denial 
masculine (as used when 
discussing gender 
stereotypes) 
descriptively or prescriptively stereotypical of men 
and/or boys 
masculinity (as used when 
discussing gender 
stereotypes) 
Possession of an individual characteristic or set of 
characteristics that are descriptively or prescriptively 
stereotypical of men and/or boys 
precarious manhood manhood as a social status that must constantly be 
striven for, achieved, and maintained through actions 
(Vandello & Bosson, 2013; Weaver et al., 2010) 
sex (or gender) role the collection of stereotypes associated with one gender 
or the other (Eagly & Karau, 2002) 
sex-typed (a) possessing characteristics that are prescriptively 
stereotypical of one’s gender group and not possessing 
characteristics that are prescriptively stereotypical of the 
other primary gender group (Bem, 1974; Spence & 
Helmreich, 1980); (b) aligned with a particular gender 
identity (Bailey & Zucker, 1995); or (c) normative or 
expected of or associated with one gender or the other 
(Wood et al., 1997) 
social identity threat a relatively broad construct that refers to any situation 
that puts one’s social identity (e.g., gender, race, religious 
group, etc.) in jeopardy (Reese et al., 2014) and that 
includes categorization threats (when one wants to be 
thought of as individual but is instead thought of in terms 
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of one’s group membership), distinctiveness threat (when 
one believes another group is “too” similar to one’s 
ingroup), threats to the value of social identity (when one’s 
ingroup is disparaged), and acceptance threats (when one is 
not thought to be a member of one’s ingroup, likely 
because they are a non-prototypical member) 
(Branscombe et al., 1999) 
social norms “rules and standards that are understood by members of 
a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior 
without the force of laws” (Cialdini & Trost, 1998, p. 
152) 
social roles “set[s] of expectations oriented toward people who 
occupy a certain ‘position’ in a social system or group” 
(Gouldner, 1957, p. 282) 
stereotype a generalized belief about a group of people (Ashmore & 
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Abstract 
Across four experiments (N = 2494 after exclusions), the authors found that cisgender 
women experience higher levels of anxiety (Studies 1a, 1c, and 2) and lower levels of self-
esteem (Studies 1c and 2) in response to feedback indicating that their physical appearance is 
less feminine than average (i.e., physical femininity threats) than feedback indicating that 
their physical appearance is more feminine than average (i.e., physical femininity 
affirmations). Feedback on the femininity of their personality had no effect on anxiety or 
self-esteem (Study 2). Physical femininity feedback had an effect on anxiety and self-esteem 
even when physical attractiveness was affirmed (in the case of anxiety; Study 1a) and even 
when controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness (in the case of both anxiety and 
self-esteem; Studies 1a and 1c), indicating that the observed effects of physical femininity 
feedback on anxiety and self-esteem were not simply a result of this feedback being 
interpreted as physical attractiveness feedback. Cisgender men, unlike women, experienced 
increased anxiety—but not reduced self-esteem—in response to threats to their masculinity 
across the domains of physical appearance and personality, though this effect was stronger 
within the domain of physical appearance (Study 2). A discrepancy between the results one 
received and one’s beliefs about oneself mediated the effects of feedback on both anxiety 
and self-esteem, in the case of women, and on anxiety, in the case of men (Study 2). 
Together, these results highlight the need to center physical appearance in research on 
gender stereotyping and its consequences. 
 
Keywords: anxiety, femininity, invalidation, self-esteem, stereotypes
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“Look like a lady; act like a man; work like a dog.” This was the final message of a 
1990 Fortune magazine piece on how gender discrimination has impeded women’s ascent up 
the corporate ladder (Fierman, 1990). In recent decades, several books and articles have 
advised women to engage in traditionally masculine behaviors if they want to succeed (e.g., 
Sandberg, 2013; Teague Moreno, 2019), and indeed, women are increasingly participating in 
traditionally masculine activities (Haines et al., 2016), pursuing degrees in traditionally 
masculine fields (Haines et al., 2016), and self-identifying with stereotypically masculine traits 
(Donnelly & Twenge, 2017), which are generally highly valued and often considered sexually 
attractive (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Feinman, 1981; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Schudson et al., 
2018). Women are also decreasingly self-identifying with stereotypically feminine traits 
(Donnelly & Twenge, 2017). Furthermore, there is some evidence that associations between 
women and traditionally feminine personality traits weakened over the course of the 20th 
century (Bhatia & Bhatia, 2020; but see Eagly et al., 2020). Perhaps as a consequence of the 
high status of masculine personality traits and the increasing acceptance of these traits in 
women, whereas men, on average, have been shown to experience anxiety in response to 
threats to their psychological gender stereotypicality (i.e., information suggesting that 
psychologically they are gender counter-stereotypical7), women, on average, have not 
 
7 Throughout this manuscript, we use the term “counter-stereotypicality,” rather than “non-
stereotypicality,” to refer to characteristics that sit in opposition to those that are expected of 
members of a social group. A person can be “non-stereotypical” by virtue of lacking 
characteristics that are expected of members of one’s social group or possessing 
characteristics that sit in opposition to those that are expected of members of a social group. 
“Counter-stereotypicality” refers solely to the latter. Within the context of gender, which is 
generally viewed as highly bipolar (with femininity on one end and masculinity on the other; 
Biernat, 1991), “counter-stereotypicality” refers to femininity in men and masculinity in 
women. Precedent for drawing a distinction between “non-stereotypicality” and “counter-
stereotypicality” can be found in early gender research that distinguished between individuals 
who were “cross-typed” (i.e., counter-stereotypical) and individuals who were 
“undifferentiated” (i.e., non-stereotypical but not counter-stereotypical; Bem, 1981). 
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(Vandello et al., 2008). Additionally, although both men and women experience reduced 
explicit self-esteem and increased fear of backlash after succeeding on a cross-sex-typed test, 
as compared to a sex-typed test, these effects have been stronger and more reliable for men 
than they have been for women (Rudman et al., 2007; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). The 
objective of the current research was to examine women’s psychological responses to threats 
to their gender stereotypicality within a novel domain—physical appearance—and, in doing 
so, to interrogate the prevailing understanding of gender stereotypicality threats as primarily 
affecting men, broaden the scope of inquiries into the consequences of gender stereotypes, 
and shed light on a possible underexamined contributor to negative psychological outcomes 
in women. 
As the guidance in Fortune magazine suggests, even though behaving in a more 
counter-stereotypical, masculine manner has become increasingly (albeit not yet completely) 
normative for women, the same has not been true for physical counter-stereotypicality. 
Historically, physical appearance has had a major influence on how women are judged 
(Burton et al., 1995), and this standard remains prominent today (Fairygodboss; Girlguiding, 
2013; Univia, 2019). The physical appearances of women in fields ranging from sports to 
politics remain highly scrutinized, and women who have a more masculine physical 
appearance are not only perceived as unattractive but are also criticized, mocked, and 
censured because they are deemed inadequately physically feminine by virtue of their 
muscularity, facial or body hair, or clothing (Chalabi, 2017; Clemente, 2016; Jespersen v. 
Harrah's Operating Co., 2006; Kendall, 2015). Physical appearance constitutes an important 
domain of gender stereotypes (i.e., of beliefs about what women and men are like and should 
be like; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Cejka & Eagly, 1999), and indeed, “males and females are 
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viewed as more different on physical dimensions than they are on psychological dimensions” 
(Deaux & Lewis, 1984, p. 1003). 
Nonetheless, studies on responses to gender stereotypicality threats have primarily 
threatened psychological gender stereotypicality. They have provided participants with false 
feedback about their “gender identity” (defined to participants as their “psychological 
masculinity or femininity;” J. Vandello, personal communication, January 24, 2017), “self-
concept” (Dahl et al., 2015), or simply their masculinity or femininity based on a “gender 
knowledge test” (e.g., Dahl et al., 2015; Rudman et al., 2007; Vandello et al., 2008), “gender 
identity survey” (the Bem Sex Role Inventory; Bem, 1974; Willer et al., 2013), personality test 
(e.g., Hunt et al., 2016; Konopka et al., 2019; Parent et al., 2018), and/or inventory of 
interests (Frederick et al., 2017) or consumer preferences (Cheryan et al., 2015). In these 
studies, all participants typically receive feedback indicating they are somewhat atypical—that 
is, different from the average person in their gender group—but whereas those in the threat 
condition receive feedback indicating that they are counter-stereotypically atypical, those in the 
affirmation condition receive feedback indicating that they are stereotypically atypical. In a few 
other studies, participants have received false feedback about their physical gender 
stereotypicality—for example, their strength and testosterone levels (Cheryan et al., 2015; 
Kosakowska-Berezecka et al., 2016). To our knowledge, however, no studies to date have 
provided participants with false feedback on the gender stereotypicality of their physical 
appearances. Furthermore, the majority of these studies have focused exclusively on men’s 
responses to masculinity threats (for some exceptions, see Rudman et al., 2007; Rudman & 
Fairchild, 2004; Vandello et al., 2008) and not on women’s responses to femininity threats. 
There are several reasons to believe that women would find threats to the femininity 
of their physical appearances particularly anxiety-provoking. First, evidence suggests that 
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physical appearance constitutes the domain of femininity that is most salient when people 
consider whether a woman is feminine overall (Spence & Sawin, 1985; Aube et al., 1995; but 
see Helgeson, 1994). Indeed, some theorists have asserted that physical appearance is not 
merely an important component of the female gender role but indeed its very essence—with 
society positioning women as objects to be seen and defining them by their “to-be-looked-
at-ness” (Mulvey, 1999, p. 837; Fredrickson et al., 1998). Correspondingly, fears related to 
physical appearance have been conceptualized as a key element of feminine gender role 
stress (Gillespie & Eisler, 1992). Additionally, when women are asked to complete the open-
ended sentence, “As a woman,” they mention physical appearances more than any other 
aspect of their experiences (other than gender-based discrimination, which is mentioned at 
comparable rates; Shea et al., 2014). And when people hear someone say that another person 
is or is not a “real woman,” they tend to believe the speaker is referring to something about 
that person’s physical appearance (J. Bosson, personal communication, February 9, 2021). 
Furthermore, in visual sex categorization tasks, only highly feminized faces and bodies are 
consistently categorized as female (e.g., Armann & Bülthoff, 2012; Davidenko, 2007; 
Johnson et al., 2012), suggesting that women, more so than men, must be highly gender 
stereotypical be categorized accurately. Finally, masculine-looking women, compared to 
feminine-looking women, masculine-looking men, and feminine-looking men, are described 
in overwhelmingly negative terms (Sutherland et al., 2015), suggesting that women must look 
sufficiently feminine to be judged positively. 
The pervasiveness of grooming among women—and the specific types of grooming 
that women tend to engage in—provides evidence that women are, indeed, invested in 
appearing physically feminine and therefore that threats to their physical femininity would 
likely induce anxiety. Women’s grooming constitutes not only “beauty work” (Kwan & 
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Trautner, 2009)—that is, labor intended to enhance physical attractiveness—but also 
femininity work (Chrisler, 2013)— that is, labor intended to enhance physical femininity. 
Facial characteristics that are more common in women than men—including high contrast 
between features and skin, smooth skin, and a lack of facial hair (Rhodes, 2006; Russell, 
2009)—are also generally considered attractive in women (Penton-Voak et al., 2004; Rhodes 
et al., 2000). Thus, when women remove facial hair and apply lipstick and eye makeup, they 
enhance their physical femininity. And indeed, the majority of women regularly use 
cosmetics, skin care products, and hair styling products, and up to 96% engage in some form 
of body hair removal (Harris Poll , 2014; Tiggemann & Hodgson, 2008; Toerien et al., 2005). 
Given that physical appearances constitute a key facet of femininity and womanhood, that 
having a highly feminine physical appearance is required for categorization as female, and 
that women invest heavily in cosmetic application and hair removal, even though threats to 
psychological femininity have not been shown to provoke anxiety in women, threats to 
physical femininity might. 
The goal of the current research was to determine whether women experience 
greater anxiety in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearances than 
affirmations of the femininity of their physical appearances, as well as whether physical 
femininity threats are particularly anxiety-inducing for women who consider their gender to 
be a core part of their overall sense of self and women who do not believe they have control 
over how feminine they look. We were also interested in whether women experience lower 
self-esteem in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearances than 
affirmations of the femininity of their physical appearances. State anxiety and state self-
esteem are moderately to highly negatively correlated (Besser et al., 2008; Heatherton & 
Polivy, 1991), and the same situations can threaten both (Spielberger, 1972, p. 490). They are 
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conceptually distinct, however, with the former representing an emotional response to a 
stimulus and the latter representing an attitude toward the self (Beck et al., 2005, p. 9; 
Rosenberg, 1962). A secondary goal of the current research was to determine whether 
physical femininity threats are distinguishable from physical attractiveness threats—that is, 
whether women find physical femininity threats anxiety-provoking even when their physical 
attractiveness has been affirmed. A tertiary goal was to determine whether the sense that 
one’s identity (as a woman, as female, as feminine, and/or overall) or sense of self is being 
denied (Cheryan & Monin, 2005) could help to explain the predicted effect of physical 
femininity threats on anxiety and potentially self-esteem among women. In other words, we 
were interested in identity invalidation as a potential mechanism underlying the predicted 
relationships between gender stereotypicality feedback and both anxiety and self-esteem. A 
final goal was to examine whether men, too, experience anxiety in response to threats to the 
masculinity of their appearances. By examining women’s responses to physical femininity 
threats (and, in the final study, men’s responses to physical masculinity threats), we aimed to 
shed light on potentially harmful consequences of gender stereotypes within the domain of 
physical appearance. 
The Current Research 
Because past work has demonstrated that unlike men, women do not experience 
anxiety in response to threats to their psychological gender stereotypicality (Vandello et al., 
2008) and because the general consensus within the field of psychology seems to be that 
masculinity is prescribed for men to a greater extent than femininity is prescribed for women 
(Sirin et al., 2004), the majority of research on gender stereotypicality threats has focused on 
masculinity threats and on consequences of the pressure on men to eschew femininity and 
embody ideals of traditional masculinity (e.g., Caswell et al., 2014; Himmelstein et al., 2018; 
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Kramer et al., 2017). As a result, this body of research may have missed out on important 
ways in which prescriptive gender stereotypes constrain and harm women. We cannot 
assume that women do not experience anxiety in response to any sorts of gender 
stereotypicality threats simply because they do not experience anxiety in response to the 
sorts of threats that have produced anxiety in men. Such an assumption can lead us to 
overlook unique elements of women’s experiences and to fail to consider the full range of 
risks that prescriptive gender stereotypes may present. Determining whether women are 
indeed vulnerable to psychological harm stemming from physical gender stereotypicality 
threats can help to provide a more comprehensive understanding of both the content and 
consequences of gender stereotypes.  
The aim of the current set of studies was therefore to examine women’s 
psychological responses to feedback indicating that they are—or are not—feminine in 
physical appearance. We predicted that women who were told their physical appearance was 
less feminine than the average female in their age group would experience more anxiety than 
women who were told their physical appearance was more feminine than the average female 
in their age group (i.e., also atypical, but in a stereotype-congruent way) (Studies 1a-c & 2), 
regardless of whether or not they were told that their physical appearance was more 
attractive than the average female in their age group (Studies 1a & 1b) and even when 
accounting for self-perceived physical attractiveness (Studies 1a-c). We also predicted that, 
consistent with past literature, women who were told their personality was less feminine than 
the average female in their age group would not experience more anxiety than women who 
were told their personality was more feminine than the average female in their age group but 
that men who were told their personality was less masculine than the average male in their 
age group would experience more anxiety than men who were told their personality was more 
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masculine than the average male in their age group (Study 2). Finally, we anticipated that a 
feeling of identity invalidation would help to explain the predicted effects of feedback about 
one’s gender stereotypicality (i.e., femininity for women and masculinity for men) on anxiety 
(Study 2). We also explored the effects of gender stereotypicality feedback on self-esteem 
and several other relevant variables. We only pre-registered formal hypotheses for anxiety, 
however, as our principal goal was to determine whether receiving information suggesting 
that one is physically gender counter-stereotypical would produce anxiety in women, just as 
receiving information suggesting that one is psychologically gender counter-stereotypical has 
been shown to produce anxiety in men (Vandello et al., 2008).  
Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c 
The primary purpose of Studies 1a-c was to determine whether cisgender women 
(i.e., women who were assigned to the female sex at birth) experience more anxiety in 
response to feedback indicating that they are less physically feminine than average compared 
with feedback indicating that they are more physically feminine than average. Study 1a tested 
this question. Study 1b sought to assess the robustness of the effect observed in Study 1a 
with a slightly different experimental set-up. Study 1c sought to reconcile the inconsistent 
results of Studies 1a and 1b. 
In all three studies, participants were told that their physical appearance would be 
assessed by novel image analysis software. After uploading photographs of themselves, they 
received feedback on their physical femininity. The feedback on their physical femininity was 
threatening (i.e., indicated that they were less feminine than average), affirming (i.e., indicated 
that they were more feminine than average), or, in Studies 1a and 1b, absent. Studies on 
masculinity and femininity threat typically include only a threat and an affirmation condition. 
However, in Studies 1a and 1b, we included a feedback absent condition, which served as a 
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control group, to examine whether the predicted effect of physical femininity feedback on 
anxiety was driven by participants whose femininity was threatened or those whose 
femininity was affirmed.  
Participants then reported their current levels of anxiety. We predicted that women 
who were told that their physical appearance was less feminine than average (i.e., those 
whose physical femininity was threatened) would experience higher levels of state anxiety 
than those who were told their physical appearance was more feminine than average (i.e., 
those whose physical femininity was affirmed). 
A secondary goal of these studies was to determine whether the predicted effect of 
physical femininity feedback on state anxiety was the result of women interpreting threats to 
their physical femininity as threats to their physical attractiveness. For women, physical 
femininity is considered a key component of—and thus highly predictive of—physical 
attractiveness (Penton-Voak et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2000), and physical attractiveness 
constitutes a gender-intensified prescriptive stereotype for women—that is, a characteristic 
that is valued in members of both major gender groups but in members of one gender group 
in particular (Parker et al., 2017; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Furthermore, the large majority 
of women in the U.S., but only a minority of men, say they face intense pressure to appear 
physically attractive (Parker et al., 2017). Thus, it is theoretically possible that women would 
experience anxiety in response to feedback indicating that they are less physically feminine 
than average because they would interpret this feedback as indicating that they are less 
physically attractive than average and would find the latter anxiety-provoking. However, given 
that in addition to attractiveness, gender conformity per se is heavily prescribed (e.g., 
Rudman, 1998) and gender nonconformity censured (Rudman et al., 2012), we did not 
expect that to be the case. Rather, we expected physical femininity threats to be anxiety-
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provoking for women independent of any threats to attractiveness that they might be 
thought to represent.  
We addressed the possibility that physical femininity threats would be anxiety-
provoking to women because they would be interpreted as physical attractiveness threats in 
three ways. First, in Studies 1a and 1b, we manipulated physical attractiveness feedback, such 
that participants were randomly assigned to receive affirming feedback or no feedback on 
their physical attractiveness. We expected physical femininity threats in and of themselves to 
be anxiety-inducing and therefore hypothesized that women would experience anxiety in 
response to threats to their physical femininity even when their physical attractiveness was 
affirmed. However, if physical femininity threats are anxiety-inducing because they represent 
physical attractiveness threats, we would expect to see an interaction between physical 
femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback, such that women would only 
experience anxiety in response to physical femininity threats when their physical 
attractiveness was not affirmed. Second, in all three studies, we examined whether physical 
femininity feedback had an effect on self-perceived physical attractiveness. Third, in all three 
studies we controlled for participants’ self-perceived physical attractiveness.  
We also sought to explore the possibility that cisgender women would experience 
not only anxiety but also reduced self-esteem in response to threats to their physical 
femininity, as compared to affirmations of their physical femininity. In past research, men 
have experienced lower levels of explicit self-esteem after succeeding in a gender counter-
stereotypical, as compared to a gender stereotypical, domain (Rudman et al., 2007). 
Additionally, threats to physical femininity could be interpreted as threats to identity —that is, 
not solely as information that one is not feminine in a very particular way (in terms of their 
looks) but that they are not feminine or even female on the inside, at their core. And past 
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work has suggested that identity invalidation (i.e., rejection of one’s membership in a group 
of which one considers oneself a part; Cheryan & Monin, 2005) may produce reductions in 
self-esteem (Garr-Schultz & Gardner, 2019; Townsend et al., 2009). Thus, we examined 
whether women who were told that their physical appearance was less feminine than average 
would experience lower levels of state self-esteem than women who were told their physical 
appearance was more feminine than average. We considered this aim exploratory, as we had 
a stronger theoretical rationale for predicting that physical femininity threats would produce 
anxiety than that they would reduce self-esteem but were interested in exploring both 
potential outcomes.  
Finally, we were interested in potential moderators of the predicted effect of physical 
femininity feedback on state anxiety, as well as additional psychological outcomes, beyond 
anxiety and self-esteem, that threats to physical femininity might produce. In Study 1a, we 
considered the possibility that threats to physical femininity would be more anxiety-
provoking for women who consider their gender to be a key facet of their overall sense of 
self than those who do not and less anxiety-provoking for women who believe their 
femininity is controllable than those who do not. In other words, we examined whether 
gender identity centrality (Rogers et al., 2015) and perceived controllability of femininity 
moderated the predicted effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety. In Study 1c, 
we considered the possibility that to cope with threats to their femininity, women who 
received feedback indicating that they were less physically feminine than average would: (a) 
make more external, situational attributions for their results than women who received 
feedback indicating that they were more physically feminine than average (Blaine & Crocker, 
1993; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Kinderman & Bentall, 2000); (b) downplay the 
importance of their results (Frey & Stahlberg, 1986; Kashima & Triandis, 1986); and (c) 
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downplay the centrality of femininity to their overall sense of self (Aronson et al., 1995; Frey 
& Stahlberg, 1986).  
Study 1a 
The purpose of Study 1a was to establish the basic predicted phenomenon that 
cisgender women would experience higher levels of state anxiety in response to threats to 
their physical femininity than affirmations of their physical femininity. 
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six 
conditions in a 3 (physical femininity feedback: affirmation, control, threat) x 2 (physical 
attractiveness feedback: affirmation, control) design. Participants were recruited through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and paid $1.00 for their participation. 
Because we had no specific predictions about effect size, we powered this study to 
detect an effect of f = 0.2, which is the average effect size for social psychology studies 
(Richard et al., 2003). An a priori power analysis (G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007) indicated 
that to detect an interaction between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness 
feedback with 80% power and α of .05, a sample of 244 participants would be needed. Based 
on previous studies with MTurk samples, we estimated that 15% of participants would fail 
the attention checks and thus recruited 287 participants. An additional nine participants 
ended up completing the study for a total sample size of 296.  
Eighty participants were excluded because they did not identify as a cisgender female 
(n=12)8, did not upload a valid photograph (i.e., did not upload a photograph or uploaded a 
 
8 In all studies, participants were asked to report the sex they were assigned at birth, on their 
original birth certificate, and their gender identity. We chose to exclude transgender 
individuals from these studies primarily for ethical reasons. As with all studies that involve 
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photograph without any woman or with more than one woman in it; n=7), failed one or 
more attention checks (which required them to accurately recall whether their results 
indicated that their physical appearance was [a] more or less feminine than the average 
female in their age group—or whether they did not receive feedback on the femininity of 
their physical appearance and [b] more or less attractive than the average female in their age 
group—or whether they did not receive feedback on their attractiveness; n=61), and/or 
indicated that they intended some of their responses as jokes (n=4). Thus, we were left with 
a sample size of 216 (Mage = 37.13, SD = 11.96; 86.11% heterosexual; 81.02% White; 6.94% 
Black; 2.31% Hispanic or Latina; 1.39% East Asian; 0.46% Native Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander; 7.88% other or multiracial/ethnic). Because the final sample size was smaller than 
intended, we conducted a sensitivity power analysis (G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007), which 
 
deception and potentially upsetting feedback, we conducted a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine whether the knowledge gained from these studies would outweigh any potential 
harms to participants. In the case of transgender individuals, for whom experiences with 
identity denial (in the form of misgendering) are relatively common and often detrimental to 
psychological wellbeing (McLemore, 2018), we determined that it would not. Furthermore, 
transgender women’s desire to possess a feminine physical appearance, though not universal 
(Nieder et al. 2019; Spade, 2003), has already been documented (Anderson et al., 2020; 
Sevelius, 2013). Many transgender women undergo medical procedures, including some that 
are costly and/or risky, to increase the femininity of their appearance, including their body 
shape, facial structure, and amount of facial and body hair (Grant et al., 2011; Kelly et al., 
2020; Plemons, 2017; White Hughto et al., 2015). And transgender women report that these 
procedures increase the alignment between their external appearance and internal sense of 
self (Dubov & Fraenkel, 2018; Owen-Smith et al., 2018). Thus, we did not believe including 
transgender women in this sample could be justified. Further, at a practical level, the sorts of 
femininity threats that transgender women tend to experience are often different not only in 
degree but also in kind from the sorts of femininity threats that cisgender women tend to 
experience. Threats to cisgender women’s femininity generally take the form of 
stereotypicality or prototypicality threats; they indicate that a woman is not “woman-like” in 
the way most women are or in the way women ought to be. Threats to transgender women’s 
femininity, on the other hand, often suggest that a woman is not only insufficiently “woman-
like” but also that in a very literal sense, she is not a woman. Thus, our interest in 
stereotypicality threats, rather than true denial of category membership, also informed our 
decision to focus on cisgender individuals in the current studies. All transgender individuals 
who enrolled in these studies were paid for their time. 
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indicated that we were powered to detect an effect of f = 0.21 (with 80% power and α = 
.05).  
Procedure. After reading the consent form, answering a series of question to 
confirm that they had carefully read the form, and agreeing to participate, participants were 
instructed to upload a photograph of themselves. They were told that the photograph would 
be analyzed by software that they would be given more information about later on. 
Specifically, they were instructed to upload a color photograph of their face in which they 
were directly facing the camera and had a neutral facial expression and both eyes open. They 
were then instructed to center the photograph. After uploading the photograph, participants 
were told that their photograph was being analyzed. 
Participants were then presented with information about a fictitious “data consulting 
and software development firm” that was partnering with researchers in the departments of 
psychology and computer science to beta-test a new image analysis software. They were told 
that the software uses a neural network to assess the masculinity/femininity and 
attractiveness of one’s facial appearance, compared to the appearances of others in one’s 
gender and age group. To maximize consistency in participants’ understandings of femininity 
and masculinity, we provided them with lists of the facial features that allegedly play the 
greatest role in determining the perceived masculinity/femininity of one’s appearance. These 
features (masculine: coarse skin texture, pronounced jawline, pronounced cheekbones, 
pronounced brow ridges, thin lips, small eyes, facial hair; feminine: smooth skin texture, does 
not have pronounced jawline, does not have pronounced cheekbones, does not have 
pronounced brow ridges, thick lips, large eyes, does not have facial hair) were taken from 
research on sex differences in facial appearances (Johnson et al., 2012; Rhodes, 2006).  
 58 
Participants were also provided with lists of the facial features that allegedly play the 
greatest role in determining the perceived attractiveness of one’s appearance. These features 
(facial symmetry, feature positioning and alignment, proportionality, ease of processing 
[fluency]) were taken from research on physical attractiveness (Abu Arqoub & Al-Khateeb, 
2011; Bashour, 2006; Fink et al., 2006; Johnston et al., 2005; Little et al., 2011; Trujillo et al., 
2014). Because we aimed to tease apart the effects of physical femininity feedback and 
physical attractiveness feedback, we omitted physically feminine traits from the list of 
physically attractive traits and instead focused on traits that are not overtly gendered.  
Participants were then presented with the supposed results of the software’s analysis 
of their photograph. At this point, they were randomly assigned to the physical femininity 
affirmation condition (in which they were told their appearance was “more feminine than 
73% of females in [their] age group”9), the physical femininity threat condition (in which 
they were told their appearance was “less feminine than 73% of females in [their] age 
group”), or the physical femininity control condition (in which they were told that an error 
had occurred and their physical femininity could not be analyzed). Results were provided in 
both written and graphic form, with participants’ level of femininity placed on a spectrum 
that ranged from “masculine appearance” to “feminine appearance.” For participants in the 
affirmation condition, the results indicated that their level of femininity was more feminine 
than the “average female.” For participants in the threat condition, the results indicated that 
their level of femininity was lower than the “average female” but higher than the “average 
 
9 We used the terms “female” (and “male,” in Study 2) rather than “woman” (and “man”) in 
our study materials to be inclusive of both participants who identified as “women” (and 
“men”) and those who identified as “girls” (and “boys” or “guys”) (Chrisler, 2013). 
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male” (and closer to the “average male” than the “average female”). These results were 
modified from those used by Vandello et al. (2008). 
Participants were also randomly assigned to the physical attractiveness affirmation 
condition (in which they were told their appearance was “more attractive than 85% of 
females in [their] age group”) or the physical attractiveness control condition (in which they 
were told that an error had occurred and their physical attractiveness could not be analyzed). 
Again, results were provided in both written and graphic form, with participants’ level of 
attractiveness placed on a spectrum that ranged from “unattractive appearance” to 
“attractive appearance.”  
After reviewing their results, participants were instructed to complete measures of 
state anxiety, state self-esteem, self-perceived attractiveness, gender identity centrality, and 
perceived controllability of femininity, as well as a manipulation check, all of which are 
described in the Measures section in the order in which they were administered. Participants 
also reported demographic information, completed an attention check, and indicated 
whether they had intended any of their responses as jokes. Participants were also asked 
whether they thought the results they had received were accurate and legitimate. We initially 
included questions about accuracy and legitimacy so that we could exclude participants who 
were suspicious of their results. However, we later realized that these were leading questions 
and thus not a valid measure of suspicion. Thus, we did not use responses to these questions 
as a basis for exclusion. We used more nuanced measures of suspicion in the following 
studies. (Of the four studies presented in this manuscript, Study 1a was the only one that was 
not preregistered.) 
After responding to these questions, participants read a debriefing form and 
answered a series of question to confirm that they had carefully read and understood the 
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form. Finally, they completed a self-affirmation induction exercise (Cohen et al., 2006) 
designed to help them psychologically recover from potential threats to their positive sense 
of self. 
Measures. For all studies, measures are described in the order in which they were 
presented to participants. The primary dependent variable of interest was state anxiety. We 
intended to measure global state-self-esteem as an exploratory dependent variable, but due 
to a programming error, we were unable to do so. (We measured state self-esteem in Studies 
1b,1c, and 2). Measures of gender identity centrality and perceived controllability of 
femininity were included as exploratory moderators. A measure of self-perceived physical 
femininity was included as a manipulation check, and a measure of self-perceived physical 
attractiveness was included as both a manipulation check and a covariate. For correlations 

























































































































































































































































































































State anxiety. Participants completed the 6-item short form version of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992), in which they were asked to indicate, on a 4-point scale 
(1=Not at all, 2=Somewhat, 3=Moderately, 4=Very much), the extent to which each of the 
following statements represented how they felt at the moment: “I feel calm” (R); “ I am 
tense;” “I feel upset;” “I am relaxed” (R); “I feel content” (R); “I am worried.” This scale 
demonstrated high internal reliability (α = .87). 
Self-perceived physical attractiveness. We measured self-perceived physical attractiveness for three 
reasons: (a) to assess the effectiveness of the physical attractiveness manipulation (i.e., as a 
manipulation check); (b) to determine whether the physical femininity manipulation had an 
effect on self-perceived physical attractiveness; and (c) to use as a covariate in our primary 
analyses. Self-perceived physical attractiveness was measured using a single-item, 7-point 
measure. Participants rated their physical attractiveness on a scale ranging from “I am not 
very physically attractive” to “I am very physically attractive” (Wade, 2000)10. We also 
measured self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality for 
exploratory purposes (see Supplemental Materials). 
Self-perceived physical femininity. We assessed the effectiveness of the physical femininity 
manipulation by asking participants to rate the femininity of their physical appearance, 
compared to the average female in their age group, on a 7-point scale ranging from “Much 
less feminine” to “Much more feminine.”  
 
10 Participants also completed the Self-Perceived Sexual Attractiveness scale (SPSA; Amos & 
McCabe, 2015). However, this measure was included solely for use in an undergraduate 
senior thesis and therefore was not analyzed for the current manuscript. 
 63 
Gender identity centrality.11 We measured gender identity centrality using a modified version of 
the identity subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). 
Participants rated their agreement with the following statements on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree): “Being a female is an important part of my 
self image;” “Being a female is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (R);” 
“Being a female is an important reflection of who I am;” “Being a female has very little to do 
with how I feel about myself (R);” “Being feminine is an important part of my self image;” 
“Being feminine is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (R);” “Being 
feminine is an important reflection of who I am;” “Being feminine has very little to do with 
how I feel about myself (R).” We originally intended to analyze items related to “female” and 
“feminine” identity separately, with the former items tapping into strength of gender 
identification or the “importance of belonging to the category” female (Becker & Wagner, 
2009). However, a factor analysis using principal components analysis with varimax rotation 
revealed that all of the items loaded onto a single factor (see Supplemental Materials for 
factor loadings and correlation matrix). Thus, all eight items were averaged to form a 
composite gender identity centrality score with high internal reliability (α = .93). 
Perceived controllability of femininity. We were interested in the possibility that perceived 
controllability of femininity would moderate the effect of physical femininity feedback on 
state anxiety—specifically, that threats to physical femininity would be less anxiety-
provoking for women who consider their femininity to be largely under their control than 
those who do not. We measured perceived controllability of femininity using items adapted 
 
11 The order in which participants completed the measures of gender identity centrality and 
perceived controllability of femininity was randomly assigned, such that half of the 
participants completed the gender identity centrality measure first and the other half 
completed the perceived controllability of femininity measure first. 
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from the Weight Locus of Control Scale (Saltzer, 1982). Participants rated their agreement 
with the following items on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree): “How 
feminine I look is entirely up to me;” “Having a feminine appearance is largely a matter of 
chance (R);” “No matter what I do, the femininity of my appearance will remain largely 
unchanged (R);” “I can control the femininity of my appearance in the way I desire;” “How 
feminine I act is entirely up to me;” “Having a feminine personality is largely a matter of 
chance (R);” “No matter what I do, the femininity of my personality will remain largely 
unchanged (R);” “I can control the femininity of my personality in the way I desire.” 
Although we originally intended to analyze items related to appearance and personality 
separately, a factor analysis using principal components analysis with varimax rotation 
revealed three distinct factors with unexpected loading patterns. The four non-reverse-coded 
items loaded onto a distinct dimension, and each pair of reverse-coded items loaded onto a 
distinct dimension (e.g., “Having a feminine appearance is largely a matter of chance” and 
“Having a feminine personality is largely a matter of chance” loaded onto the same 
dimension). Neither all of the appearance-related items considered together (α = .57) nor all 
of the personality-related items considered together (α = .42) constituted a reliable scale. 
When all of the items were considered together, the scale was slightly more internally reliable 
(α = .63). We proceeded with our planned analyses, with all appearance-related and 
personality-related items averaged to form a single perceived controllability of femininity 
score. These analyses should be interpreted with caution, however, given that the items used 
did not constitute a highly reliable scale. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks. To determine whether we had successfully manipulated self-
perceived physical femininity and to examine whether physical attractiveness feedback had 
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any effect on self-perceived physical femininity, we conducted a 3 x 2 between-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness 
feedback as the independent variables and self-perceived physical femininity as the 
dependent variable. As intended, there was a main effect of physical femininity feedback on 
self-perceived physical femininity, F(2, 210) = 68.22, p < .001, f = 0.80, such that participants 
in the threat condition perceived themselves as less physically feminine (M = 3.31, SD = 
1.20) than participants in the control condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.04) and participants in the 
control condition perceived themselves as less physically feminine than participants in the 
affirmation condition (M = 5.34, SD = 1.10; all Tukey’s honestly significant difference 
[HSD] test ps < .001). There was no effect of physical attractiveness feedback on self-
perceived physical femininity, F(1, 210) = 0.36, p = .550, f = .03, nor an interactive effect of 
physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical 
femininity, F(2, 210) = 1.06, p = .349, f = 0.08. 
Next, to determine whether we had successfully manipulated self-perceived physical 
attractiveness and to examine whether physical femininity feedback had any effect on self-
perceived physical attractiveness, we conducted another 3 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA 
with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the independent 
variables and self-perceived physical attractiveness as the dependent variable. Unexpectedly, 
there was no effect of physical attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical 
attractiveness, F(1, 210) = 3.65, p = .057, f = .13, though the results were trending in the 
intended direction, with participants in the affirmation condition perceiving themselves as 
more physically attractive (M = 4.54, SD = 1.45) than participants in the control condition 
(M = 4.19, SD = 1.51).  
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Also somewhat surprisingly, given that femininity constitutes a key component of 
attractiveness in women (Penton-Voak et al., 2004; Rhodes et al., 2000), there was no effect 
of physical femininity feedback on self-perceived physical attractiveness, F(2, 210) = 0.85, p 
= .431, f = .09, nor an interactive effect of physical femininity feedback and physical 
attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical attractiveness, F(2, 210) = 0.56, p = .575, f 
= .07. 
Self-perceived physical femininity and self-perceived physical attractiveness were 
moderately correlated, r(214) = 0.33, p < .001. 
Primary Analyses. To determine whether, as predicted, physical femininity 
feedback had an effect on state anxiety regardless of physical attractiveness feedback, we ran 
an ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the 
independent variables and state anxiety as the dependent variable. As predicted, there was a 
medium-size main effect of physical femininity feedback, F(2, 210) = 4.68, p = .010, f = .21, 
such that participants in the threat condition (M = 1.91, SD = 0.67) reported higher levels of 
state anxiety than participants in the affirmation condition (M = 1.60, SD = 0.61; Tukey’s 
HSD p = .006) (see Table 2.2 for means from all studies). There was no difference in levels 
of state anxiety between participants in the threat condition and those in the control 
condition (M = 1.71, SD = 0.59; Tukey’s HSD p =.181) nor between participants in the 
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 Threat  Affirmation  Control 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Study 1a      
Female participants 1.91 (0.67)a  1.60 (0.61)b  1.71 (0.59)ab 
Study 1b      
Female participants 1.87 (0.64)a  1.86 (0.62)a  1.94 (0.65)a 
Study 1c      
Female participants 2.06 (0.72)  1.77 (0.67)  ----- 
Study 2      
Female participants 2.15 (0.67)  1.83 (0.64)  ----- 
  Male participants 1.89 (0.62)  1.67 (0.60)  ----- 
Note. Means that share a superscript (e.g., a) are not significantly different from other means 
on the same row 
 
There was also no effect of physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(1, 
210) = 2.67, p = .104, f = .11, nor an interactive effect of physical femininity feedback and 
physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(2, 210) = 0.09, p = .915, f = .03.  
Because we sought to determine whether physical femininity threats produced 
anxiety even in the presence of affirmations of physical attractiveness, we broke down the 
data by physical attractiveness feedback condition. We found that participants whose 
physical femininity was threatened reported significantly higher levels of state anxiety than 
those whose physical femininity was affirmed within both the physical attractiveness control 
condition (M = 1.98, SD = 0.73 vs. M = 1.65, SD = 0.70; t(79) = -2.03, p = .046, d = 0.45) 
and the physical attractiveness affirmation condition (M = 1.83, SD = 0.58 vs. M = 1.56, SD 
= 0.54; t(81) = -2.20, p = .030, d = 0.49).  
For a more conservative analysis, we then re-ran our primary analysis as an analysis 
of covariance (ANCOVA) with self-perceived physical attractiveness included as a covariate. 
Controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness, which significantly predicted state 
anxiety, F(1, 209) = 31.86, p < .001, f = 0.38, we observed a comparable effect of physical 
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femininity feedback on state anxiety, F(2, 209) = 5.43, p = .005, f = 0.21. Again, neither 
physical attractiveness feedback, F(1, 209) = 0.99, p = .320, f = 0.06, nor the interaction 
between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback, F(2, 209) = 0.18, 
p = .833, f = 0.04, had an effect on state anxiety.12 
Exploratory Analyses. 
Gender identity centrality. Because we were interested in gender identity centrality as a potential 
moderator of the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, we first wanted to 
confirm that the manipulations had no effect on levels of gender identity centrality. We 
found that neither physical femininity feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback—nor 
the interaction between the two—had any effect on gender identity centrality (ps > .50). 
Thus, we conducted an exploratory analysis to determine whether gender identity centrality 
moderated the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety. We ran a linear 
regression with physical femininity feedback (dummy coded with affirmation as the 
reference group) and gender identity centrality (mean-centered) as predictors and state 
anxiety as the outcome variable. Gender identity centrality did not predict levels of state 
anxiety, B = 0.01, SE = 0.03, p = .651, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) [-0.04, 0.07]. We then 
added the interactions between these variables to the model. Neither interaction between 
physical femininity feedback (dummy coded) and gender identity centrality was significant 
(control vs. affirmation: B = -0.02, SE = 0.08, p = .803, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.13]; threat vs. 
affirmation: B = 0.11, SE = 0.07, p = .082, 95% CI  [-0.01, 0.24]).  
 
12 Because the plurality of participants (n=48; 22.22% of the sample) reported no anxiety and 
thus the distribution of state anxiety was positively-skewed, we also transformed state 
anxiety into a binary variable with 0=anxiety absent and 1=anxiety present and conducted a 
binary logistic regression to determine whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on 
whether participants reported any state anxiety. See Supplemental Materials. 
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Given that we did not power the current study to detect these interactions and that 
the physical femininity feedback (threat vs. affirmation) x gender identity centrality 
interaction was in the expected direction, however, we plotted the simple effects that made 
up this interaction. As shown in Figure 2.1, the effect of physical femininity feedback (threat 
vs. affirmation) on state anxiety appeared to be driven by participants high in gender identity 
centrality whose physical femininity was threatened. At low levels of gender identity 
centrality (1 SD below the mean), there was no effect of physical femininity feedback on 
anxiety (threat vs. affirmation: B = 0.15, SE = 0.14, p = .277, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.42]; control 
vs. affirmation: B = 0.14, SE = 0.16, p = .408, 95% CI [-0.19, 0.46]; threat vs. control: B = 
0.01, SE = 0.16, p = .934, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.34]). At high levels of gender identity centrality (1 
SD above the mean), on the other hand, there was an effect of physical femininity feedback 
on anxiety (threat vs. affirmation: B = 0.49, SE = 0.14, p < .001, 95% CI [0.21, 0.76]; control 
vs. affirmation: B = 0.08, SE = 0.16, p = .624, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.39]; threat vs. control: B = 
0.41, SE = 0.17 p = .016, 95% CI [0.08, 0.74]), such that those whose femininity had been 
threatened reported higher levels of anxiety than those whose femininity had been affirmed 
and those who received no feedback on their femininity. Furthermore, although there was 
no significant effect of gender identity centrality on anxiety among participants in any of the 
three femininity feedback conditions, among those in the threat condition, this effect was 
trending in the expected direction, with increasing levels of gender identity centrality 
predicting increasing levels of anxiety, B = 0.09, SE = 0.05, p = .080, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.20].  
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Figure 2.1. State anxiety by femininity feedback condition and gender identity centrality 
 
Perceived controllability of femininity. Again, because we were interested in perceived 
controllability of femininity as a potential moderator of the effect of physical femininity 
feedback on state anxiety, we first wanted to confirm that the manipulations had no effect 
on perceived controllability of femininity. We found that neither physical femininity 
feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback—nor the interaction between the two—had 
any effect on perceived controllability of femininity (ps > .15). Thus, we conducted an 
exploratory analysis to determine whether perceived controllability of femininity moderated 
the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety. We ran a linear regression with 
physical femininity feedback (dummy coded, again with affirmation as the reference group) 
and perceived controllability of femininity (mean-centered) as predictors and state anxiety as 
the outcome variable. Perceived controllability of femininity predicted state anxiety, B = -




















their femininity was controllable, the less state anxiety they reported (with a 1-point increase 
in perceived controllability on a 6-point scale predicting a 0.25-point decrease in state anxiety 
on a 4-point scale). We then added the interactions between these variables to the model. 
Neither interaction between physical femininity feedback (dummy coded) and perceived 
controllability of femininity was significant (control vs. affirmation: B = 0.08, SE = 0.14, p = 
.580, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.36]; threat vs. affirmation: B = 0.08, SE = 0.14, p =.564, 95% CI [-
0.20, 0.37]).  
Study 1b 
In Study 1a, before receiving feedback on their physical appearance, all participants 
were presented with lists of the facial features said to play the greatest role in determining 
the perceived masculinity/femininity and attractiveness of one’s appearance. These lists 
made the bipolar nature of facial femininity and masculinity particularly salient and framed 
facial femininity as a lack of facial masculinity (with, for example, “facial hair” presented as a 
masculine feature and “does not have facial hair” presented as a feminine feature). The 
purpose of Study 1b was to test the robustness of the phenomenon established in Study 1a 
by examining whether the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety replicated 
when participants were not presented with these lists of facial features.  
Method 
Hypotheses, methods, and analyses for this study were preregistered (see 
https://osf.io/va2fu/?view_only=45c5120cd4d24e6aae56dd25457bbc56).  
Participants and Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six 
conditions in a 3 (physical femininity feedback: affirmation, control, threat) x 2 (physical 
attractiveness feedback: affirmation, control) design. Participants were recruited through 
Prolific Academic and paid $1.84 for their participation. 
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As with Study 1a, we sought to include 244 participants in our final sample. Because 
we had to exclude 27% of participants from Study 1a, we estimated that 334 participants 
would need to be recruited to achieve this sample size. Thus, we recruited 334 participants. 
An additional seven participants ended up completing the study for a total sample size of 
341.  
Ninety-five participants were excluded because they did not identify as a cisgender 
female (n=3), did not upload a valid photograph (i.e., did not upload a photograph or 
uploaded a photograph without any woman or with more than one woman in it; n=7), failed 
one or more attention checks (which, as in Study 1a, required them to accurately recall the 
direction of the results they had received—i.e., whether the results indicated that their 
physical appearance was more or less feminine [and attractive] than average—or whether 
they had not received any results; n=63), indicated that they intended some of their 
responses as jokes (n=2), and/or clearly believed that the feedback they received was not 
produced by image analysis software (as determined by pre-registered criteria, which are 
described in the Procedure section; n=26). Thus, we were left with a sample size of 246 (Mage 
= 33.37, SD =11.16; 72.36% heterosexual; 73.17% White; 9.35% Black; 4.07% Hispanic or 
Latina; 4.07% East Asian; 0.81% South Asian; 0.41% Native American or Alaskan Native; 
8.13 % other or multiracial/ethnic). 
Procedure. The procedure was nearly identical to that of Study 1a with a few 
exceptions. Most critically, whereas participants in Study 1a were presented with lists of the 
facial features said to play the greatest role in determining the perceived facial 
masculinity/femininity and attractiveness of one’s appearance, participants in Study 1b were 
not. Also, instead of simply reading about the fictitious image analysis software, participants 
in Study 1b watched a brief informational video that described it (see Supplemental 
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Materials). The video provided a more detailed description of how the software was 
developed (using “deep learning”) and used graphics to represent this process. Study 1b also 
included a series of “beta testing” questions about the software, which were intended to 
bolster the credibility of the manipulation. 
Additionally, Study 1b omitted the measures of gender identity centrality and 
perceived controllability of femininity, which were included in Study 1a for exploratory 
purposes and which were not central to the questions being pursued in this follow-up study. 
It included the measure of state self-esteem (described in the Measures section) that was 
omitted from Study 1a due to a programming error. For exploratory purposes, it also 
included a measure of participants’ desire to switch their photograph (see Supplemental 
Materials). This measure was administered following the measures of state anxiety and state 
self-esteem, as well as the manipulation checks. 
Finally, in this study we probed for participant suspicion using a series of pre-
registered questions. The first question asked participants to describe their thoughts and/or 
feelings about their results. The second asked if they had any reservations about their results. 
If they indicated that they had reservations, they were asked to describe these reservations. 
They were then asked what they thought the study was testing and were given the 
opportunity to provide additional comments. These responses were coded for suspicion by 
two coders using the following coding scheme: 0=no indication of suspicion; 1=participant 
suspects that the feedback might not have been produced by image analysis software and/or 
there is some indication that the participant is suspicious; 2=participant seems certain that 
the feedback was not produced by image analysis software. A two-way random effects model 
indicated high inter-rater reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient [ICC] = .87, 95% CI 
[.76, .85]). Participants were excluded if both coders rated their suspicion level as 2. 
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Measures. As in Study 1a, the primary dependent variable of interest was state 
anxiety. A measure of state self-esteem was included as an exploratory dependent variable. 
Also as in Study 1a, a measure of self-perceived physical femininity was included as a 
manipulation check, and a measure of self-perceived physical attractiveness was included as 
both a manipulation check and a covariate. For correlations among all measured variables, 
















































































































































































































































































State anxiety. As in Study 1a, participants completed the 6-item short form version of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). The scale demonstrated high 
internal reliability (α = .86). 
State self-esteem. Participants rated their agreement with the following items, taken and 
modified from the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) on a scale of 1 (Not 
at all) to 5 (Extremely): “I feel confident;” “I am worried about how I am regarded;” “I feel 
satisfied with myself right now;” “I am dissatisfied with myself;” “I feel self-conscious;” “I 
feel displeased with myself;” “I feel good about myself;” “I am pleased with myself right 
now;” “I am worried about what other people think of me;” “I feel inferior to others at this 
moment;” “I feel concerned about the impression I am making.” This scale demonstrated 
high internal reliability (α = .94). State self-esteem was highly correlated with state anxiety, 
r(244) = -0.59, p < .001.  
Self-perceived physical attractiveness. We measured self-perceived physical attractiveness using the 
single-item, 7-point measure used in Study 1a. As in Study 1a, we also measured self-
perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality for exploratory purposes 
(see Supplemental Materials). 
Self-perceived physical femininity. We assessed the effectiveness of the physical femininity 
manipulation by asking participants to rate their physical femininity using the single-item, 7-
point scale used in Study 1a. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks. First, to determine whether we had successfully manipulated 
self-perceived physical femininity and to examine whether physical attractiveness feedback 
had any effect on self-perceived physical femininity, we conducted a 3 x 2 between-subjects 
ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the 
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independent variables and self-perceived physical femininity as the dependent variable. As 
intended, there was a main effect of physical femininity feedback on self-perceived physical 
femininity, F(2, 240) = 46.30, p < .001, f = 0.61, such that participants in the threat condition 
perceived themselves as less physically feminine (M = 3.35, SD = 1.24) than those in the 
control condition (M = 4.52, SD = 1.18) and participants in the control condition perceived 
themselves as less physically feminine than those in the affirmation condition (M = 5.08, SD 
= 1.19; all Tukey’s HSD test ps < .020).  
There was no effect of physical attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical 
femininity, F(1, 240) = 1.30, p = .256, f = 0.06, nor an interactive effect of physical 
femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback on self-perceived physical 
femininity, F(2, 240) = 0.15, p = .861, f = 0.03. 
Next, to determine whether we had successfully manipulated self-perceived physical 
attractiveness and to examine whether physical femininity feedback had any effect on self-
perceived physical attractiveness, we conducted another 3 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA 
with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the independent 
variables and self-perceived physical attractiveness as the dependent variable. Surprisingly, 
neither physical attractiveness feedback nor physical femininity feedback–nor the interaction 
between the two–significantly affected self-perceived physical attractiveness, all ps > .30. 
Self-perceived physical femininity and self-perceived physical attractiveness were 
moderately to highly correlated, r(244) = 0.42, p < .001. 
Primary Analyses. To determine whether, as predicted, physical femininity 
feedback had an effect on state anxiety regardless of physical attractiveness feedback, we ran 
an ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the 
independent variables and state anxiety as the dependent variable. Contrary to our 
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hypothesis and in contrast with Study 1a, there was no main effect of physical femininity 
feedback on state anxiety, F(2, 240) = 0.34, p = .715, f = 0.05 (see Table 2.2 for means). 
There was, however, a main effect of physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(1, 
240) = 8.32, p = .004, f = 0.18, such that participants in the attractiveness control condition 
(M = 2.00, SD = 0.63) reported higher levels of state anxiety than participants in the 
attractiveness affirmation condition (M = 1.75, SD = 0.60). There was no interactive effect 
of physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(2, 
240) = 1.29, p = .276, f = 0.10. 
We re-ran this analysis as an ANCOVA, with self-perceived physical attractiveness 
included as a covariate. Controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness, which 
significantly predicted state anxiety, F(1, 239) = 12.49, p < .001, f = 0.22, there was still an 
effect of physical attractiveness feedback on state anxiety, F(1, 239) = 7.43, p = .007, f = 
0.17. Again, neither physical femininity feedback, F(2, 239) = 0.20, p = .822, f = 0.04, nor the 
interaction between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback, F(2, 
239) = 1.10, p = .334, f = 0.09, had an effect on state anxiety.13  
Exploratory Analyses. 
State self-esteem. To examine whether physical femininity and/or physical attractiveness 
feedback influenced levels of state self-esteem, we ran an ANOVA with physical femininity 
feedback and physical attractiveness feedback as the independent variables and state self-
esteem as the dependent variable. There was no main effect of physical femininity feedback, 
F(2, 240) = 0.16, p = .849, f = 0.04, on state self-esteem (see Table 2.4 for means). There was 
 
13 As in Study 1a and as preregistered, we also ran a binary logistic regression to determine 
whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on whether participants reported any 
state anxiety. See Supplemental Materials. 
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also no main effect physical attractiveness feedback, F(1, 240) = 3.13, p = .078, f = 0.11, nor 
an interaction between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback, 
F(2, 240) = 2.52, p = .083, f = 0.14. 
Table 2.4 
Effects of Feedback about Physical Appearance on State Self-Esteem 
 
 Threat  Affirmation  Control 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Study 1a      
Female participants -----  -----  ----- 
Study 1b      
Female participants 4.12 (0.99)a  4.15 (0.89)a  4.05 (1.03)a 
Study 1c      
Female participants 3.90 (1.01)  4.24 (0.92)  ----- 
Study 2      
Female participants 3.75 (0.99)  4.20 (0.92)  ----- 
  Male participants 4.21 (0.91)a  4.33 (0.93)a  ----- 
Note. Means that share a superscript (e.g., a) are not significantly different from other means 
on the same row 
 
We then re-ran this analysis as an ANCOVA, with self-perceived physical 
attractiveness included as a covariate. Controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness, 
which significantly predicted state self-esteem, F(1, 239) = 80.10, p < .001, f = 0.57, there 
was again no main effect of physical femininity feedback, F(2, 239) = 0.01, p = .994, f = 0.01, 
or physical attractive feedback, F(1, 239) = 2.18, p = .141, f = 0.08, on state self-esteem. 
Again, there was no interaction between physical femininity feedback and physical 
attractiveness feedback, F(2, 239) = 2.53, p = .082, f = 0.12.  
Study 1c 
 In Study 1a, in which participants were presented with lists of features said to 
contribute to perceptions of facial masculinity/femininity and attractiveness, we observed an 
effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, such that participants whose physical 
femininity was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical 
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femininity was affirmed. In Study 1b, in which participants were not presented with these lists 
of features, we did not see this effect. Thus, the purpose of Study 1c was to reconcile these 
inconsistent results by systematically manipulating inclusion of these lists of facial features in 
the experimental set-up and testing whether physical femininity feedback affected levels of 
state anxiety when these lists of features, which framed physical femininity and masculinity 
as opposites and femininity as a lack of masculinity, were present but not when they were 
absent. 
Method 
Hypotheses, methods, and analyses for this study were preregistered (see 
https://osf.io/krhqx/?view_only=a4db641c11c2415f84a807852e92813f).  
Participants and Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions in a 2 (physical femininity feedback: affirmation, threat) x 2 (lists of physical 
features: present, absent) design. Participants were recruited through Prolific Academic and 
paid $1.84 for their participation. 
In Study 1a, in which all participants were given the lists of features, those whose 
physical femininity was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than those whose 
physical femininity was affirmed. Because we sought to determine whether excluding these 
lists of features “knocked out” this main effect, we powered Study 1c to detect an effect half 
the size of the main effect observed in Study 1a (Ledgerwood, 2019, 2020).14  
 
14 This power analysis was based on an effect size obtained through a preliminary analysis of 
Study 1a data, which focused on four of the six items in the state anxiety measure and which 




A power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) determined that a sample of 
N=404 would be needed to detect this interaction with 80% power. We anticipated that 20% 
of recruited participants would be ineligible, fail an attention check, and/or not upload a 
valid photograph. (Because participants in this study were only given one type of feedback, 
we anticipated that fewer people would be excluded for failing the attention check than in 
Studies 1a and 1b). Therefore, we recruited 505 participants. 
Forty-seven participants were excluded because they did not identify as a cisgender 
female (n=2), did not upload a valid photograph (i.e., did not upload a photograph or 
uploaded a photograph without any woman or with more than one woman in it; n=9), failed 
the attention check (which required them to accurately recall whether their results indicated 
that their physical appearance was more, less, or as feminine as the average female in their 
age group—or whether they did not receive feedback on the femininity of their physical 
appearance; n=7), indicated that they intended some of their responses as jokes (n=1), 
and/or clearly believed that the feedback they received was not produced by image analysis 
software (n=30). Thus, we were left with a sample size of 458 (Mage = 33.43, SD = 11.70; 
71.18% heterosexual; 72.49% White; 9.39% Black; 4.59% Hispanic or Latina; 4.37% East 
Asian; 1.53% South Asian; 0.22% Middle Eastern or Arab American; 0.22% Native 
American or Alaskan Native; 7.21% other or multiracial/ethnic or did not report 
race/ethnicity). A sensitivity power analysis (G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that 
we were powered to detect an effect of f = 0.13 (with 80% power and α = .05). 
Procedure. The procedure mirrored that of Study 1b, with a few changes. The 
primary change was that participants in Study 1c were randomly assigned to see (as in Study 
1a) or not see (as in Study 1b) lists of the facial features that supposedly play the greatest role 
in determining the perceived masculinity/femininity of one’s appearance 
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Also, in Study 1c, participants only received feedback on the masculinity/femininity 
of their facial appearance. They did not receive feedback on the attractiveness of their facial 
appearance. Manipulation checks in Studies 1a and 1b indicated that this feedback did not 
robustly alter self-perceived physical attractiveness. Furthermore, the reason for including 
this manipulation was to determine whether threats to physical femininity produce anxiety 
simply because they constitute implied threats to physical attractiveness. However, physical 
femininity feedback did not affect self-perceived physical attractiveness in Study 1a or Study 
1b. (To ensure that our analyses were maximally conservative, we retained the measure of self-
perceived physical attractiveness and controlled for this variable in key analyses.) 
Additionally, given that in Study 1a, participants in the control condition reported 
levels of anxiety that fell between (though did not significantly differ from) those in the 
threat condition and those in the affirmation condition and that our goal was to examine 
differences in anxiety between women whose physical femininity was threatened and women 
whose physical femininity was affirmed, we omitted the physical femininity control 
condition from Study 1c. This omission of a control condition is consistent with previous 
studies on threats to gender stereotypicality (Vandello et al., 2008).  
Finally, additional measures of attributions for results, perceived bipolarity of 
physical femininity and masculinity, importance of results, and feminine identity centrality, 
described in the Measures section, were included in Study 1c for exploratory purposes. All 
exploratory measures were administered following the measure of state anxiety, and all 
exploratory measures other than state self-esteem were administered following the 
manipulation checks. We probed for participant suspicion using the same pre-registered 
questions used in Study 1b. These responses were again coded for suspicion by two coders. 
A two-way random effects model indicated high inter-rater reliability (intraclass correlation 
 83 
coefficient [ICC] = .82, 95% CI [.78, .85]). Participants were again excluded if both coders 
rated their suspicion level as 2.  
Measures. As in Studies 1a and 1b, the primary dependent variable of interest was 
state anxiety. As in Study 1b, a measure of state self-esteem was included as an exploratory 
dependent variable. Measures of attributions for results, perceived bipolarity of physical 
femininity and masculinity, and feminine identity centrality were also included as exploratory 
dependent variables. A measure of self-perceived physical femininity was included as a 
manipulation check, and a measure of self-perceived physical attractiveness was included as a 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































State anxiety. As in Studies 1a and 1b, participants completed the 6-item short form version 
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). The scale demonstrated high 
internal reliability (α = .89). 
State self-esteem. As in Study 1b, participants rated their agreement with eleven items taken and 
modified from the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). This scale 
demonstrated high internal reliability (α = .94). State self-esteem was highly correlated with 
state anxiety, r(456) = -0.65, p < .001.  
Self-perceived physical attractiveness. We measured self-perceived physical attractiveness using the 
single-item, 7-point measure used in Studies 1a and 1b. As in Studies 1a and 1b, we also 
measured self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality for 
exploratory purposes (see Supplemental Materials). 
Self-perceived physical femininity. We assessed the effectiveness of the physical femininity 
manipulation by asking participants to rate their physical femininity using the single-item, 7-
point scale used in Studies 1a and 1b. 
Attributions for results. We were interested in the possibility that to cope with threats to their 
femininity, women who received feedback indicating that they were less physically feminine 
than average would make more external, situational attributions for their results than women 
who received feedback indicating that they were more physically feminine than average 
(Kinderman & Bentall, 2000). Participants therefore responded to the following questions 
on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much): “To what extent do you think the results you 
received are based on aspects of your physical appearance that you could change if you 
wanted to?” “To what extent do you think the results you received are based on stable 
aspects of your physical appearance (R)?” “To what extent do you think the results you 
received are based on aspects of the specific photograph you uploaded?” “How much do 
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you think your results would change on a day-to-day basis?” Because these items did not 
form a reliable scale (α = .47), we analyzed each of them separately. 
Perceived bipolarity of physical femininity and masculinity. If women only experience anxiety in 
response to threats to their physical femininity when they have viewed lists of the features 
said to play the greatest role in determining perceived facial masculinity/femininity, this 
might be because viewing these lists makes the bipolar nature of physical femininity and 
masculinity particularly salient (with facial femininity defined largely as a lack of facial 
masculinity). To explore this possibility, we measured perceived bipolarity of physical 
femininity and masculinity by asking participants to respond to the following question on a 
scale of 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much): “When it comes to physical appearance, to what 
extent do you think masculinity and femininity are opposites?” 
Importance of results. We were also interested in the possibility that to cope with threats to their 
femininity, women who received feedback indicating that they were less physically feminine 
than average would downplay the importance of their results (Frey & Stahlberg, 1986; 
Kashima & Triandis, 1986). We therefore asked participants to rate their agreement, on a 
scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree), with the following statement: “The results 
I received are important to me.” 
Feminine identity centrality. Finally, we were interested in the possibility that to cope with 
threats to their femininity, women who received feedback indicating that they were less 
physically feminine than average would downplay the centrality of femininity to their overall 
sense of self. We therefore included a single item from the measure of gender identity 
centrality used in Study 1a (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Participants rated their agreement, 
on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree), with the statement: “Being feminine 
is an important part of my self image.” Although we did not observe an effect of physical 
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femininity feedback on gender identity centrality in Study 1a, we included this measure for 
exploratory purposes. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks. To confirm that we successfully manipulated self-perceived 
physical femininity and examine whether presence of the lists of physical features affected 
self-perceived physical femininity, we conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with 
physical femininity feedback and lists of physical features as the independent variables and 
self-perceived physical femininity as the dependent variable. As intended, there was a main 
effect of physical femininity feedback on self-perceived physical femininity, F(1, 454) = 
150.29, p < .001, f = 0.57, such that participants in the affirmation condition perceived 
themselves as more physically feminine (M = 5.07, SD = 1.21) than participants in the threat 
condition (M = 3.55, SD = 1.40). There was no effect of listing physical features on self-
perceived physical femininity, F(1, 454) = 0.48, p = .489, f = 0.03, nor an interactive effect of 
physical femininity feedback and listing physical features on self-perceived physical 
femininity, F(1, 454) = 1.75, p = .186, f = 0.05.  
Primary Analyses. To determine whether, as predicted, physical femininity 
feedback had an effect on state anxiety and whether this effect was only present when 
participants saw lists of physical features that supposedly contribute to overall assessments 
of facial masculinity/femininity, we ran a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with physical 
femininity feedback and lists of physical features as the independent variables and state 
anxiety as the dependent variable. Consistent with the results of Study 1a, there was a 
medium-size main effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, F(1, 454) = 20.52, 
p<.001, f = 0.21, such that participants in the threat condition reported higher levels of state 
anxiety (M = 2.06, SD = 0.72) than participants in the affirmation condition (M = 1.77, SD 
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= 0.67) (see Table 2.2 for means from all studies). There was no main effect of listing 
physical features on state anxiety, F(1, 454) = 2.55, p = .111, f = 0.07. Contrary to our 
prediction, there was no interactive effect of physical femininity feedback and listing physical 
features on state anxiety, F(1, 454) = 0.24, p = .622, f = 0.02. Physical femininity feedback 
had a significant effect on state anxiety when the lists of physical features were present, F(1, 
224) = 7.41, p = .007, f = 0.18, and absent, F(1, 230) = 13.93, p < .001, f = 0.25.  
For a more conservative analysis, we re-ran this analysis as an ANCOVA, with self-
perceived physical attractiveness included as a covariate. Controlling for self-perceived 
physical attractiveness, which significantly predicted state anxiety, F(1, 453) = 12.71, p < 
.001, f = 0.16, there was still an effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, F(1, 
453) = 21.28, p<.001, f = 0.21. Again, neither listing physical features, F(1, 453) = 3.57, p = 
.060, f = 0.09, nor the interaction between physical femininity feedback and listing physical 
features, F(1, 453) = 0.12, p = .724, f = 0.02, had an effect on state anxiety.15  
Exploratory Analyses. 
State self-esteem. To examine whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on state self-
esteem and whether if so, this effect was only present when participants saw lists of physical 
features that supposedly contribute to overall assessments of facial masculinity/femininity, 
we ran another 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and lists 
of physical features as the independent variables and state self-esteem as the dependent 
variable. There was a main effect of physical femininity feedback on state self-esteem (see 
Table 2.4), F(1, 454) = 14.91, p<.001, f = 0.18, such that participants in the threat condition 
 
15 As in Studies 1a and 1b and as preregistered, we also ran a binary logistic regression to 
determine whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on whether participants 
reported any state anxiety. See Supplemental Materials. 
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reported lower levels of state self-esteem (M = 3.90, SD = 1.01) than participants in the 
affirmation condition (M = 4.24, SD = 0.92). There was no main effect of listing physical 
features on state self-esteem, F(1, 454) = 0.35, p = .552, f = 0.03, nor an interaction between 
physical femininity feedback and listing physical features, F(1, 454) = 0.18, p = .669, f = 0.02. 
For a more conservative analysis, we re-ran this analysis as an ANCOVA, with self-
perceived physical attractiveness included as a covariate. Controlling for self-perceived 
physical attractiveness, which significantly predicted state self-esteem, F(1, 453) = 93.84, 
p<.001, f = 0.45, the effect of physical femininity feedback on levels of state self-esteem 
remained significant, F(1, 453) = 18.56, p<.001, f = 0.18. Again, there was no main effect of 
listing physical features on state anxiety, F(1, 453) = 1.96, p = .162, f = .06, nor an 
interaction between physical femininity feedback and listing physical features, F(1, 453) = 
0.75, p = .387, f = 0.04.  
Attributions for results. We conducted a series of 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVAs to assess 
the effects of physical femininity feedback, lists of physical features, and the interactions 
between the two variables on each item. Because we were examining four attribution-related 
dependent variables, we set the alpha levels to .0125 for these analyses. We found that 
participants whose physical femininity was affirmed attributed their results to stable aspects 
of their physical appearance to a greater extent (M = 4.89, SD = 1.41) than participants 
whose physical femininity was threatened (M = 4.07, SD = 1.55), F(1, 454) = 35.25, p < 
.001, f = 0.28. Additionally, participants whose physical femininity was affirmed thought 
their results would change on a day-to-day basis to a lesser extent (M = 3.69, SD = 1.82) 
than participants whose physical femininity was threatened (M = 4.08, SD = 1.80), F(1, 454) 
= 5.60, p = .018, f = 0.11, though this result did not achieve statistical significance based on 
our pre-set alpha level. There was no effect of physical femininity feedback on the extent to 
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which participants thought the results they received were based on aspects of their physical 
appearance that they could change if they wanted to, nor on the extent to which they 
thought the results they received were based on aspects of the specific photograph they 
uploaded, ps > .20. There were no main effects of listing physical features ps > .20, nor any 
interactions between physical femininity feedback and listing physical features, ps > .20. 
Perceived bipolarity of physical femininity and masculinity.  We sought to determine whether 
participants perceived physical femininity and masculinity as more bipolar when they had 
viewed lists of the facial features said to play the greatest role in determining facial 
masculinity/femininity, as compared to when they had not viewed such lists. We also sought 
to determine whether physical femininity feedback moderated this potential effect. A 2 x 2 
between-subjects ANOVA with physical femininity feedback and lists of physical features as 
the independent variables revealed no main effects of physical femininity feedback, F(1, 454) 
= 1.50, p = .221, f = 0.06, or listing physical features, F(1, 454) = 0.64, p = .426, f = 0.04, on 
perceived bipolarity of physical femininity and masculinity. It did, however, reveal a 
marginally significant interaction between physical femininity feedback and listing physical 
features, F(1, 454) = 3.88, p = .050, f = 0.09. Among participants whose physical femininity 
was threatened, perceived bipolarity did not differ between those who saw the lists of 
features (M = 4.45, SD = 1.45) and those who did not (M = 4.28, SD = 1.59), F(1, 220) = 
0.69, p = .407, f = 0.06. Surprisingly, among participants whose physical femininity was 
affirmed, those who saw the lists of features perceived femininity and masculinity as less 
bipolar (M = 4.34, SD = 1.60) than those who did not (M = 4.75, SD = 1.57), F(1, 234) = 
3.82, p = .052, f = 0.13, though this effect was only marginally significant. 
Importance of results. To determine whether participants downplayed the importance of 
threatening, as compared to affirming, results, and whether listing physical features 
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moderated this potential effect, we conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with 
physical femininity feedback and lists of physical features as the independent variables. This 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of physical femininity feedback, such that participants 
whose physical femininity was affirmed indeed rated the results as more important to them 
(M = 3.55, SD = 1.76) than participants whose physical femininity was threatened (M = 
2.99, SD = 1.70), F(1, 454) = 12.30, p < .001, f = 0.16. This main effect was qualified by a 
significant two-way interaction, F(1, 454) = 5.57, p = .019, f = 0.11. 
Among participants in the lists absent condition, those whose physical femininity 
was affirmed rated the results as more important to them (M = 3.81, SD = 1.82) than those 
whose physical femininity was threatened (M = 2.86, SD = 1.57), F(1, 230) = 18.25, p<.001, 
f = 0.28. Among participants in the lists present condition, those whose physical femininity 
was affirmed (M = 3.33, SD = 1.68) did not differ from those whose physical femininity was 
threatened (M = 3.14, SD = 1.85) in their ratings of the results’ importance to them, F(1, 
224) = 0.62, p = .432, f = 0.05.  There was no main effect of listing of physical features, F(1, 
454) = 0.40, p = .528, f = 0.03. 
Feminine identity centrality. To examine whether participants whose physical femininity was 
threatened downplayed the importance of femininity to their self-image, as compared to 
those whose physical femininity was affirmed—and whether this potential effect was 
moderated by listing physical features, we conducted a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with 
physical femininity feedback and lists of physical features as the independent variables and 
feminine identity centrality as the dependent variable. Neither physical femininity feedback, 
F(1, 454) = 2.97, p = .086, f = 0.08, nor listing physical features, F(1, 454) = .005, p = .945, f 
= 0.003, had an effect on femininity identity centrality. There was also no interaction 
between the two variables, F(1, 454) = 2.17, p = .141, f = 0.07. 
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 Given that we observed no effect of our manipulations on feminine identity 
centrality and that Study 1a provided some evidence that the effect of physical femininity 
feedback on state anxiety might be driven by participants high in gender identity centrality, 
we conducted exploratory analyses to determine whether feminine identity centrality 
moderated the effects of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety and self-esteem. A 
linear regression revealed an interaction between physical femininity feedback and feminine 
identity centrality, B = 0.12, SE = 0.04, p = .001, 95% CI [0.05, 0.20]. As shown in Figure 
2.2, at low levels of feminine identity centrality (1 SD below the mean), there was no effect 
of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, B = 0.09, SE = 0.09, p = .313, 95% CI [-
0.09, 0.27]. At high levels of feminine identity centrality (1 SD above the mean), however, 
there was an effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety, B = 0.51, SE = 0.09, p < 
.001, 95% CI [0.33, 0.69], such that participants whose femininity had been threatened 
reported higher levels of anxiety than participants whose femininity had been affirmed. 
Furthermore, whereas there was no effect of feminine identity centrality on anxiety among 
participants in the affirmation condition, B = -0.02, SE = 0.03, p = .444, 95% CI [-0.07, 
0.03], there was an effect of feminine identity centrality on anxiety among participants in the 
threat condition, B = 0.10, SE = 0.03, p < .001, 95% CI [0.05, 0.15], with increasing levels of 




Figure 2.2. State anxiety by femininity feedback condition and feminine identity centrality 
 
 
Next, we turned to state self-esteem. A linear regression again revealed an interaction 
between physical femininity feedback and feminine identity centrality, B = -0.20, SE = 0.05, 
p < .001, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.09]. As shown in Figure 2.3, at low levels of feminine identity 
centrality (1 SD below the mean), there was no effect of physical femininity feedback on 
state self-esteem, B = 0.03, SE = 0.13, p = .825, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.22]. At high levels of 
feminine identity centrality (1 SD above the mean), however, there was an effect of physical 
femininity feedback on state self-esteem, B = -0.69, SE = 0.13, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.94, -
0.44], such that participants whose femininity had been threatened reported lower levels of 
self-esteem than participants whose femininity had been affirmed. Additionally, whereas 
there was no effect of feminine identity centrality on self-esteem among participants in the 
affirmation condition, B = 0.05, SE = 0.04, p = .217, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.12], there was an 
effect of feminine identity centrality on self-esteem among participants in the threat 
condition, B = -0.15, SE = 0.04, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.22, -0.08], with increasing levels of 

























Figure 2.3. State self-esteem by femininity feedback condition and feminine identity centrality 
 
Studies 1a, 1b, & 1c Discussion 
Across these studies, we found evidence that cisgender women experience more 
anxiety in response to threats to their physical femininity than affirmations of their physical 
femininity and that the effect of physical femininity feedback on anxiety cannot be explained 
by an assumption that a threat to one’s physical femininity constitutes a threat to one’s 
physical attractiveness. 
In Study 1a, in which participants were given lists of physical features upon which 
assessments of physical femininity were said to be based, women whose physical femininity 
was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than cisgender women whose physical 
femininity was affirmed. This effect held even when participants were told they were highly 
physically attractive and even when controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness. 
Levels of state anxiety among women who received no feedback on their femininity fell 



















two experimental conditions, suggesting that the effect of physical femininity feedback was 
driven by both women whose physical femininity was threatened and women whose physical 
femininity was affirmed. In other words, affirming feedback and threatening feedback 
seemed to move women’s levels of state anxiety in opposite directions. Exploratory 
moderation analyses, however, revealed that gender identity centrality predicted levels of 
anxiety only among women whose physical femininity had been threatened, although this 
effect did not reach statistical significance. Furthermore, among participants high in gender 
identity centrality, those whose physical femininity had been threatened experienced 
heightened levels of anxiety, relative to those who received no feedback on their femininity, 
whereas those whose physical femininity had been affirmed did not experience reduced levels 
of anxiety, relative to those who received no feedback on their femininity. Together, these 
results suggest that physical femininity threats, rather than affirmations, may have been 
particularly influential in producing the observed effect of physical femininity feedback on 
levels of anxiety. 
In Study 1b, in which participants were not given lists of physical features upon 
which assessments of physical femininity were said to be based, women whose physical 
femininity was threatened did not experience higher levels of state anxiety than those whose 
physical femininity was affirmed. Furthermore, physical femininity feedback had no effect 
on state self-esteem. 
Study 1c sought to reconcile the discrepant results of Studies 1a and 1b by examining 
whether physical femininity threats only produce anxiety when women are presented with 
lists of the facial features that supposedly play the greatest role in determining assessments of 
physical femininity and masculinity and that frame physical masculinity and femininity as 
opposites (i.e., as two ends of a single spectrum) and femininity as the absence of masculinity 
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(as in Study 1a but not 1b). Contrary to our prediction, women whose physical femininity 
was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical femininity 
was affirmed regardless of whether they saw these lists of physical features. As in Studies 1a 
and 1b, physical femininity feedback did not affect self-perceived physical attractiveness, and 
as in Study 1a, the effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety held even when 
controlling for self-perceived physical attractiveness. Thus, this study provided further 
evidence that threats to physical femininity in particular—rather than implied threats to 
physical attractiveness—produce anxiety in women. Furthermore, moderation analyses 
demonstrated that feminine identity centrality predicted anxiety and self-esteem among 
women whose femininity had been threatened but not those whose femininity had been 
affirmed. This study therefore lent further support to the idea that physical femininity 
threats, rather than physical femininity affirmations, affect levels of anxiety, as well as self-
esteem. 
Exploratory analyses from Study 1c also revealed a number of results worthy of 
further investigation. Participants whose physical femininity was threatened reported not 
only higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical femininity was affirmed but also 
lower levels of state self-esteem, even when controlling for self-perceived physical 
attractiveness, which was highly predictive of state self-esteem. Additionally, women whose 
physical femininity was threatened attributed their results to stable aspects of their 
appearance to a lesser extent than those whose physical femininity was affirmed. They also 
believed, more so than those whose physical femininity was affirmed, that they would get 
different results on different days. Unsurprisingly, then, women whose physical femininity 
was threatened viewed their results as less important to them. Together, these results, though 
exploratory, are suggestive of motivated cognition in the face of threats to gender 
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stereotypicality. Women may discredit their results as a means a coping with such threats. 
This explanation is speculative at this point, however, and should be systematically examined 
in future studies. 
Study 2 
 Studies 1a-c focused exclusively on women and their responses to threats to the 
femininity of their physical appearances. In Study 2, we expanded our focus to include both 
women and men and threats to both physical and psychological gender stereotypicality. In 
doing so, we sought to determine (i) whether, among women, increased anxiety and reduced 
self-esteem following gender stereotypicality threats are unique to the domain of physical 
appearance and (ii) whether increased anxiety and reduced self-esteem following physical 
gender stereotypicality threats are unique to women.  
Past research has demonstrated that women do not experience anxiety in response to 
threats to their psychological femininity (Vandello et al., 2008). However, this past work 
employed a slightly different paradigm than the one we used and was conducted with a 
different sample. Therefore, it was unclear whether within the same sample of women and 
with comparable paradigms we would observe that women indeed experience anxiety—and 
potentially reduced self-esteem—in response to threats to their physical but not their 
psychological femininity. 
 Furthermore, although studies have examined men’s psychological and behavioral 
responses to threats to their psychological masculinity (e.g., Dahl et al., 2015; Willer et al., 2013) 
and physical strength (Cheryan et al., 2015), they have not, to our knowledge, examined 
men’s responses to threats to the masculinity of their physical appearance. Thus, it is unclear 
whether men, like women, experience anxiety in response to feedback indicating that their 
physical appearance is less gender stereotypical than average. Is increased anxiety following 
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physical gender stereotypicality threats, relative to affirmations, a phenomenon unique to 
women, whose physical appearances are frequently subjected to commentary and critique 
(Heith, 2003, p. 126), or is this a phenomenon experienced by women and men alike? 
Some non-experimental evidence suggests that men may, indeed, experience such 
anxiety. For example, adolescent boys with high levels of babyfacedness (which largely 
overlaps with facial femininity; Dinnerstein & Weitz, 1994; Friedman & Zebrowitz, 1992) 
tend to be colder and more academically competent and to engage in more criminal behavior 
than peers with more mature (and thus masculine) facial appearances (Zebrowitz, 
Andreoletti, et al., 1998; Zebrowitz, Collins, et al., 1998). Behaving in a stereotypically 
masculine manner may be a strategy that babyfaced boys and men use to cope with the 
anxiety associated with appearing physically feminine. Additionally, when men’s 
psychological masculinity is threatened, they have been shown to not only espouse 
stereotypically masculine attitudes and behave in a stereotypically masculine manner (Bosson 
& Vandello, 2011; Glick et al., 2007; Willer et al., 2013) but also to overestimate their height 
(Cheryan et al., 2015)—that is, to exaggerate one component of their physical masculinity. 
Together, these findings suggest that men may, indeed, be concerned about appearing 
physically masculine and may therefore experience anxiety, just as women do, in response to 
threats to their gender stereotypicality within the domain of physical appearance. 
However, psychological and behavioral masculinity may be more heavily prescribed 
for men than physical masculinity is. In a 2017 nationally representative survey of U.S. 
adults, participants were asked “what traits society values most in men and women” (Parker 
et al., 2017). In reference to women, the plurality of responses (35%) referred to physical 
attractiveness, whereas in reference to men, the plurality (33%) referred to honesty and 
morality—and only 11% referred to physical attractiveness. Furthermore, research on 
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precarious manhood has suggested that whereas womanhood is a physical status, manhood is 
a social status that is only attained when men behave in a sufficiently masculine manner and 
take on sufficiently masculine roles—and that can be lost at any moment if men fail to live 
up to social expectations (Vandello & Bosson, 2013). Finally, unlike physical femininity in 
women, physical masculinity in men is not consistently associated with ratings of physical 
attractiveness (Rhodes, 2006). Indeed, in some studies, facially feminine men have been rated 
as more attractive than facially masculine men (Penton-Voak et al., 2004). If men are 
invested in appearing physically attractive, then, they may not seek to appear particularly 
physically masculine. Thus, men may be primarily concerned with being psychologically and 
behaviorally masculine, rather than with looking masculine, and may experience anxiety in 
response to threats to the gender stereotypicality of their personalities but not their 
appearances. 
 The primary goal of Study 2 was to compare women’s and men’s responses to 
threats to the gender stereotypicality of their physical appearances and personalities. We 
predicted that among women, those whose physical femininity was threatened would 
experience higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical femininity was affirmed 
but that those whose psychological femininity was threatened would not experience higher 
levels of state anxiety than those whose psychological femininity was affirmed. We predicted 
that among men, those whose psychological masculinity was threatened would experience 
higher levels of state anxiety than those whose psychological masculinity was affirmed. We 
also predicted that among men, those whose physical masculinity was threatened would not 
experience higher levels of state anxiety than those whose physical masculinity was affirmed. 
This latter prediction was more tentative than the others, however, because, as described 
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earlier, we also had reason to believe that men might, indeed, find threats to their physical 
masculinity anxiety-provoking.  
 A secondary goal of Study 2 was to examine a possible mediator of the predicted 
effects of femininity and masculinity threats on state anxiety (and potentially state self-
esteem, as in Study 1c, physical femininity threats, relative to physical femininity 
affirmations, produced reduced self-esteem in women). Although across Studies 1a-c we 
found strong evidence that women experience anxiety in response to physical femininity 
threats, compared to affirmations, we did not explore potential mechanisms underlying this 
observed effect, and to our knowledge, past research has not explored mechanisms 
underlying the relationships between masculinity threats and anxiety in men. To fully 
understand experiences with gender stereotypicality threats and eventually pave the way for 
interventions to mitigate the harmful consequences of these threats, it is important to 
determine why these threats produce anxiety and possibly reduced self-esteem. 
Women and men may experience threats to their femininity and masculinity, 
respectively, as threats to their identity, and experiences with identity invalidation have been 
linked to increased stress and anxiety (Albuja et al., 2019; Murray et al., 2012) and reduced 
self-esteem (Garr-Schultz & Gardner, 2019; Townsend et al., 2009). Thus, we examined felt 
identity invalidation as a potential mediator of the predicted relationship between gender 
stereotypicality threat and state anxiety and the possible relationship between gender 
stereotypicality threat and state self-esteem. 
We also explored gender identity as a potential alternative mediator. We did not 
specifically anticipate that gender identity would vary by condition but sought to consider 
this possibility, given that gender identity can be contextually dependent (Mehta, 2015). 
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Mediation analysis cannot directly demonstrate that an effect of gender 
stereotypicality threat on identity invalidation causes increased anxiety or reduced self-esteem 
(MacKinnon et al., 2007). It can, however, provide preliminary evidence for felt identity 
invalidation as a mechanism underlying the potential relationships between gender 
stereotypicality threat and both anxiety and self-esteem. Thus, it is an important starting 
point for investigations into the psychological mechanisms by which gender stereotypicality 
threats, relative to affirmations, produce negative psychological consequences. 
Method 
Hypotheses, methods, and analyses for this study were preregistered (see 
https://osf.io/shkn3/?view_only=ccfab0f6cc2e426daa91204fc167fd0d).  
Participants and Design 
This study utilized a 2 (participant gender: female, male) x 2 (domain: physical 
appearance, personality) x 2 (feedback: affirmation, threat) factorial design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a domain condition and a feedback condition. Participants were 
recruited through Prolific and paid $2.28 for their participation. 
We predicted a three-way interaction, such that women would experience anxiety in 
response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearance but not threats to the 
femininity of their personality, whereas men would experience anxiety in response to threats 
to the masculinity of their personality but not threats to the masculinity of their physical 
appearance. In Study 1c, women whose physical femininity was threatened experienced more 
anxiety than those whose physical femininity was affirmed. Therefore, to determine whether 
this effect would be eliminated when the domain switched from physical appearance to 
personality, we powered our study to detect an effect half the size of the main effect from 
Study 1c (A. Ledgerwood, personal communication, September 11, 2019; Ledgerwood, 2019, 
 102 
2020).16 A power analysis using G*Power determined that a sample of N=938 would be 
needed to detect this interaction with 80% power. We expected the opposite result for 
men—that those whose masculinity within the domain of personality was threatened would 
experience more anxiety than those whose masculinity within the domain of personality was 
affirmed but that this effect would be eliminated when the domain switched from 
personality to physical appearance. Thus we needed 938 male participants to detect this 
interaction with 80% power, for a total sample size of 1876. Based on Study 1c, we 
anticipated that approximately 16% of recruited participants would be ineligible, fail an 
attention check, and/or not upload a valid photograph. Therefore, we attempted to enroll 
2234 participants. 
Thirty-five responses were from participants who had already taken the survey, so 
these responses were excluded, leaving us with an initial sample size of 2199 participants. Six 
hundred twenty-five participants were then excluded because they did not identify as a 
cisgender female or male (n=18), did not submit a valid video (n = 358), failed the attention 
check (which required that they accurately recall whether they received feedback on their 
physical appearance or their personality and whether that feedback indicated that they were 
more, less, or as feminine [or masculine] as the average person in their gender and age group; 
n = 294), dropped out before being assigned to a condition (n = 4), and/or clearly believed 
that the feedback they received was not produced by video analysis software (n = 87). Thus, 
we were left with a sample size of 1574 (822 female, 752 male; Mage = 31.08, SD = 11.00; 
76.94% heterosexual; 67.79% White; 8.01% Black; 7.05% Hispanic or Latina; 5.59% East 
 
16 This power analysis was based on an effect size obtained through a preliminary analysis of 
Study 1c data, which focused on four of the six items in the state anxiety measure and which 
was completed before the data were fully cleaned (f = 0.18), rather than final analyses (f = 
0.21). 
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Asian; 3.30% South Asian; 0.70% Middle Eastern or Arab American; 0.19% Native 
American or Alaskan Native; 0.13% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; 7.24% other or 
multiracial/ethnic). The number of exclusions was high but not unreasonably so given that 
this was an online study in which participants were asked to use an embedded video recorder 
on their computer. Because the final sample size was smaller than intended, we conducted 
sensitivity power analyses (G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007), which indicated that we were 
powered to detect two two-way interactions (in female and male participants) with effect 
sizes of f = 0.10 (with 80% power and α = .05). 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that of Study 1c, with a few changes, all of which are 
noted here. In this study, participants were instructed to record videos, rather than upload 
photographs, of themselves. Specifically, they were instructed to record a 1-2-minute video 
in which they introduced themselves as they would to a person they were meeting for the 
first time. Videos were recorded using an embedded recorder from addpipe.com.  
Additionally, because this study sought to compare responses to feedback about 
one’s gender stereotypicality in two distinct domains, participants were told that the software 
uses a neural network to assess the femininity/masculinity of either one’s facial appearance, 
in the physical appearance condition, or one’s personality, in the personality condition, 
compared to others in one’s gender and age group. Participants in this study did not see any 
lists of characteristics that supposedly determine masculinity/femininity. 
 Finally, Study 2 omitted the measures of desire to change photograph, attributions 
for results, perceived bipolarity of physical femininity and masculinity, importance of results, 
and feminine identity centrality, which were included in Study 1c for exploratory purposes. It 
included new measures of felt identity invalidation and gender identity, described in the 
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Measures section. We included measures of felt identity invalidation to examine whether 
they mediated the predicted interactive effects of domain and feedback on state anxiety. We 
included gender identity to explore it as a potential alternative mediator. The measure of 
gender identity was distinct from the measures of gender identity centrality used in Studies 1a 
and 1c, as whereas the latter focused on the extent to which being female and/or feminine 
was central to one’s overall sense of self, the former focused on the extent to which one felt 
female and/or feminine [or male and/or masculine] in the first place. (For example, one 
might feel very feminine but not think of femininity as an important part of their overall 
identity.) The measures of both felt identity invalidation and gender identity were 
administered following the measures of state anxiety and state self-esteem. 
We probed for participant suspicion using the same questions used in Studies 1b and 
1c. These responses were coded for suspicion by three coders. One coder coded responses 
from all participants; the other two coders coded responses from half of the participants. 
Two-way random effects models indicated acceptable inter-rater reliability (ICC1 = .72, 95% 
CI [.68, .76]; ICC2 = .75, 95% CI [.73, .79]). As in Studies 1b and 1c, participants were 
excluded if both coders rated their suspicion level as 2. 
Measures 
 As in Studies 1a-c, the primary dependent variable of interest was state anxiety. As in 
Studies 1b and 1c, a measure of state self-esteem was included as an exploratory dependent 
variable. Measures of felt identity invalidation and gender identity were also included as 
exploratory mediators. For correlations among all measured variables, see Tables 2.6 (for 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































State anxiety. As in Studies 1a-c, participants completed the 6-item short form version of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). The scale demonstrated high 
internal reliability (α = .86). 
State self-esteem. As in Studies 1b and 1c, participants rated their agreement with eleven items 
taken and modified from the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). This scale 
demonstrated high internal reliability (α = .94). State self-esteem was highly correlated with 
state anxiety, r(1571) = -0.67, p < .001. 
Felt identity invalidation. We use the term “felt identity invalidation” to refer to the sense that 
one’s internal sense of self or membership in a group of which one considers oneself a part 
is denied or not recognized by others (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). We measured felt identity 
invalidation to determine whether it mediated the predicted interactive effects of domain and 
feedback condition on state anxiety and potentially state self-esteem. Participants rated their 
agreement with thirteen statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). A 
factor analysis using principal components analysis with varimax rotation, along with an 
examination of the correlations among all felt identity invalidation items (see Supplementary 
materials for both), suggested that the felt identity invalidation items tapped into three 
underlying constructs: (a) felt gender identity invalidation (i.e., the extent to which participants 
felt that their internal sense of femaleness [maleness], womanhood [manhood], and/or 
femininity [masculinity] was not recognized by others); (b) felt global identity invalidation (i.e., 
the extent to which participants felt that their overall internal sense of self was not recognized 
by others); and (c) results-identity discrepancy (i.e., the extent to which participants felt that 
the feedback they had received was inconsistent with their sense of self). Specifically, the 
factor analysis indicated that all of the reverse-scored items that asked about gender identity 
invalidation loaded onto the first factor, all of the regularly-scored items that asked about 
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gender identity invalidation loaded onto the second factor, and all of the items that asked 
about global identity invalidation loaded onto the third factor. The results-identity 
discrepancy item did not load onto any of these three factors. We did not, however, interpret 
the first two factors as necessarily conceptually distinct; rather, it seemed possible that the 
distinction between the reverse-scored and regularly-scored gender identity invalidation 
items was a result of shared method variance within each of these clusters of items. The 
correlation matrix revealed that correlations between the reverse-scored and regularly-scored 
gender identity invalidation items ranged from .34 - .50. We thus deemed them sufficiently 
correlated to include together in a single scale, which left the felt global identity invalidation 
items and the results-identity discrepancy item to be measured separately.  
Felt gender identity invalidation. Participants rated their agreement with the following statements: 
“I feel validated as a female [male]” (R); “I feel that my identity as a female [male] is 
recognized by others” (R); “I am concerned that others do not recognize my ‘femaleness’ 
[‘maleness’];” “I feel validated as feminine [masculine]” (R); “I feel that my identity as 
feminine [masculine] is recognized by others” (R); “I am concerned that others do not 
recognize my femininity [masculinity];” “I feel validated as a woman [man]” (R); “I feel that 
my identity as a woman [man] is recognized by others” (R); “I am concerned that others do 
not recognize my womanhood [manhood].” These nine items demonstrated high internal 
reliability (α = .91). 
Felt global identity invalidation. Participants rated their agreement with the following statements: 
“I feel that my identity is recognized by others” (R); “I do not feel that other people see me 
for who I really am;” “Other people’s sense of who I am aligns with who I feel I am” (R). 
These items demonstrated acceptable internal reliability (α = .75). 
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Results-identity discrepancy. Participants rated their agreement with the statement “I feel like the 
results I received are consistent with my beliefs about who I really am” (R) (adapted from 
Bosson and colleagues’ [2012] measure of threats to belonging and coherence). 
Gender identity. We were interested in gender identity as a potential alternative mediator of the 
predicted interactive effects of domain and feedback on state anxiety and potentially state 
self-esteem. Participants rated their agreement with the following statements regarding their 
identity on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so): “I feel like a female [male];” “On the 
inside, I feel feminine” (reverse-scored for men); “On the inside, I feel masculine” (reverse-
scored for women). (Both female and male participants completed the latter two items.) 
They also rated their agreement with the statement “I feel like a woman [man],” which we 
included in case participants’ level of identification with the term “female [male]” differed 
from their identification with the term “woman [man].” Measuring gender identity using this 
sort of scale has precedent in the literature (Ho & Mussap, 2019). These items demonstrated 
high internal reliability (α = .83). 
Self-perceived femininity/masculinity. We assessed the effectiveness of the manipulations by 
asking participants to rate the femininity (for women) or masculinity (for men) of their 
physical appearance and personality, compared to the average person in their gender and age 
group, on 7-point scales ranging from “Much less feminine [masculine]” to “Much more 
feminine [masculine].” 
Results 
For clarity of presentation, we report only those results that are most relevant to the 
aims of this study. For example, when main effects are qualified by two-way interactions and 
two-way interactions are qualified by three-way interactions, only the highest-order 
interactions are reported. Additional results can be found in the Supplemental Materials. 
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Manipulation Checks 
To analyze the effectiveness of our manipulations, we began by recoding 
participants’ ratings of their gender stereotypicality so that we could analyze female and male 
participants’ ratings together. We recoded male participants’ self-perceived masculinity of 
appearance and female participants’ self-perceived femininity of appearance as “self-
perceived gender stereotypicality of appearance” and male participants’ self-perceived 
masculinity of personality and female participants’ self-perceived femininity of personality as 
“self-perceived gender stereotypicality of personality.” We then further recoded so that the 
ratings of participants in the appearance condition and participants in the personality 
condition could be analyzed together. For participants who had received feedback on their 
appearance, we recoded self-perceived gender stereotypicality of appearance and for 
participants who had received feedback on their personality we recoded self-perceived 
gender stereotypicality of personality as “self-perceived gender stereotypicality within the 
relevant domain.”  
To confirm that we had successfully manipulated self-perceived gender 
stereotypicality within the relevant domain, we ran a 2 x 2 ANOVA with domain and 
feedback as independent variables. This ANOVA revealed the anticipated main effect of 
feedback, F(1, 1570)=113.54, p < .001, f = 0.27, such that participants in the affirmation 
condition reported higher levels of gender stereotypicality within the relevant domain (M = 
4.70, SD = 1.38) than participants in the threat condition (M = 3.96, SD = 1.43). It also 
revealed an unexpected effect of domain, F(1, 1570) = 37.67, p < .001, f = 0.15, such that 
levels of self-perceived gender stereotypicality of physical appearance among participants 
who received feedback on their physical appearance (M = 4.53, SD = 1.40) were higher than 
levels of self-perceived gender stereotypicality of personality among participants who 
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received feedback on their personality (M = 4.12, SD = 1.48). However, there was no 
interaction between feedback and domain, F(1, 1570) = 0.01, p = .94, f = 0.002, indicating 
that the effect of the feedback (affirmation vs. threat) did not significantly differ by domain. 
Primary Analyses 
To test our primary prediction that women would experience anxiety in response to 
threats to the femininity of their appearance but not their personality and that men would 
experience anxiety in response to threats to the masculinity of their personality but not their 
appearance, we conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with participant gender, domain, and 
feedback as the independent variables.  
Although this ANOVA did not reveal a significant participant gender x domain x 
feedback interaction, F(1, 1566) = 1.87, p = .171, f = 0.03, we broke down our sample by 
participant gender, as preregistered, because our sample was powered to detect two two-way 
interactions (one within female participants and one within male participants), rather than a 
three-way interaction. (Indeed, a sensitivity power analysis [G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007] 
indicated that we were only powered to detect a three-way interaction with an effect size of f 
= .07 with 80% power and α = .05). 
Among male participants, there was no domain x feedback interaction, F(1, 748) = 
1.14, p = .286, f = 0.04—only a main effect of feedback, F(1, 748) = 14.04, p < .001, f = 
0.14, such that those whose masculinity was threatened reported higher levels of anxiety (M 
= 1.87, SD = 0.62) than those whose masculinity was affirmed (M = 1.70, SD = 0.62). 
Surprisingly and contrary to our prediction, further pre-registered analyses revealed that the 
effect of feedback on anxiety was only significant for participants who received feedback on 
the masculinity of their appearance, F(1, 389) = 12.69, p < .001, f = 0.18 (see Table 2.2 for 
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means), though the effect for feedback on the masculinity of their personality was in the 
predicted direction, albeit not statistically significant, F(1, 359) = 3.28, p = .071, f = 0.10. 
Among female participants, we observed the predicted domain x feedback 
interaction, F(1, 818) = 8.96, p = .003, f = 0.10. Within the domain of physical appearance, 
participants whose femininity was threatened reported levels of anxiety higher (M = 2.15, SD 
= 0.67) than those of participants whose femininity was affirmed (M = 1.83, SD = 0.64), 
F(1, 425) = 26.30, p < .001, f = 0.25 (see Table 2.2). Within the domain of personality, there 
was no effect of feedback, F(1, 393) = 0.58, p = .446, f = 0.04. Within this domain, 
participants whose femininity was threatened reported levels of anxiety comparable (M = 
1.88, SD = 0.68) to those of participants whose femininity was affirmed (M = 1.83, SD = 
0.64).17 
Exploratory Analyses 
State self-esteem. We conducted another 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to examine the effects of 
participant gender, domain, feedback, and the interactions among these variables on state 
self-esteem. This ANOVA revealed a three-way interaction, F(1, 1565) = 5.87, p = .016, f = 
0.06. There was a significant domain x feedback interaction among female, F(1, 818) = 
14.66, p < .001, f = 0.13, but not male, F(1, 747) = 0.13, p = .716, f = 0.01, participants. 
There was also no main effect of feedback among male participants, F(1, 747) = 2.05, p = 
.153, f = 0.05. Female participants whose physical femininity was threatened reported lower 
levels of state self-esteem (M = 3.75, SD = 0.99) than female participants whose physical 
femininity was affirmed (M = 4.20, SD = 0.92), F(1, 425) = 23.15, p < .001, f = 0.23. 
 
17 As preregistered, we also ran two binary logistic regressions, one for female participants 
and one for male participants, to examine whether domain, feedback, and/or the interaction 
between these variables influenced the likelihood that participants would report any state 
anxiety. See Supplemental Materials. 
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However, there was no effect of feedback (threat vs. affirmation) on self-esteem among 
female participants who received feedback on the femininity of their personality, F(1, 393) = 
0.41, p = .525, f = 0.03. Means for self-esteem among participants who received feedback on 
their physical appearance are presented in Table 2.4. 
Potential Mediators 
One aim of Study 2 was to determine whether felt identity invalidation (in the form 
of felt gender identity invalidation, felt global identity invalidation, and/or results-identity 
discrepancy) and/or gender identity could help to explain the effects of gender 
stereotypicality feedback on state anxiety and state self-esteem. We began by looking at the 
effects of participant gender, domain, and feedback on the potential mediators. 
Felt gender identity invalidation. We conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to examine the potential 
effects of participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these 
variables—on felt gender identity invalidation. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
feedback, F(1, 1565) = 26.05, p < .001, f = 0.13, such that those whose gender 
stereotypicality was threatened reported higher levels of felt gender identity invalidation (M 
= 2.47, SD = 1.24) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.17, SD = 
1.02). 
There was no participant gender x domain x feedback interaction, F(1, 1565) = 0.07, 
p = .795, f = 0.01—and no domain x feedback interaction among female or male participants 
(ps > .35).  
All other results for felt gender identity invalidation are presented as Supplemental 
Materials. 
Felt global identity invalidation. We also conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to examine the potential 
effects of participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these 
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variables—on felt global identity invalidation. This ANOVA revealed no significant effects 
(ps > .08). We broke the sample down by gender and found no evidence for domain x 
feedback interactions among female or male participants (ps > .75).  
Results-identity discrepancy. We conducted another 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to examine the potential 
effects of participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these 
variables—on participants’ sense that the feedback they received was inconsistent their 
beliefs about who they really are. The ANOVA also revealed a three-way participant gender 
x domain x feedback interaction, F(1, 1566) =9.99, p = .002, f =0.07. 
A two-way ANOVA revealed a domain x feedback interaction among male 
participants, F(1, 748) = 11.31, p < .001, f = 0.11. Among male participants who received 
feedback on their personality, there was an effect of feedback, F(1, 359) = 43.73, p < .001, f 
= 0.35, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater 
discrepancy between their results and identity (M = 3.97, SD = 1.82) than those whose 
gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.78, SD = 1.59). There was an even stronger 
effect of feedback among male participants who received feedback on their appearance, F(1, 
389) = 157.90, p < .001, f = 0.64, such that again, those whose gender stereotypicality was 
threatened felt a greater discrepancy between their results and identity (M = 4.43, SD = 1.72) 
than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.44, SD = 1.40). 
Another two-way ANOVA revealed an even stronger domain x feedback interaction 
among female participants, F(1, 818) = 68.77, p < .001, f = 0.25. Among female participants 
who received feedback on their personality, there was an effect of feedback, F(1, 393) = 
24.09, p < .001, f = 0.25, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a 
greater discrepancy between their results and identity (M = 3.51, SD = 1.83) than those 
whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.66, SD = 1.62). There was an even 
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stronger effect of feedback among female participants who received feedback on their 
appearance, F(1, 425) = 373.44, p < .001, f = 1.07, such that those whose gender 
stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater discrepancy between their results and identity 
(M = 4.84, SD = 1.59) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.15, SD 
= 1.25). 
All other results for felt results-identity discrepancy are presented as Supplemental 
Materials. 
Gender identity. We were also interested in gender identity as a potential alternative mediator 
of the effects of feedback (threat vs. affirmation) on state anxiety and state self-esteem. We 
conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA to analyze the effects of participant gender, domain, and 
feedback—and the interactions among these variables—on gender identity.   
 This ANOVA revealed a main effect of feedback, F(1, 1565) = 5.80, p = .016, f = 
0.06, such that participants whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed reported a more 
gender-congruent gender identity (M = 6.01, SD = 0.97) than those whose gender 
stereotypicality was threatened (M = 5.89, SD = 1.01). No other effects were significant (ps 
> .08).  
For exploratory purposes, we broke down the sample by gender and found no 
evidence for an effect of feedback, F(1, 748) = 0.32, p = .571, f = 0.02 , or a domain x 
feedback interaction, F(1, 748) = 0.07, p = .796, f = 0.01, among male participants. There 
was, however, evidence for an effect of feedback among female participants, F(1, 817) = 
8.12, p = .004, I= 0.10, such that those whose femininity was affirmed reported a more 
gender-congruent gender identity (M = 6.06, SD = 1.01) than those whose femininity was 
threatened (M = 5.87, SD = 1.02). There was also some evidence for a domain x feedback 
interaction among female participants, though this effect did not reach statistical 
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significance, F(1, 817) = 3.57, p = .059, f = 0.07. There was no effect of feedback on gender 
identity among women who received feedback on their physical appearance, F(1, 424) = 
0.48, p = .490, f = 0.03. There was, however, an effect of feedback on gender identity among 
woman who received feedback on their personality, F(1, 393) = 10.83, p = .001, f = 0.17, 
such that those whose femininity was affirmed reported a more gender-congruent gender 
identity (M = 6.04, SD = 0.96) than those whose femininity was threatened (M = 5.71, SD = 
1.06). 
Finally, we looked separately at the effects of feedback on each of the four items in 
the gender identity measure. We did not observe effects of masculinity feedback on any of 
these items among men who received feedback on their physical appearance or men who 
received feedback on their personality. Similarly, we observed no effects of femininity 
feedback among women who received feedback on their physical appearance. We did, 
however, observed effects of femininity feedback on all four items among women who 
received feedback on their personality. Descriptive statistics for women in each of the four 





Effects of Femininity Feedback on Gender Identity 
 
 Physical appearance  Personality 
 Threat  Affirmation  
p 
 Threat  Affirmation  
p 
 M (SD)  M (SD)   M (SD)  M (SD)  
I feel like a 
female. 
 
6.31 (1.08)  6.38 (1.08)  .485  6.09 (1.22)  6.41 (1.02)  .005 
I feel like a 
woman. 
 
6.17 (1.18)  6.20 (1.19)  .807  5.98 (1.27)  6.30 (1.06)  .006 
On the inside, 
I feel feminine. 
 
5.80 (1.35)  5.91 (1.27)  .368  5.34 (1.48)  5.71 (1.39)  .011 
On the inside, 
I feel 
masculine. (R) 
5.76 (1.32)  5.81 (1.33)  .670  5.42 (1.49)  5.75 (1.32)  .020 
 
Mediation Analyses 
Of the four potential mediators (felt gender identity invalidation, felt global identity 
invalidation, results-identity discrepancy, and gender identity), the one with a pattern of 
results most similar to that of state anxiety (and self-esteem, in women) was results-identity 
discrepancy. Therefore, we ran a series of analyses using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2013a, 2013b) to determine whether results-identity discrepancy mediated (i.e., 
helped to statistically explain) the interactive effects of domain and feedback on both state 
anxiety and state self-esteem in female participants and the main effect of feedback on state 
anxiety in male participants. We used bootstrapping with 5,000 samples to estimate bias 
corrected confidence intervals for the indirect effects.  
We began by looking at female participants and tested a moderated mediation model 
(Model 7) with feedback (threat=1, affirmation=0) as the predictor variable, state anxiety as 
the outcome variable, results-identity discrepancy as the mediator, and domain 
(appearance=1, personality=0) as a moderator of the effect of feedback on results-identity 
discrepancy. We observed indirect effects of feedback on anxiety through results-identity 
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discrepancy among both participants who received feedback on their appearance and 
participants who received feedback on their personality, but this indirect effect was stronger 
for those in the appearance condition (B = 0.27, 95% CI [0.19, 0.34]) than those in the 
personality condition (B = 0.08, 95% CI [0.05, 0.13]), supporting moderated mediation (B = 
0.18; 95% CI [0.12, 0.26]). Within the domain of physical appearance, switching from 
affirming to threatening feedback resulted in a 0.27-point increase in anxiety on a 4-point 
scale, mediated by results-identity discrepancy. Within the domain of personality, switching 
from affirming to threatening feedback resulted in a 0.08-point increase in anxiety on a 4-
point scale, mediated by results-identity discrepancy. There was no direct effect of feedback 
on state anxiety (B = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.12]), indicating that results-identity discrepancy 
fully accounted for the effects of feedback on anxiety. 
We then conducted these analyses with state self-esteem, rather than state anxiety, as 
the outcome variable. We observed indirect effects of feedback on self-esteem through 
results-identity discrepancy among both participants who received feedback on their 
appearance and participants who received feedback on their personality, but this indirect 
effect was stronger for those in the appearance condition (B = -0.38, 95% CI [-0.51, -0.28]) 
than those in the personality condition (B = -0.12, 95% CI = -0.19, -0.07), again supporting 
moderated mediation (B = -0.26; 95% CI [-0.38, -0.17]). Within the domain of physical 
appearance, switching from affirming feedback to threatening feedback resulted in a 0.38-
point reduction in self-esteem on a 5-point scale, mediated by results-identity discrepancy. 
Within the domain of personality, switching from affirming feedback to threatening 
feedback resulted in a 0.12-point reduction in self-esteem on a 5-point scale, mediated by 
results-identity discrepancy. As with state anxiety, there was no direct effect of feedback on 
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state self-esteem (B = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.20]), indicating that results-identity discrepancy 
fully accounted for the effects of feedback on self-esteem. 
We next turned to male participants. Because male participants showed a main effect 
of feedback on state anxiety but no moderation of this effect by domain, we tested a simple 
mediation model (Model 4) with feedback as the predictor variable, state anxiety as the 
outcome variable, and results-identity discrepancy as the mediator. We observed an indirect 
effect of feedback on anxiety through results-identity discrepancy (B = 0.10, 95% CI [0.05, 
0.15]), supporting mediation. Switching from affirming feedback to threatening feedback 
resulted in a 0.10-point increase in anxiety on a 4-point scale, mediated by results-identity 
discrepancy. There was no direct effect of feedback on state anxiety (B = 0.07, 95% CI [-
0.03, 0.17]), indicating that results-identity discrepancy fully accounted for the effect of 
feedback on self-esteem. 
Because we had not observed an effect of feedback on state self-esteem among male 
participants, we did not further probe this relationship.  
Discussion 
 Study 2 replicated and extended the results of Studies 1a and 1c by comparing 
women’s and men’s psychological responses to gender stereotypicality threats within the 
domains of physical appearance and personality. As predicted, women experienced greater 
state anxiety when the femininity of their physical appearance, but not their personality, was 
threatened than when it was affirmed. Contrary to our prediction that men would show the 
opposite pattern of results for state anxiety—that is, that they would experience heightened 
anxiety when the masculinity of their personality, but not their appearance, was threatened—
we found that men experienced state anxiety in response to masculinity threats across 
domains. Surprisingly, when we broke down the results by domain (as pre-registered), we 
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observed that the effect of feedback on anxiety was only truly significant among men who 
received feedback on their physical appearance (though it was also marginally significant 
among men who received feedback on their personality). This result should be interpreted 
with caution, however, as there was no interaction between feedback and domain among 
men—only a main effect of feedback. 
Additionally, women experienced lower levels of state self-esteem when the 
femininity of their physical appearance, but not their personality, was threatened than when 
it was affirmed. Unlike women, men did not report different levels of state self-esteem when 
their masculinity was threatened versus when it was affirmed.  
 A secondary goal of Study 2 was to examine potential mediators of the effects of 
gender stereotypicality feedback on state anxiety and state self-esteem in women and state 
anxiety in men. We considered felt gender identity invalidation, felt global identity 
invalidation, results-identity discrepancy, and gender identity. We found that those whose 
gender stereotypicality was threatened reported higher levels of felt gender identity 
invalidation and less gender-congruent gender identities than those whose gender 
stereotypicality was affirmed. 
We also found that among both female and male participants, those whose gender 
stereotypicality was threatened reported a discrepancy between their results and their sense 
of self across domains, though this effect was stronger among those who had received 
feedback on their appearance than those who had received feedback on their personality. 
This difference between domains was particularly strong among female participants. Because 
this pattern of results mirrored that for state anxiety (and state self-esteem, in women), we 
tested results-identity discrepancy as a mediator of the relationships between feedback and 
both state anxiety and state self-esteem. We found evidence that among women, the effect 
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of feedback on results-identity discrepancy, moderated by domain, mediated the effects of 
feedback on both state anxiety and state self-esteem. We also found evidence that among 
men, the effect of feedback on results-identity discrepancy mediated the effect of feedback 
on state anxiety. 
 The results of Study 2 demonstrate that both women and men experience anxiety in 
response to threats to the gender stereotypicality of their appearances. Furthermore, these 
results demonstrate that whereas for men, the effect of masculinity threat on anxiety extends 
across domains (both personality and physical appearance), for women, the effect of 
femininity threat on anxiety is limited to the domain of physical appearance. For both 
women and men, however, the effect of gender stereotypicality threat on anxiety is stronger 
within the domain of physical appearance than the domain of personality. 
These results also demonstrate that threats to femininity of physical appearance, but 
not femininity of personality, produce reduced self-esteem in women. Threats to masculinity 
in either domain, however, do not produce reduced self-esteem (or at least self-reported self-
esteem) in men, potentially because self-esteem is considered a masculine trait (Prentice & 
Carranza, 2002) and thus assertions of self-esteem may serve to restore men’s sense of 
masculinity in the wake of such threats (Bosson et al., 2009). 
Finally, the results of Study 2 provide preliminary evidence that a sense of identity 
invalidation—and specifically, the feeling that the feedback one received does not align with 
one’s sense of self—may help to explain the negative psychological consequences (increased 
state anxiety and reduced state self-esteem) of gender stereotypicality threats. 
Internal Meta-Analysis 
Because we observed the predicted effect of physical femininity feedback on state 
anxiety among women in Studies 1a, 1c, and 2, but not Study 1b, we conducted an internal 
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meta-analysis to assess the robustness of this effect across the four studies (Fabrigar & 
Wegener, 2016). We used the procedures outlined by Goh and colleagues (2016) to calculate 
mean effect size (Cohen’s d). For Studies 1a and 1b, we limited our analyses to participants 
in the physical femininity affirmation and threat conditions and collapsed across physical 
attractiveness feedback conditions. For Study 1c, we collapsed across lists of physical 
features (present and absent) conditions. As depicted in Figure 2.2, across the four studies, 
we found a main effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety among women, d = 
0.38, Z = 6.74, p < .001, 95% CI [0.27, 0.50], such that women whose physical femininity 
was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than women whose physical femininity 
was affirmed.  
  
Figure 2.2. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the effect of physical femininity feedback on state 
anxiety among women across studies. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Because we also observed an effect of physical femininity feedback on state self-
esteem among women in Studies 1c and 2, but not Study 1b, we conducted an internal meta-
analysis to assess the robustness of this effect across the three studies in which state self-







esteem was measured. As depicted in Figure 2.3, across these three studies, we found a main 
effect of physical femininity on state self-esteem among women, d = -0.34, Z = -5.55, p < 
.001, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.22], such that women whose physical femininity was threatened 
reported lower levels of state self-esteem than women whose physical femininity was 
affirmed. 
  
Figure 2.3. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the effect of physical femininity feedback on state 
self-esteem among women across studies. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 For exploratory purposes, we also conducted internal meta-analyses to determine 
whether there was any evidence that physical femininity feedback affects state anxiety or 
self-esteem among non-heterosexual women, who are often rated as more physically 
masculine than heterosexual women (Johnson et al., 2007; Lyons et al., 2014; Rieger et al., 
2010) and who may be more likely than heterosexual women to have an intentionally 
masculine gender presentation (Halberstam, 1996; Rubin, 2006). Sensitivity power analyses 
indicated that we could detect effect sizes of d = 0.30 for anxiety and d = 0.31 for self-
esteem with 80% power. As depicted in Figure 2.4, across the four studies, we observed a 






main effect of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety among non-heterosexual women 
(n = 351), d = 0.25, Z = 3.19, p = .001, 95% CI [0.13, 0.56], such that those whose physical 
femininity was threatened reported higher levels of state anxiety than women whose physical 
femininity was affirmed.  
 
Figure 2.4. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the effect of physical femininity feedback on state 
anxiety among non-heterosexual women across studies. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
As depicted in Figure 2.5, we also observed a main effect of physical femininity 
feedback on state self-esteem among non-heterosexual women (n = 328), d = -0.43, Z = -
3.82, p < .001 , 95% CI [-0.65, -0.21], such that women whose physical femininity was 
threatened reported lower levels of state self-esteem than women whose physical femininity 
was affirmed.  









Figure 2.5. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for the effect of physical femininity feedback on state 




 Past research has suggested that whereas men experience increased anxiety in 
response to threats to their masculinity, women do not experience increased anxiety in 
response to threats to their femininity (Vandello et al., 2008). That research, however, 
focused on threats to psychological masculinity and femininity. In the current studies, we 
examined whether women experience anxiety in response to threats to their physical 
femininity. 
Across these studies, women indeed experienced higher levels of anxiety when the 
femininity of their physical appearance was threatened than when it was affirmed (Studies 1a, 
1c, & 2). Whereas threats to physical femininity appeared to produce increases in anxiety 
(relative to control), affirmations of physical femininity appeared to produce reductions in 
anxiety (Study 1a). Although we did not observe an effect of physical femininity feedback on 






levels of state anxiety in Study 1b, results from an internal meta-analysis revealed that this 
effect was robust across the four studies. 
Furthermore, we found evidence that this heightened anxiety was not a product of 
the threat to physical attractiveness that a threat to physical femininity might be thought to 
represent. In other words, women found threats to physical femininity to be anxiety-
inducing in and of themselves. Additionally, the effect of physical femininity feedback on 
state anxiety was not contingent upon participants being given explicit information about the 
physical features upon which judgments of physical femininity and masculinity are based 
(Study 1c). Threats to physical femininity were anxiety-inducing regardless of whether or not 
participants were given information about what constitutes physical femininity.  
We also found evidence across these studies that in addition to producing increased 
anxiety, threats to physical femininity, relative to affirmations of physical femininity, produce 
reductions in self-esteem among women (Studies 1c & 2 and internal meta-analysis with 
Studies 1b, 1c, & 2). 
Furthermore, we found initial evidence that women who receive feedback indicating 
that they are less physically feminine than average may be less inclined than those who 
receive feedback indicating that they are more physically feminine than average to view this 
feedback as important and stable (Study 1c). These results are preliminary, however, and 
must be replicated before any firm conclusions can be drawn from them. 
Additionally, in Study 2, which compared women’s and men’s psychological 
responses to feedback on the gender stereotypicality of their physical appearances and 
personalities, we found evidence that whereas men experience anxiety in response to gender 
stereotypicality threats across two different domains (physical appearance and personality), 
women’s anxiety response is limited to gender stereotypicality threats within the domain of 
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physical appearance. We also found evidence that whereas threats to physical femininity, 
relative to affirmations of physical femininity, produce reduced self-esteem in women, 
neither threats to physical masculinity nor threats to masculinity of personality produce 
reduced self-esteem in men. Explaining this gender difference in the effects of gender 
stereotypicality feedback on self-esteem would require more research. Given that having 
high self-esteem is a gender-intensified prescriptive stereotype for men (Prentice & Carranza, 
2002), it is possible that for men, assertions of self-esteem serve as a form of 
compensation—that is, a means of restoring their sense of masculinity after it has been 
threatened. This explanation is speculative, however, and must be explored further before 
any conclusions about the reasons for this gender difference can be drawn. 
Study 2 also provided preliminary evidence that a feeling of identity invalidation—
and more specifically, a discrepancy between the feedback one received and one’s beliefs 
about who one really is—may explain why gender stereotypicality threats within the domain 
of physical appearance induce anxiety and reduced self-esteem in women and why gender 
stereotypicality threats across domains induce anxiety in men. This finding is consistent with 
past research on consequences of identity invalidation (Albuja et al., 2019; Murray et al., 
2012) and, as discussed later in this section, should be explored in more depth in future 
work.    
Given that the only effects we consistently tested and observed across studies were 
those of physical femininity feedback on state anxiety and state self-esteem, we focus on 
these consistent findings throughout the remainder of our discussion. These findings present 
a challenge to the notion that unlike men, women do not experience anxiety in response to 
threats to their gender stereotypicality. They suggests that women may not, in fact, be less 
concerned with being feminine than men are with being masculine. Rather, whereas men 
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seem to be concerned with achieving and maintaining masculinity across domains (i.e., in 
terms of both personality and appearance), women may be concerned with achieving and 
maintaining femininity within the domain of physical appearance in particular. 
At a theoretical level, the current results broaden prevailing understandings of gender 
stereotypes—and of femininity in particular. Although nearly forty years ago, Deaux and 
Lewis (1984) suggested that gender stereotypes comprise four domains—personality traits, 
role behaviors, occupations, and physical appearance—the majority of the literature on 
gender stereotypes has continued to focus primarily (albeit not exclusively) on psychological 
forms of gender stereotypes. Studies on threats to gender stereotypicality in particular have 
given participants feedback on their masculinity and femininity on the basis of their 
knowledge, personality, interests, or task performance (Frederick et al., 2017; Hunt et al., 
2016; Lee-Won et al., 2017; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). Thus, the conclusions that have 
been drawn from these studies are limited by their focus on one domain of gender 
stereotypicality. Given our finding that women do indeed experience anxiety—and reduced 
self-esteem—in response to threats to the gender stereotypicality of their physical appearances, 
the current studies serve as a call to gender researchers to expand the scope of their inquiry 
to include all four domains of stereotypes that Deaux and Lewis proposed (1984). 
Furthermore, they suggest that research on appearance-related gender stereotypes should 
move beyond a focus on physical attractiveness (Prentice & Carranza, 2002) to a broader 
examination of the pressure on women to appear feminine. 
Although the current studies present a new perspective on the previous finding that 
men, but not women, experience anxiety in response to threats to their gender 
stereotypicality and suggest that women do indeed experience such anxiety, as well as reduced 
self-esteem, our findings should not be interpreted as disputing other theories and evidence 
 129 
that have sought to explain this earlier finding. Our results are not, for example, inconsistent 
with previous accounts suggesting that manhood but not womanhood is a precarious social 
status (Vandello & Bosson, 2013), that masculinity within the domains of personality, role 
behaviors, and occupations is higher status than femininity (Feinman, 1981), or that 
femininity in men is more associated with presumptions of same-gender sexual orientation 
than masculinity in women is (McCreary, 1994). Nor, however, do our results directly 
support any of these accounts. Rather, they exist in parallel with previous explanations for 
men and women’s discrepant responses to feedback indicating that they are counter-
stereotypical. 
At a practical level, the current findings help to elucidate the lived experiences of 
women by pointing to a previously underexplored contributor to anxiety and low self-esteem 
in women. They may also help to explain the great deal of resources—in terms of both time 
(Today/AOL, 2014) and money (Harris Poll, 2014)—that women spend on femininity work, 
including facial hair removal (Toerien et al., 2005) and cosmetic application (Today/AOL, 
2014). Thus, these results have the potential to inform interventions that can improve 
women’s psychological well-being. Specifically, they suggest that discussion of the pressure 
on women to appear physically feminine and the negative psychological consequences of 
believing one is physically counter-stereotypical should be incorporated into guidelines for 
clinical practice with women (American Psychological Association, Girls and Women 
Guidelines Group, 2018), just as the pressure on men to act in a sufficiently masculine 
manner is addressed in guidelines for clinical practice with men (American Psychological 
Association, Boys and Men Guidelines Group, 2018). The current results also suggest that 
beyond contributing to women’s insecurities about body shape and size (Grabe et al., 2008), 
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advertisements for beauty products and procedures—such as hair removal and cosmetics—
may reinforce women’s anxiety about not appearing sufficiently feminine.  
Although the current work has a number of important theoretical and practical 
implications, it also has several limitations that highlight key areas for future research. First, 
our samples consisted primarily of White women (69%-81%). Thus we cannot assume that 
the results from these studies would generalize to women of color. In fact, given that racial 
stereotypes are highly gendered (Galinsky et al., 2013; Goff et al., 2008) and that definitions 
of femininity in the United States are highly Eurocentric (Cole, 2009; Collins, 2004), we 
would expect women’s responses to threats to their femininity to vary as a function of race. 
Black women are thought of by many as non-prototypical women (Thomas et al., 2014) and 
are often perceived as more physically masculine than White women (Goff et al., 2008; Lei et 
al., 2020). Thus, they likely experience more chronic threats to their femininity than women 
of other racial groups do. Black women might therefore be sensitized to these sorts of 
threats—and thus especially affected by them. On the other hand, they might be desensitized 
to these sorts of threats—and thus especially resistant to their negative consequences. 
Indeed, evidence suggests that on average Black women are more satisfied with their 
appearances than White women are (Jefferson & Stake, 2009; York-Crowe & Williamson, 
2005). Because across the current studies only 103 Black women received feedback on the 
femininity of their physical appearance, we did not have adequate power to determine 
whether this feedback affected their levels of anxiety (we could detect d = 0.55 with 80% 
power) or self-esteem (we could detect d = 0.60 with 80% power). Future research should 
recruit a more racially diverse sample and oversample Black women to examine how women 
of different races respond to threats to their physical femininity. Future research should also 
recruit a sample that is more diverse in terms of age, as the mean age for participants in the 
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current studies ranged from 33-37. Given the large overlap in what constitutes a “feminine” 
appearance and a “youthful” appearance (Dinnerstein & Weitz, 1994; Friedman & 
Zebrowitz, 1992), we might also expect to see different responses to physical femininity 
threats among women who are older and who might therefore also face more chronic 
threats to their femininity. Future research with more diverse samples would benefit from 
the use of alternative paradigms, however, as threatening the femininity of women whose 
femininity is chronically threatened could cause undue—albeit temporary—psychological 
distress. 
The current research is also limited by its focus on facial appearances. There are 
numerous distinct elements of physical gender stereotypicality, including, but not limited to 
facial appearance, overall appearance, hair style, amount of body hair, and body shape (Aube 
et al., 1995; Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Lewis, 1983; Kagan, 1964; Myers & Gonda, 1982; 
Spence & Sawin, 1985). It is certainly possible—and indeed likely—that women would 
respond differently to threats to different aspects of their physical femininity. In the current 
studies, however, we opted to focus on facial femininity for both theoretical and practical 
reasons. To draw a clear distinction between physical and psychological femininity feedback, 
we wanted to focus on an aspect of appearance that is not closely tied to one’s personality. 
More malleable and thus more controllable components of physical appearance (e.g., 
clothing and hairstyle) are more likely to reflect one’s personality than less malleable and thus 
less controllable components (e.g., face and body shape). Additionally, whereas it reasonable 
to expect that participants would find randomly assigned feedback on their facial femininity 
plausible, it is less reasonable to expect that they would find randomly assigned feedback on, 
say, the femininity of their hairstyle or clothing plausible. After all, participants likely have a 
strong sense of what the general consensus would be about how feminine those aspects of 
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their appearance are. They may have less of a clear sense, however, of how feminine others 
believe their face is. Finally, extensive research has been conducted on consequences of 
facial femininity and masculinity and has demonstrated that complex inferences and 
judgments are often made on the basis of facial appearance (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2014). 
Thus, facial appearance was an ideal target for feedback in these studies. Future research, 
however, should expand upon the current studies by examining whether our results extend 
to feedback on the femininity of women’s bodily appearances.  
Additionally, the current set of studies focused solely on psychological consequences of 
gender stereotypicality threats. Future work should build upon this to examine behavioral 
consequences of such threats—and, specifically, on potential compensatory assertions of 
femininity (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). Just as men engage in traditionally masculine behaviors 
following threats to their psychological masculinity (e.g., Berke et al., 2017; Bosson & 
Vandello, 2011; Parent et al., 2018; Talley & Bettencourt, 2008), women may engage in 
physical feminization (e.g., cosmetic application, use of photo editing applications, etc.) 
following threats to their physical femininity. Examinations of potential compensation in the 
wake of physical femininity threats can help to elucidate how women cope with this anxiety-
inducing and self-esteem-diminishing experience. 
Furthermore, although Study 2 provided initial evidence that a sense of identity 
invalidation may help to explain the effects of threats to gender stereotypicality on state 
anxiety and self-esteem, this finding must be explored further before firm conclusions can be 
drawn about the psychological mechanisms underlying the observed effects. The measures 
of felt identity invalidation used in this study were not validated scales, and the measure of 
results-identity discrepancy, which mediated the effect of gender stereotypicality threats on 
anxiety and self-esteem, consisted of a single item—“I feel like the results I received are 
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consistent with my beliefs about who I really am” (R). Although this item asked participants 
to report the extent to which the feedback they received was discrepant with their beliefs 
about who they really are (i.e., their identity or sense of self), participants may have 
interpreted this item as referring to their beliefs about what their appearance or personality is 
like (i.e., whether the results they received were accurate). Future research should therefore 
develop and validate a more formal measure of felt identity invalidation to more reliably 
establish whether the feeling that one’s internal sense of self or membership in a gender 
group is not being recognized can account for the negative psychological effects of gender 
stereotypicality threats. Future studies could also directly manipulate identity invalidation in 
cisgender women and men (e.g., by leading women to believe they were mistaken for men 
and men to believe they were mistaken for women) to help determine whether identity 
invalidation indeed produces increased anxiety in women and men and reduced self-esteem 
in women. 
Finally, the results of Study 2 suggested that gender stereotypicality threats can affect 
individuals’ gender identities. In this study, participants whose gender stereotypicality was 
threatened reported less gender-congruent gender identities than those whose gender 
stereotypicality was affirmed. This effect, however, was driven by women in the personality 
condition. Indeed, the pattern of results for gender identity was the exact opposite of the 
pattern of results for anxiety. (Whereas women in the personality condition were the only 
group that did not experience effects of gender stereotypicality threats on anxiety, they were 
also the only group that did experience effects of gender stereotypicality threats on gender 
identity.) One possible explanation for these inverse results is that because psychological 
femininity threats were not anxiety-inducing for women, those who received feedback 
indicating that they were less feminine than average internalized this feedback and 
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incorporated it into their sense of self. Indeed, the discrepancy participants felt between their 
internal sense of self and the results they received appeared to be lower among women in the 
personality threat condition than participants in any of the other threat conditions. It is also 
possible that the reverse causal relationship was at play—that because women who received 
feedback indicating that they were less feminine than average incorporated that feedback 
into their sense of self, they did not find this feedback anxiety-inducing. Additional research 
is therefore needed to explain these findings and to examine other ways in which external 
feedback about one’s gender stereotypicality might influence one’s internal sense of self. 
Conclusions 
 Although past work has demonstrated that women do not experience anxiety in 
response to threats to their psychological femininity, the present studies reveal that women 
do, indeed, experience heightened levels of anxiety—as well as reduced levels of self-
esteem—in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearance. Furthermore, 
the current studies demonstrate that these effects are not the result of women interpreting 
threats to their physical femininity as threats to their physical attractiveness. Rather, they may 
result from a sense of identity invalidation that threats to gender stereotypicality evoke. 
Finally, these studies reveal that men experience anxiety, but not reduced self-esteem, in 
response to masculinity threats across the domains of personality and physical appearance—
but that this effect is particularly strong in the case of threats to physical masculinity. 
Overall, this research suggests that conversations about gender stereotyping and the 
consequences thereof should be expanded to include expectations about not only women 
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Gender stereotypes represent beliefs about both what women and men are like 
(descriptive stereotypes) and what women and men should be like (prescriptive stereotypes) 
(Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Heilman, 2001; Fiske & Stevens, 1993). A major portion of 
literature on the content and consequences of gender stereotypes has focused on what can 
broadly be described as psychological characteristics—primarily personality traits but also 
interests and cognitive abilities. Gender stereotypes, however, comprise both psychological 
and physical attributes (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Lewis, 1983, 1984; Kagan, 1964), and 
this dissertation focuses on the latter. Across four studies, I find that whereas men 
experience anxiety in response to threats to their masculinity across the domains of 
personality and physical appearance, women only experience anxiety (as well as reduced self-
esteem) in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearance. Furthermore, I 
find that identity invalidation—and specifically, a sense that one’s internal sense of self is not 
externally recognized—may underlie these effects.  
Although this dissertation represents an important first step toward understanding 
the phenomenon of femininity threat, given the dearth of previous research on this topic, 
much work remains to be done. In this concluding chapter, I therefore present a preliminary 
agenda for further research on femininity threat. I begin by briefly summarizing the findings 
of this dissertation. I then highlight three key contributions of these findings to the broader 
field of psychology—and the psychology of gender in particular. Finally, I explore additional 
questions about femininity threat that were not answered—or not fully answered—in this 
dissertation. By pursuing these questions, future research can develop a richer and more 
comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms, consequences, and generalizability of the 




Summary of Dissertation 
In Chapter 1 of my dissertation, I provided an overview of key constructs—namely, 
gender stereotypes, gender identity, gender stereotypicality threats, and identity 
invalidation—and highlighted several gaps in the literature on gender stereotypes that require 
further attention. First, I called for more research on the physical components of gender 
stereotypes (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Deaux & Lewis, 1983, 1984; Kagan, 1964). Second, I 
argued that stereotypes about physical appearance are particularly central to how people 
think about femininity (Aube et al., 1995; Spence & Sawin, 1985) and therefore that by 
neglecting stereotypes within this domain, past work may have overlooked important ways in 
which stereotypes harm women. Third, I organized situations in which gender stereotypes 
shape impressions of and therefore harm women along two dimensions (perspective: 
external vs. internal and stereotype congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) and therefore 
four categories: (a) situations in which others believe a woman is stereotypical (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002; Heilman, 1983); (b) situations in which others believe a woman is counter-
stereotypical (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Rudman & Glick, 2001); (c) situations in which a woman 
believes she is stereotypical (Spencer et al., 1999); and (d) situations in which a woman 
believes she is counter-stereotypical. I noted that extensive research has examined the first 
three types of situations but that the final type of situation, in which a women’s femininity is 
threatened, has been largely neglected. I also noted that the paucity of research on femininity 
threats stands in stark contrast with the abundance of research on masculinity threats. I 
argued that although examinations of gender stereotypicality threats in men are important, so 
too are examinations of these threats in women. Finally, I asserted that more research is 
needed to determine whether gender stereotypicality threats have an effect on identity 




invalidation; Campbell & Troyer, 2007; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Franco & O’Brien, 2018). 
As a whole, Chapter 1 laid the foundation for the empirical work presented in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 sought to address the gaps in research highlighted in Chapter 1 by examining 
whether women experience anxiety and/or reduced self-esteem in response to femininity 
threats within the domain of physical appearance and if so, whether a sense of identity 
invalidation can help to explain these effects. Study 1a, but not 1b, found that women indeed 
experience anxiety in response to threats to, as compared to affirmations of, their physical 
femininity, even when their physical attractiveness has been affirmed and even when 
controlling for self-perceptions of physical attractiveness. Study 1c revealed that women 
experience not only anxiety but also reduced self-esteem in response to these threats, 
compared to affirmations, regardless of whether or not the characteristics that make up a 
“feminine” appearance are laid out for them, and even when controlling for self-perceived 
physical attractiveness. In Study 2, which looked at both women and men and randomly 
assigned participants to receive feedback on either their physical appearance or personality, I 
found that whether women experience anxiety and reduced self-esteem in response to 
threats to their femininity, relative to affirmations of their femininity, depends on what 
domain of femininity they receive feedback on. Only femininity threats within the domain of 
physical appearance produced anxiety and reduced self-esteem. By contrast, Study 2 
demonstrated that whether men experience anxiety and reduced self-esteem in response to 
threats to their masculinity, compared to affirmations of their masculinity, does not depends 
on what domain of masculinity they receive feedback on. Masculinity threats produced 
anxiety across domains and had no effect on self-esteem in either domain. Furthermore, a 
sense that the results one received were inconsistent with one’s internal sense of self (i.e., 




feedback on anxiety and self-esteem in women and the main effect of masculinity feedback 
on anxiety in men. Finally, meta-analyses of the studies presented in Chapter 2 indicated that 
across studies, women—including sexual minority women—experienced anxiety and 
reduced self-esteem in response to threats to their physical femininity, as compared to 
affirmations of their physical femininity. Overall, Chapter 2 revealed robust effects of physical 
femininity threats on anxiety and self-esteem in women. 
Contributions 
This research makes several contributions to the literature on the psychology of 
gender. First, it challenges the prevailing wisdom that women are not distressed by threats to 
their femininity. Second, it uncovers a likely mechanism underlying the effects of gender 
stereotypicality threats on anxiety. Additionally, it challenges the idea that femininity and 
attractiveness in women are one and the same. Finally, it highlights the consequences of 
gender stereotypicality threats within a novel context. In this section, I elaborate on each of 
these contributions. 
Past work has suggested that men are more constrained by injunctive gender 
stereotypes than women are (Sirin et al., 2004) and that as a result, men, but not women, 
experience psychological distress in response to gender stereotypicality threats (Vandello et 
al., 2008). This dissertation challenges this conclusion by expanding the scope of research on 
gender stereotypicality threats to include stereotypes within the domain of physical 
appearance and demonstrating that women indeed experience anxiety and reduced self-
esteem in response to threats to their physical femininity. Buoyed by Vandello and 
colleagues’ (2008) finding that men but not women experience anxiety in response to threats 
to their gender stereotypicality, research on masculinity threats has taken off in recent years. 




response to threats their physical femininity, the work presented in this dissertation serves as 
a call for more research on this phenomenon.  
Relatedly, this work also complicates the prevailing wisdom that manhood is more 
“precarious” than womanhood is. The theory of precarious manhood asserts that whereas 
womanhood is understood to be a biological status that is inevitably reached with age, 
manhood is understood to be a social status that requires constant work to achieve and 
maintain—and that can be lost at any time (Vandello & Bosson, 2013). This theory has been 
supported by two main types of evidence: (i) evidence that when people think about 
manhood and womanhood in general, they tend to think of the former as more social and as 
requiring more work than the latter; and (ii) evidence that, as described previously, men, but 
not women, experience distress in response to gender stereotypicality threats (Vandello et al., 
2008). One explanation for the first finding might be that apparent effortlessness is a key 
component of idealized femininity; women are expected to engage in femininity work 
without anyone being aware of it (Clarke & Griffin, 2007; Kwan & Trautner, 2009; Toerien 
& Wilkinson, 2003). However, the current research does not directly speak to this piece of 
evidence for the theory of precarious manhood. It does, however, directly challenge the 
second piece of evidence. Because the final study presented in this dissertation found that 
men experienced anxiety in response to threats to the masculinity of both their physical 
appearance and their personality, some might argue that it provides additional support for 
the idea that men are more readily threatened by gender stereotypicality threats than women 
are—and therefore that manhood is indeed particularly precarious. I would assert, however, 
that the number of domains in which people negatively respond to gender stereotypicality 
threats is not the only reasonable operationalization of precariousness. Indeed, it could just 




esteem in response to gender stereotypicality threats, relative to affirmations, womanhood is 
more precarious than manhood is. I would disagree with this assertion, as well. The current 
research cannot directly speak to the question of whether manhood is more precarious than 
womanhood is. Indeed, this question might not even be an appropriate one, given that 
female adults are often labeled as “girls,” rather than “women” (MacArthur et al., 2020) and 
frequently do not even identify as “women” themselves (Chrisler, 2013). This research does, 
however, suggest that just as men are psychologically invested in their masculinity, so, too, 
are women psychologically invested in their femininity. And believing they have failed to 
achieve an adequate level of femininity is psychologically distressing. Thus, this research 
begins to point to the precariousness of femininity.  
The work presented in this dissertation also provides evidence for a mechanism 
underlying the effects of gender stereotypicality threats in both women and men. Specifically, 
it indicates that a feeling of misalignment between external and internal impressions of 
oneself (what we call “results-identity discrepancy” and conceptualize as a component of felt 
identity invalidation) can help to explain these effects. In the final study of this dissertation, 
we found that this results-identity discrepancy mediated the moderated effects of femininity 
threats on anxiety and self-esteem in women and the main effects of masculinity threats on 
anxiety in men. We also found that the only instance in which gender stereotypicality 
feedback had no effect on anxiety (women who received feedback on their personality) was 
also the only instance in which gender stereotypicality feedback had an effect on gender 
identity, suggesting that gender stereotypicality threats might only be distressing to the extent 
that they contradict one’s deeply held, internal sense of self. Whereas much past work has 
focused on documenting the consequences of gender stereotypicality threats (for men in 




This dissertation also highlights the importance of distinguishing between physical 
femininity and physical attractiveness, two constructs that are often conflated in research on 
women’s body-related cognition and affect. In the studies presented in this dissertation, self-
perceived physical femininity and self-perceived physical attractiveness were indeed 
moderately to highly correlated. They were not, however, so highly correlated as to be 
redundant with one another, and in none of these studies did physical attractiveness 
feedback affect self-perceived physical femininity or did physical femininity feedback affect 
self-perceived physical attractiveness. Despite not having any effect on self-perceived 
physical attractiveness, however, physical femininity threats consistently produced anxiety 
and reduced self-esteem. Thus, this dissertation suggests that fear of looking masculine, much 
like fear of looking unattractive, constitutes a key component of feminine gender role 
stress—or the stress associated with being a woman (Gillespie & Eisler, 1992). Past work has 
highlighted the importance of achieving a feminine physical appearance among transgender 
women (that is, women who were assigned to the male sex at birth; Ainsworth & Spiegel, 
2010; White Hughto & Reisner, 2016; Plemons, 2017). This dissertation extends this work 
and demonstrates that physical femininity—and facial femininity in particular—is important 
to cisgender women, as well. By drawing attention to the distinction between femininity and 
attractiveness, this dissertation broadens the scope of research on body image—and 
particularly appearance (dis)satisfaction—in cisgender women. 
Finally, this dissertation illustrates potential harms of software designed to assess 
people’s faces and speech. Scientists are increasingly using deep learning to build artificial 
neural networks (i.e., networks of algorithms) that can analyze people’s appearances and 
behaviors. Researchers have developed networks to classify faces by gender (Jia & 




evaluate people’s attractiveness (Eisenthal et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2019) and personality (Suen 
et al., 2020; Wei et al., 2018). As this technology has become more widespread, so too has its 
use by private businesses. Smartphone applications like FaceRate use deep learning to rate 
users’ attractiveness, and platforms like HireVue use machine learning to evaluate job 
applicants’ personalities (Leutner et al., 2020). As this technology becomes increasingly 
“social,” it is critical for social scientists to examine not only its benefits but also its 
unintended consequences. 
In past work on gender stereotypicality threats, participants received feedback that 
was supposedly based on their responses to a knowledge test (Lee-Won et al., 2017), 
personality test (Willer et al., 2013), or interest or consumer preferences inventory (Cheryan 
et al., 2015; Frederick et al., 2017).  In the current studies, participants received feedback that 
was supposedly based on novel software’s analysis of a photograph or video they had 
uploaded. Although no photographs or videos were actually analyzed in these studies, the 
description of the software that was supposedly used was based on descriptions of real deep 
learning software and therefore allowed us to examine how participants would respond to 
judgments that were allegedly derived from algorithms. The results of this dissertation 
illuminate how psychologically harmful judgments of femininity and masculinity can be, even 
in the absence of other humans. Thus, the current research indicates that before creating 
software to provide people with feedback on their femininity or masculinity, researchers and 
developers would be advised to consider the likely deleterious consequences of such work. 
Limitations and Open Questions 
More research is needed to develop a comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon at the center of this dissertation: femininity threats. The first three studies in 




this phenomenon. These studies determined that physical femininity threats, relative to 
physical femininity affirmations, produce anxiety and reduced self-esteem in women and 
established that these effects can occur even when these threats are not interpreted as threats 
to attractiveness and even when physical femininity is not defined for women. The final 
study took a broader perspective on femininity threats and confirmed what we expected: that 
psychological femininity threats do not produce anxiety or reduced self-esteem in women. 
Although research on masculinity threats is plentiful, research on femininity threats is 
not. Much additional work is therefore needed to produce a comprehensive body of 
literature on this topic—particularly, on when and which women experience (or do not 
experience) psychological distress in response to these threats, as well as on the effects of 
these threats not only for those who have been threatened but for people in general. In this 
section, I begin by considering the methods used in the current studies and provide 
suggestions for how future work might expand upon them. I then lay out three urgent 





To my knowledge, this dissertation represents the first empirical examination of 
women’s psychological responses to physical femininity threats. In designing these studies, 
my collaborators and I made a number of methodological decisions, each of which had both 
benefits and drawbacks. In this section, I explore three of these decisions and provide 
suggestions for how future research employing similar paradigms might capitalize upon the 
strengths and address the limitations of the methods used here.  
 In these studies, we were primarily interested in between-group differences—
specifically, differences between women whose femininity was threatened and women whose 
femininity was affirmed. Thus, we randomly assigned participants to one of the feedback 
conditions and compared levels of anxiety and self-esteem after participants had received 
feedback on their appearance. These between-subjects designs enabled us to make the 
desired comparisons between participants whose femininity was threatened and participants 
whose femininity was affirmed. They did, not, however, allow us to draw definitive 
conclusions about which condition(s) drove the observed effects. Although we framed these 
studies largely in terms of the effects of femininity threats on anxiety and self-esteem, the 
between-group differences that emerged might have also or alternatively resulted from the 
effects of femininity affirmations on anxiety and self-esteem. 
To gain insight into which condition(s) drove the observed effects, we included 
control conditions in the first two studies. In Study 1a, in which we observed the predicted 
effect of physical femininity feedback on anxiety, levels of anxiety among participants in the 
control condition fell squarely between those of participants in the threat condition and 
participants in the affirmation condition, thus suggesting that both feedback conditions 




gender identity centrality predicted levels of anxiety and self-esteem following physical 
femininity threats, but not physical femininity affirmations, suggesting that the effects of 
feedback on these outcome variables were driven primarily by participants whose femininity 
was threatened. Still, one way to determine which condition(s) produce changes in anxiety 
and/or self-esteem would be to add a within-subjects component to these studies—for 
instance, to measure anxiety and self-esteem both before and after participants receive 
feedback. Therefore, future work examining the psychological consequences of femininity—
or masculinity—feedback would be advised to employ a pretest–posttest design. 
Additionally, to gain a clearer sense of whether women’s baseline levels of anxiety 
and self-esteem are closer to those reported after experiencing femininity threats or those 
reported after experiencing femininity affirmations, future research might make use of 
alternative control conditions. The control condition used in the first two studies in this 
dissertation provided participants with an error message indicating that their photograph 
could not be analyzed. Although this control was appropriate in that it ensured that 
participants went through the exact same procedure as those in the experimental conditions, 
it might not have been ideal given that receiving an error message about one’s physical 
appearance could itself be an anxiety-inducing experience for some people (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 
2008). Additionally, because we dropped the control condition in later studies, we were 
unable to determine whether levels of anxiety among participants in this condition reliably 
fell between those of participants in the two experimental conditions. Future research might 
therefore make consistent use of a more neutral control than that used in the studies 
presented here. For example, it might inform participants that they are going to receive 
feedback about their femininity—but assess their anxiety and self-esteem before providing 




 Finally, the current studies provided participants with feedback that was supposedly 
based on a deep learning analysis of a photograph or video they had uploaded and informed 
participants that the software being used to analyze their appearance (or personality, in Study 
2) was trained on thousands of photographs (or videos, in Study 2) that had been rated by 
panels of human coders. By grounding gender stereotypicality feedback in human ratings, we 
aimed to convey to participants that they were indirectly being judged by other people. 
Indeed, past research demonstrates that artificial intelligence can be used to create 
environments that feel distinctly social (Nash et al., 2018). Furthermore, by providing 
feedback that was supposedly derived from an algorithm, rather than a single person, we 
aimed to convey to participants that the feedback they received was based on a shared, 
rather than an esoteric, understanding of femininity.  
It is possible that participants would have responded differently to the feedback they 
received had it come from, for example, a human interaction partner. On the one hand, such 
feedback might be easier to dismiss, as a single person’s impression is inherently subjective 
and likely not representative of most people’s impressions of one’s appearance or 
personality. On the other hand, feedback from software might be easier to dismiss, as this 
sort of technology is inevitably imperfect and often systematically biased (Danks & London, 
2017). Future work might therefore manipulate the source of the feedback participants 
receive, such that they are randomly assigned to receive feedback from either from an 
algorithm that analyzes femininity on the basis of general consensus or from another person.  
Future work exploring the effects of femininity feedback from other people, rather 
than algorithms, should also consider the social identities of the people providing this 
feedback. As discussed in more depth in the following section, women’s attributions for 




the person or people providing this feedback might influence their attributions. For example, 
if a woman’s physical femininity is threatened by a man or group of men, she might be more 
inclined to dismiss that threat as the product of harmful gender stereotypes than if her 
physical femininity is threatened by another woman or group of women. On the other hand, 
given that femininity is often defined by its appeal to the “male gaze” (Berger, 1972; Hoskin, 
2019; Mulvey, 1999), a woman might be less inclined to dismiss a physical femininity threat 
coming from a man or group of men than a threat coming from a woman or group of 
women. These two competing possibilities—as well as other ways in which the source of 
femininity feedback might influence women’s psychological wellbeing—ought to be 
considered in future work. 
In sum, the methods used in the current research allowed us establish that physical 
femininity feedback supposedly derived from an algorithmic evaluation of one’s facial 
appearance has a reliable effect on anxiety and self-esteem in women. More research is 
needed, however, to conclusively determine which type of physical femininity feedback—
threat or affirmation—drives these effects and to elucidate whether and how these effects 
would vary with varying sources of feedback. 
Directions for Future Research on Femininity Threats 
In the previous section, I explored methodological limitations of the current research 
that could be addressed with relatively minor changes in future research. In this section, I lay 
out three urgent directions for future work on femininity threats, which can, respectively, 
deepen, extend, and expand the studies presented here: (i) research on why women do not 
appear to be distressed by psychological femininity threats; (ii) research on the direct and 
proximal, as well as indirect and more distal, consequences of physical femininity threats; 




sexual minority women are distressed by physical femininity threats. Together, this work can 
help to not only shed further light on the research presented in this dissertation but also 
elucidate both its generalizability and reach. These suggested future lines of research are 













































































































Future Line I: Why Are Women Affected by Physical but Not Psychological Femininity 
Threats? 
The studies in this dissertation revealed that women experience anxiety and reduced 
self-esteem in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearances but not 
threats to the femininity of their personalities. Furthermore, these studies revealed that 
threats to the femininity of women’s physical appearances produce a greater sense of identity 
invalidation than threats to the femininity of their personalities do—and that this sense of 
identity invalidation mediates the interactive effect of femininity feedback (threat vs. 
affirmation) and domain (physical appearance vs. personality) on anxiety and self-esteem. 
Although this moderated mediation begins to suggest that identity invalidation can help to 
explain why threats to physical but not psychological femininity are distressing to women, it 
does not fully account for these disparate effects. After all, women did report higher levels of 
identity invalidation when the femininity of their personality was threatened than when it 
was affirmed, but this sense of invalidation did not result in anxiety or reductions in self-
esteem. The question therefore remains: If women experience distress in response to threats 
to their physical femininity, then why do they not experience distress in response to threats to 
their psychological femininity?  
Information suggesting that a woman’s personality is counter-stereotypical has two 
critical implications: (a) that she possesses traits that are incongruent with beliefs about what 
women are like; (b) that she possesses traits that are highly valued and considered high status 
(Feinman, 1981; Rudman & Glick, 1999; Cejka & Eagly, 1999) and does not possess traits 
that are devalued and considered low status (Hoskin, 2019). It is therefore possible that this 
information is simultaneously threatening—of women’s gender stereotypicality—and 




(a) this information would produce increased anxiety in women who place high value their 
femininity, relative to their status, and reduced anxiety in women who place low value on 
their femininity, relative to their status; (b) these two interpretations would produce 
contradictory effects in women, essentially canceling each other out. 
Testing the first possibility would require measuring additional moderators, 
providing women with feedback on the femininity of their personality (threat vs. 
affirmation—or perhaps more accurately, counter-stereotypical vs. stereotypical feedback), 
and examining whether the measured moderators predict levels of anxiety among women 
who are told their personality is counter-stereotypical as compared to women who are told 
their personality is stereotypical. Specifically, it would require measuring the extent to which 
women value their femininity, relative to their status, and/or their endorsement of traditional 
gender roles (Levant et al., 2007). In the final study of this dissertation, we measured gender 
identity, and this measure included the items “On the inside, I feel feminine” and “On the 
inside, I feel masculine.” These items were completed after the manipulation, however, and 
the manipulation had an effect on gender identity. Additionally, this measure did not assess 
the extent to which women valued their femininity—only the extent to which they felt 
feminine. Therefore, in a follow-up study, prioritization of femininity, versus status, would 
need to be measured before the manipulation, as would endorsement of traditional gender 
roles, which measures the extent to which people believe that in general, women and men 
should behave differently and occupy different social roles. I would predict that the more 
women value their femininity over their status and the more they endorse traditional gender 
roles, the more anxiety (and potentially reduced self-esteem) they would experience in 
response to feedback indicating that their personality is counter-stereotypical (i.e., masculine, 




femininity threats, future research can determine whether it is indeed that case that women 
do not experience anxiety or reduced self-esteem in response to such threats or rather, 
whether some women experience anxiety and reduced self-esteem in responses to these 
threats, whereas others do not.  
Testing the second possibility—that the implications of counter-stereotypical 
feedback for femininity and status produce contradictory effects, thus canceling each other 
out—would require manipulating the framing of this feedback. For example, the 
manipulation could frame feminine personality traits as high-status and highly valued in 
society (for example, by indicating that research has found that people who possess these 
traits are more successful and increasingly sought out in business and politics) or as low-
status and not particularly valued in society (for example, by indicating that research has 
found that people who possess these traits are less successful and not sought out in business 
and politics)—or present no information about the status of these traits. 
Additionally, because, in the final study of this dissertation, the effect of masculinity 
threats within the domain of personality on men’s anxiety was only marginally significant, it 
is important to consider the possibility that participants in this study found the feedback 
about their appearances more meaningful than the feedback about their personalities. For 
example, participants might have been acting differently in the videos they submitted than 
they do in their day-to-day lives and therefore more inclined to dismiss the feedback about 
their personality than the feedback about their appearance. Therefore, future research could 
use a slightly different paradigm to provide this feedback. Although it was important in the 
current work to have participants upload videos of themselves so that we could credibly 
provide them with feedback about either their physical appearance or their personality, this 




future research, rather than uploading videos of themselves speaking, participants could 
simply complete personality and/or interest inventories, as they have done in past research 
(Frederick et al., 2017; Willer et al., 2013). By strategically manipulating the framing of 
psychological femininity threats, future research can help to explain why women—or at least 
many women—do not experience these threats as distressing. 
Future work could also consider why men are distressed by feedback indicating that 
they are less psychologically masculine then average—and, specifically, whether the anxiety 
men experience in response to such feedback results from the threat to their identity or the 
threat to their status that this feedback represents. Given that status is such a fundamental 
element of the male gender role (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010), parsing the distinct 
contributions of identity threat and status threat to men’s responses to masculinity threats 
would be a difficult endeavor. By framing masculine personality traits as either high-status or 
low-status, the two could theoretically be disentangled. For example, similar to that which 
was proposed for future studies on femininity threat, participants could be told that people 
who possess masculine traits are generally successful and sought out in business and politics 
or that people who possess these traits are often unsuccessful and decreasingly sought out in 
business and politics. Such a manipulation might not be feasible, however, as informing men 
that masculine personality traits are decreasing in status might itself present a group status 
threat to men—and this sort of threat is liable to produce the same sorts of effects that a 
threat to a man’s individual masculinity would (Willer et al., 2013). 
More broadly, given how intimately connected gender and status are, the current 
work, in conjunction with past work on masculinity threats, raises questions as to how 
unique the observed results are to gender—and how likely they would be to generalize to 




posits the existence of three major types of group-based hierarchies: one based on age (in 
which adults hold power over children), one based on gender (in which men have higher 
status and hold more power than women), and one based on “arbitrary sets” (such as 
religion or race, in which certain groups have higher status and hold more power than 
others). Although these three types of hierarchies are unique from one another in several 
ways, they also possess similarities. For example, just as threats to the privileged status of 
men have been linked to assertions of male superiority and dominance (Willer et al., 2013), 
threats to the privileged status of White Americans have been linked to increased prejudice 
against racial outgroups and increased support for policies that preserve the status quo (Craig 
et al., 2018). The asymmetry in women’s and men’s responses to psychological gender 
stereotypicality threats may therefore reflect a broader tendency for high status groups to be 
more vulnerable to stereotypicality threats than low status groups are. More research is 
needed, however, to test this possibility. 
Future Line II: Consequences of Physical Femininity Threats 
In this dissertation, I demonstrated that women experience anxiety and reduced self-
esteem in response to threats to the femininity of their physical appearances. Furthermore, I 
found that a sense of identity invalidation statistically explained this effect. It is possible, 
however, that the psychological consequences of physical femininity threats extend beyond 
these specific constructs. Furthermore, the question remains: How do women cope with the 
feelings of identity invalidation and psychological distress that physical femininity threats 
produce? And what are the consequences of these coping strategies? Here, I lay out three 
avenues for future research that can begin to answer these questions. The first avenue 
focuses on expanding the focus of research on psychological responses to physical 




and elements of the self-concept. The second avenue focuses on moving beyond women’s 
psychological responses to physical femininity threats to explore their behavioral responses to 
these threats. Finally, the third avenue focuses on examining potential consequences of these 
behavioral responses. 
How Else Do Women Psychologically Respond to Physical Femininity 
Threats?. In the current set of studies, we were primarily interested in the effects of physical 
femininity threats on anxiety, which past work has demonstrated masculinity threats produce 
in men (Vandello et al., 2008). Future work, however, would benefit from also considering 
the effects of femininity threats on other forms of emotional distress—and on anger in 
particular (Spielberger et al., 1983). Although anxiety and anger are similar in terms of both 
valence (negative) and arousal (high), they differ from one another in several important ways. 
Whereas anxiety has been described as involving a feeling of submissiveness, anger has been 
described as involving a feeling of dominance (Russell & Mehrabian, 1974). Whereas anxiety 
has been described as being avoidance-oriented, anger has been described as being 
approach-oriented (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). And whereas anxiety has been described as a 
response to hazards, anger has been described as a response to moral transgressions 
(Petersen, 2010). Furthermore, when it comes to interpersonal rejection (a phenomenon that 
is distinct from but likely related to gender stereotypicality threats), anxiety, more so than 
anger, tends to follow from self-blame (internal attributions), whereas anger, more so than 
anxiety, tends to follow from other-blame (external attributions) (Zimmer-Gembeck et al., 
2016). 
Causal attributions for femininity threats—which likely vary as a function of both the 
situation and the individual—may therefore influence the extent to which women respond to 




for these threats (i.e., attribute them to a true lack of femininity), they may respond with 
anxiety. To the extent that they make external attributions (e.g., attribute threats to raters’ 
narrow, misguided understandings of what is means to look “feminine”), however, they may 
respond with anger. Future research is therefore needed to determine whether and if so when 
and in whom physical femininity threats produce anger, as opposed or in addition to anxiety. 
This research could begin by assessing participants’ attributions for femininity threats and 
examining whether these attributions predict emotional responses (with more internal 
attributions producing more anxiety and more external attributions producing more anger). 
It could also experimentally manipulate the source of feedback and, as a result, attributions 
for feedback. For example, participants could be randomly assigned to learn that the 
software evaluating their appearance was developed based on the ratings of either a diverse 
group of women and men or a homogenous group. I would anticipate that participants in 
the former condition would be more likely than those in the latter to make internal 
attributions for the feedback and to experience anxiety and that participants in the latter 
condition would be more likely than those in the former to make external attributions and to 
experience anger. 
Additionally, given that anxiety tends to involve avoidance motivation whereas anger 
tends to involve approach motivation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), future work might 
consider differences in the behavioral consequences of anxiety and anger in the wake of 
femininity threats. To the extent that they are motivated to act, women who make internal 
attributions for femininity threats—and who are therefore likely to experience anxiety—may 
attempt to cope by increasing the femininity of their physical appearance, as described in the 
following section. On the other hand, women who make external attributions for femininity 




the source of the feedback. For example, if a woman attributes such a threat to narrow, 
misguided understandings of what is means to look “feminine” and becomes angry as a 
result, she might be inclined to take action—either individually or collectively—to address 
what she views as harmful gender stereotypes. Future research could test this possibility 
using both correlational and experimental methods. First, it could examine whether different 
emotional responses to femininity threats predict divergent behavioral responses. Next, if 
causal attributions for threats indeed inform emotional responses (as predicted above), it 
could experimentally manipulate these attributions and examine not only state anxiety and 
anger but also behavioral intentions and actions. 
Future work also ought to examine the effects of physical femininity threats on 
elements of the self-concept other than self-esteem (Campbell et al., 1996). In the current 
studies, we opted to focus on self-esteem, an evaluative component of self-concept, as 
experiences with identity denial have been linked to reductions in self-esteem, or negative 
evaluations of the self. Future research, however, would benefit from taking a broader 
perspective on self-concept and considering the extent to which these threats affect self-
concept clarity, defined as “the extent to which the contents of an individual’s self-
concept…are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable” 
(Campbell et al., 1996). Experiences with rejection or failure in valued domains have been 
linked to reductions in self-concept clarity (Ayduk et al., 2009; Lavallee & Campbell, 1995; 
Nezlek & Plesko, 2001), as have the imagined loss of a valued social identity (Slotter et al., 
2015) and the disconfirmation of self-beliefs (Hertel, 2017). Thus, threats to physical 
femininity are likely to have a destabilizing effect on self-concept, particularly among women 
who think of themselves as feminine and/or see their femininity as central to their overall 




doubt who they are as people. Measuring self-concept clarity in future studies would 
contribute to a more thorough understanding of the effects of physical femininity threats on 
women’s sense of self.  
How Do Women Behaviorally Respond to Physical Femininity Threats?. 
Experiences with actual or anticipated invalidation have been linked to the pursuit of 
external identity affirmation (e.g., Sevelius, 2013). For example, transgender women who 
have few opportunities for such affirmation have reported that sex with men can validate 
their gender identity (Melendez & Pinto, 2007; Nemoto et al., 2004) and that they may 
engage in sexual activity that they otherwise would not if it affirms their sense of 
womanhood (Bockting et al., 1998; Edwards et al., 2007). Experimental work has also 
demonstrated that experiences with identity invalidation can lead to compensatory assertions 
of identity. When Asian Americans experience challenges to their American identity, for 
example, they have been shown to put extra effort into demonstrating their knowledge of 
American culture (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). Research on masculinity threat has revealed 
similar results. When men’s masculinity is threatened, they tend to assert it through 
traditionally masculine behaviors and attitudes, including violence and aggression, support 
for war, homophobia, and interest in buying a sports utility vehicle  (Bosson & Vandello, 
2011; Bosson et al., 2009; Glick et al., 2007; Talley & Bettencourt, 2008; Willer et al., 2013). 
Although the ways in which transgender women feminize their physical appearances in the 
pursuit of identity recognition has been preliminarily considered (e.g., Plemons, 2017), to my 
knowledge, research has yet to consider femininity work as a strategy by which cisgender 
women seek to obtain identity affirmation in the wake of threats to their physical femininity. 
Future work might consider examining whether cisgender women engage in 




given that past work has suggested that such “recovery strategies” may not, in fact, restore 
self-esteem (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004), future research should investigate whether these 
assertions of femininity are psychologically effective as coping mechanisms. 
I began testing the first question—whether women “compensate” in response to 
physical femininity threats—in a pilot study that was interrupted by the COVID-19 
pandemic and which can serve as a model for future research. In this study, we gave 
participants feedback on their physical femininity and then instructed them to create a social 
media profile by taking a photograph of themselves (i.e., a “selfie”), editing and applying 
filters to the photograph as desired, and reporting on their personality traits and interests. 
Participants were not given specific instructions for taking the photographs, as we wanted 
them be free to make their own decisions about their facial expression, bodily posture, and 
positioning, all of which can serve specific impression management goals (e.g., appearing 
more feminine; Krämer & Winter, 2008; Smith & Sanderson, 2015). 
In future studies, to determine whether women indeed present themselves as more 
feminine after their physical femininity has been threatened, participants’ photographs can 
be coded on a number of different dimensions, such as: self-touching (i.e., touching one’s 
face, hair, or clothing, which is more common in women’s selfies than men’s; Döring et al., 
2016); head and body cant (which are also more common in women’s selfies than men’s; 
Döring et al., 2016); smiling (which tends to be more expansive in women’s Facebook 
profile pictures than men’s; Tifferet & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2014); use of filters (which tends to be 
more frequent among women than men; Dhir et al., 2016); and angle (i.e., taken from above, 
which is more common in women’s selfies than men’s; taken from below, which is more 
common in men’s selfies than women’s; or taken from the front; Sedgewick et al., 2017). 




they are taken from previous studies of gender stereotypes (Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Haines et 
al., 2016; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Spence et al., 1974, 1975; Zinkhan et al., 2004). 
Analyses of these data could reveal not only if women compensate for threats to their 
physical femininity but also how women compensate—that is, whether they assert their 
femininity in the domain in which they were threatened (physical appearance) or in another 
domain (personality or interests). 
To answer the question of whether such compensation serves as an effective coping 
strategy, future studies could also measure anxiety, self-esteem, and identity invalidation 
again, after participants have had the opportunity to assert their femininity, to determine 
whether such assertions reduce anxiety and restore self-esteem and if so, whether reductions 
in participants’ sense of identity invalidation can explain these effects. 
Future work should also examine alternative coping strategies that women may use 
to reduce anxiety and restore their self-esteem in the wake of threats to their physical 
femininity—particularly mechanisms that do not require women to devote time, energy, or 
money to increasing their adherence to gender stereotypes. When people experience threats 
to their self-integrity (i.e., their positive sense of self), they can restore it by engaging in self-
affirmation (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Importantly, such self-affirmation does not need to 
pertain to the same domain in which their sense of self was threatened to be effective 
(Sherman & Cohen, 2002; Steele, 1988). Therefore, self-affirmation exercises, in which 
individuals reflect on their personal values and/or skills and why these values and skills are 
important to them, can serve as a psychological buffer in threatening situations—particularly 
among people who are low in trait self-esteem (Cohen et al., 2006; Creswell et al., 2005).  
In the studies in this dissertation, all participants completed such a self-affirmation 




on the deception involved in the study (i.e., informed that the feedback was bogus). 
Furthermore, anxiety and self-esteem were not measured again after participants completed 
the self-affirmation exercise. Therefore, future research is needed to determine whether 
engaging in a self-affirmation exercise can reduce women’s anxiety and restore their self-
esteem following experiences with physical femininity threats. 
Do Behavioral Responses to Femininity Threats Maintain Physical Gender 
Stereotypes?. The studies presented in this dissertation focused on the experiences of 
women whose physical femininity had been threatened. The pressure on women to appear 
physically feminine, however, may have broader implications—including implications for the 
maintenance of descriptive gender stereotypes. As discussed, when their physical femininity 
has been threatened, women may put effort into “recovering” that femininity (Rudman & 
Fairchild, 2004) by, for example, presenting themselves in a stereotypical fashion. Similarly, 
women whose physical femininity has not been threatened may put effort into ensuring that 
they appear adequately stereotypical so as to avoid experiencing femininity threats. The more 
women feminize their appearances—to either recover from or avoid femininity threats—the 
less visible their “natural” appearances (i.e., their appearances in the absence of photograph 
editing, facial and body hair removal, cosmetic application, hair styling, etc.) become. 
Humans are generally considered a sexually dimorphic species (cf. Blackless et al., 
2000), and in the absence of any femininity work, women and men, on average, would no 
doubt look different from one another. The femininity work that women engage in, 
however, certainly exaggerates these differences. When women apply cosmetics, they 
generally darken their eyes and lips, thus increasing average gender differences in facial 
contrast (Etcoff et al., 2011; Russell, 2010). And when they shave, wax, or undergo 




Tiggemann & Hodgson, 2008; Toerien et al., 2005), they increase average gender differences 
in amount of facial and body hair. As Friedman (2013) puts it: “Polarizing grooming 
practices create sex differences where there are none ‘naturally’ or significantly exaggerate 
subtle differences, thus reducing the proportion of human commonalities male and female 
bodies would otherwise share…” (p. 82). Being unaware of these practices—or the extent to 
which women tend to engage in them—may lead people to believe that women and men 
look more different than they naturally do. As Chrisler (2013) has noted: 
Most men have no idea until they live with a woman (and maybe not even then 
because most of this work is done in private) how much time and effort it takes 
women to tame their natural bodies and shape them into an ‘acceptable’ look… 
 
To test this possibility, future research could adapt a paradigm developed by Rudman 
and Fairchild (2004), who found that after their psychological gender stereotypicality had 
been threatened, men and, to a lesser extent, women expressed concerns about others’ 
reactions to their counter-stereotypicality, engaged in attempts to conceal their counter-
stereotypicality, and understood that through that concealment, they were contributing to 
the maintenance of gender stereotypes. To determine whether similar processes occur within 
the domain of physical appearance, future research could have women upload photographs 
of themselves (as they did in the studies in this dissertation), provide them with feedback 
about their physical femininity, give them the opportunity to upload either their original 
photograph or a new or edited photograph to a social media website, and then ask them how 
feminine future visitors to the social media website would expect women, in general, to look. 
I would predict that women who uploaded new or edited photographs of themselves, as 
compared to those who did not, would think future visitors to the website would expect 




Future studies could also investigate the extent to which lack of awareness of 
femininity work reinforces descriptive gender stereotypes about physical appearance. For 
example, correlational research could examine whether the amount of time people believe 
the average woman devotes to femininity work predicts the extent to which they believe 
women and men naturally look different. I would predict that the less femininity work 
people believe women engage in, the more different they would believe women and men 
naturally look. 
The results of such future work could inform interventions to buffer against the 
deleterious consequences of physical femininity threats, as well as the broader pressure to 
appear feminine. Given that women are inundated with images of other women whose 
appearances have been altered (via makeup, hair styling, and photograph editing; Wolf, 
1990), they may falsely believe that most women naturally look more feminine than they 
actually do. This belief could produce unrealistic expectations about their own 
appearances—and lead them to chronically feel like they do not “measure up.” Informing 
women about the amount of work that goes into feminizing other women’s appearances 
might therefore alter their expectations for their own appearances and make them less 
vulnerable to physical femininity threats. 
Such interventions could make use of existing media, such as Dove’s Evolution video 
(Nelson, 2013; Piper, 2006), which depicts a model undergoing a dramatic physical 
transformation before appearing on a billboard advertisement and which concludes with the 
message “No wonder our perception of reality is distorted.” Although this video was 
developed as part of Dove’s “Campaign for Real Beauty” and focuses on attractiveness, 
rather than femininity, given how closely connected these two constructs are (Penton-Voak 




correcting misconceptions about typical levels of physical femininity. By correcting these 
misconceptions, interventions could begin to not only alter descriptive gender stereotypes 
but also mitigate the negative consequences of gender stereotypicality threats. 
Future Line III: Intersectional Perspectives 
Gender, race, and sexual orientation all intersect with one another to form unique 
identities and experiences, and none of these dimensions can be fully understood in isolation 
from the others (Cole, 2009; Crenshaw, 1994; Essed, 1991, p. 5; Ghavami & Peplau, 2013; 
Rosette et al., 2018; Shields, 2008). In the research presented in this dissertation, however, 
which relied upon online convenience samples, the majority of women who participated 
were White (69%-81% across studies) and heterosexual (68%-86% across studies). In this 
section, I therefore propose two directions for future research that center the experiences of 
women who were not adequately represented in the current work and whose relationships 
with femininity and femininity threats may vary substantially from those of White, 
heterosexual women. The first proposed direction focuses on how Black and sexual minority 
women respond to physical femininity threats. The second considers Black and sexual 
minority women’s relationships with femininity more broadly. The conclusions that can be 
drawn from the studies presented in this dissertation are limited by these studies’ samples. 
By taking an intersectional perspective, future research can gain a more complete 
understanding of women’s relationships with femininity and femininity threats. 
Do Femininity Threats Differentially Affect Women with Different 
Intersecting Identities?. Additional research is needed to establish if and how women of 
other demographic groups respond to and cope with physical femininity threats—or, in 




on two groups of women—Black women and sexual minority women—who may be 
particularly likely to experience femininity threats in their daily lives.  
Black Women. Future work might examine how Black women respond to physical 
femininity threats, which they may experience more often than women of other racial groups 
do, as well as how their attributions for these threats influence their psychological and 
behavioral responses. In past work with predominantly White samples, participants 
perceived Black women’s faces as more masculine than White women’s faces (Goff et al., 
2008; Lei et al., 2020). Participant comments from the studies presented in this dissertation 
reveal that at least some of the Black women who participated were acutely aware of these 
biased perceptions and were concerned about their implications for how the software had 
evaluated their femininity. (Participants provided these comments before being debriefed.) For 
example, a 23-year-old Black heterosexual participant from Study 1b whose physical 
femininity and attractiveness had both been affirmed commented: “I mean, I was very happy 
that I was rated as attractive and feminine. Especially being black, I thought I would have 
bad results but I was shocked to see my rating was pretty good.” On the flip side, a 20-year-
old Black heterosexual participant from Study 1c whose femininity had been threatened asked: 
I was wondering who the model of femininity and masculinity is for your study and 
who (as in the culture and race) made this program. I know that people of certain 
culture view others as a more or less masculine than a person of another culture.  
For example, white people will find black characteristics on women more masculine, 
and it is difficult for people to recognize the ages of people from differing cultures. 
So who are we being judged by? 
 
Additionally, a 21-year-old Black heterosexual participant from Study 1c whose femininity 
had been threatened explained: 
I have heard of similar software before and how it fails when it comes to classifying 
black women....I am constantly reminded that I am not 'feminine' in the way that I 
should be and I don't need a beta version software to use my face to reaffirm the 





It is unclear, however, how Black women’s awareness of White people’s biased 
perceptions of their femininity influenced their psychological responses to the feedback they 
received. Attributions for this feedback might have influenced participants’ responses. 
Attributing interpersonal rejection to discrimination, rather than one’s own 
deficiencies, can buffer against the negative effects of rejection on self-esteem (Crocker et al., 
1991; Major et al., 2003). Attributing physical femininity threats to racism could similarly 
protect Black women from the self-esteem-diminishing consequences of such threats. This 
protection, however, would not necessarily mean that these threats are less globally harmful 
to Black women than they are to White women—only that they might be less harmful to 
their self-esteem in the moment. Indeed, a large body of literature demonstrates that chronic 
experiences with discrimination can result in negative mental health outcomes (Banks et al., 
2006; Hatzenbuehler, 2009; Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009), suggesting that frequent 
femininity threats could be detrimental to Black women’s psychological wellbeing. 
Attributing femininity threats to racism could also potentially produce anger and 
physiological activation (Mendes et al., 2008), both of which can be productive, in terms of 
facilitating approach-oriented coping and collective action (Stürmer & Simon, 2009; Van 
Zomeren et al., 2012), but also damaging, in terms of long-term mental health consequences 
(Pittman, 2011).  
Examining the effects of attributions for physical femininity threats on Black 
women’s responses to these threats would require manipulating the source of the feedback 
they receive. For example, participants could be randomly assigned to either a condition in 
which they are told that they are being evaluated by White raters (and/or that the software 
assessing their appearance was tested on White women) or a condition in which they are told 




Black women). Participants could then report not only their levels of anxiety and self-esteem 
but also their attributions for the feedback, their levels of anger, and their desire to engage in 
collective action. Among participants whose femininity is threatened, I would expect those 
evaluated by White raters to be more likely than those evaluated by Black raters to attribute 
their results to racism or racial biases. I would also expect them to consequently report 
higher levels of self-esteem, more anger, and a greater desire to engage in collective action. I 
would have no a priori predictions about the effects of evaluator race on levels of anxiety, 
given that both femininity threats and experiences with racial discrimination can produce 
anxiety (Graham et al., 2015). It is possible, however, that participants in the “White 
evaluator” condition would attribute their feedback to both their racial group membership and 
their actual physical femininity—or in other words, that they would believe that because they 
are Black, they truly look masculine. If this were the case, I would expect participants who 
receive femininity threats from a White evaluator to experience particularly high levels of 
anxiety (Graham et al., 2016; Sosoo et al., 2019). 
Alternatively, to avoid potential ethical concerns about subjecting Black women to 
unnecessary psychological risks, future studies could make use of paradigms that do not 
involve directly threatening individual participants’ femininity. For example, rather than 
providing participants with feedback about their own appearance, researchers could 
manipulate the salience of beliefs about the appearances of Black women in general (Neel et 
al., 2013). They could then examine not only anxiety, self-esteem, and anger but also 
impression management strategies to determine whether Black women who are reminded of 
beliefs about their ingroup experience negative psychological consequences (Jerald et al., 




Additionally, future correlational and qualitative studies could explore potential long-term 
consequences of frequent physical femininity threats. 
Finally, future research should also consider how other women of color respond to 
physical femininity threats—and femininity threats more generally. Their responses might 
also differ from those of participants in the current studies, the majority of whom were 
White. For example, Asian women, who are often stereotyped as hyperfeminine (Pyke & 
Johnson, 2003), might be particularly distressed by femininity threats, which would suggest 
that they are not only counter-stereotypical women but also highly counter-stereotypical 
Asian women. These threats might also be particularly upsetting if they come as a surprise 
(Wirth et al., 2017). On the other hand, to the extent that Asian women have internalized 
stereotypes about their ingroup and perceive themselves as highly feminine as a result, they 
might be less likely than other women to interpret femininity threats as meaningful 
reflections of reality (Feather & Simon, 1971). Additional research is clearly needed to 
understand how experiences with femininity threats differ among women with different 
racial identities. 
Sexual Minority Women. Future work would also be advised to examine sexual 
minority women’s experiences with and responses to physical femininity threats. On average, 
lesbians are perceived as more physically masculine than heterosexual women (Lyons et al., 
2014; Rieger et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2007), and in some cases, lesbians intentionally 
present themselves as masculine as a form of identity expression (Halberstam, 1996; Rubin, 
2006). Lesbians are also often stereotyped as having masculine personalities (Blashill & 
Powlishta, 2009; Kite & Deaux, 1987; Taylor, 1983). Nonetheless, an internal meta-analysis 
revealed that non-heterosexual women in our samples (which included women who 




or “other”) indeed experienced increased anxiety in response to physical femininity threats, 
as compared to physical femininity affirmations. And a number of non-heterosexual 
participants discussed their sexual identity when commenting on the feedback they had 
received. 
For example, a 39-year-old White lesbian from Study 1c whose physical femininity 
had been threatened noted that the results she had received were consistent with her 
expectations and gender presentation, saying: 
I am a very masculine looking middle-aged lesbian, so I wasn't surprised at all. If 
anything I kind of expected it to say that I was even more masculine looking than it 
did. I often get mistaken as a man and even when I was a little girl people thought I 
was a little boy. 
 
On the other hand, a 38-year-old White bisexual participant from Study 2 whose physical 
femininity had also been threatened noted that that her results were unexpected and 
questioned whether her sexual orientation had contributed to them: 
I guess I was a little surprised that the software did not see me as feminine.  I feel 
like I am definitely recognized as female and feminine.  I am bisexual so I am not 
sure if that has anything to do with my being less feminine or not but this is 
something that I now will think about.  I generally feel pretty good about myself and 
the results will not change that, however it was a little surprising and made me think 
about how i present myself. 
 
An 18-year-old Black lesbian from Study 1c whose physical femininity had been affirmed 
expressed both surprise and satisfaction with her results: 
I've never really perceived myself as a very feminine or even remotely attractive 
person. Especially as a gay woman on the larger side...who doesn't wear makeup or 
typically feminine clothing. I've always thought others - both men and women - 
perceived me as much more masculine and unattractive than the average female, 
which I've never really liked very much. I just wear clothes that are comfortable and 
practical and I don't feel like wearing makeup would be me being my authentic self. 
These results were a complete surprise and a nice confidence boost that made me 
feel better about myself, especially considering that I (as usual) was wearing no 
makeup at all in the picture. Admittedly, the angle of the picture makes me look 
better than I think I usually do (hides some of the fat under my chin), but the picture 





Finally, an 18-year-old White bisexual participant from Study 1c whose physical femininity 
had also been affirmed noted that the results she had received were reassuring, given her 
sexual identity: 
I am in a lesbian relationship currently and I hate doubting my appearance because 
one of us will be labeled the boy in the relationship. My results were me being 73% 
more feminine than other women, which made me happy but after a few minutes 
guilty. It should not matter and yet because of the stigma, I don't want to look at all 
masculine. 
 
Together, these comments highlight the variation in gender expression—and 
responses to physical femininity feedback—that exists among sexual minority women. They 
also suggest that in some cases, physical femininity feedback may be particularly meaningful 
for sexual minority women, who may interpret this feedback as a reflection of either their 
confirmation or their refutation of stereotypes about their sexual orientation group—or in 
other words, who may experience stereotype threat in contexts in which their femininity is 
evaluated. Future work is needed to compare the extent to which heterosexual and non-
heterosexual women experience anxiety in such contexts, as well as to explore individual 
differences that predict sexual minority women’s psychological responses to physical 
femininity threats. 
(How) Do Women with Different Identities Develop Different Definitions of 
Femininity?. Finally, future research might explore alternative constructions of femininity 
among women with different identities. Throughout this dissertation, I have focused on 
understandings of femininity that are both Eurocentric and heteronormative (Collins, 2004). 
Black and queer women, however, may have more diverse understandings of what it means 
to be feminine. 
Black Women. Although Black women are aware of Eurocentric standards of 




& Zucker, 2007; Sekayi, 2003)—and therefore might not be as harmed by them. Indeed, 
exposure to “mainstream” (i.e., White) television appears to have negative consequences for 
body image among White but not Black women (Schooler et al., 2004). Furthermore, despite 
being exposed to White people’s negative stereotype about their group (Jerald et al., 2017), 
initial evidence indicates that Black women are either as satisfied or more satisfied with their 
bodies than White women are (Grabe & Hyde, 2006; Smith et al., 1999). Although both 
Black and White women might value physical femininity to the same extent, their 
understandings of what constitutes physical femininity might differ. For example, one study 
found that wearing makeup is more important to White women than Black women but that 
wearing feminine clothing is more important to Black women than White women (Cole & 
Zucker, 2007). Future research is needed to determine whether, when, and how Black 
women resist understandings of femininity that reinforce racial hierarchy and claim 
alternative femininities (Eko, 2018). 
Sexual Minority Women. Just as White and Black women might, on average, define 
femininity differently, so, too, might heterosexual and sexual minority women. Although 
sexual minority women might be more likely than heterosexual women to identify as 
masculine (Lippa, 2000), even those who identify as highly feminine might be less 
constrained by hegemonic understandings of femininity than heterosexual women who 
identify as highly feminine are. This possibility is exemplified by a comment from a 44-year-
old Hispanic/Latina bisexual participant from Study 1c whose physical femininity had been 
affirmed, who said: 
Gender binaries are social constructs that are not only fluid but on a spectrum. I am 
Queer cis-woman who plays with gender but presents as femme. The results I 





Femme-identified queer women and other femme-identified individuals (i.e., 
“femmes”) provide examples of challenges to dominant understandings of what it means to 
be feminine (Blair & Hoskin, 2015). Although relatively few psychological studies have 
explored the identities and experiences of individuals who identify as femme, those that have 
have noted several themes that distinguish what it means to be femme from what it means to 
be hegemonically feminine. In one study focused on a community of sexual minority 
women, for example, femmes were described as rebellious, courageous, powerful, strong, 
open, honest, sexual, and aesthetically feminine (Levitt et al., 2003). In another study of 
femme-identified individuals of a variety of gender identities and sexual orientations, 
participants described strength, agency, rebellion, and self-actualization as key characteristics 
associated with femme identity (Blair & Hoskin, 2015). 
Femme identity is characterized by its resistance to externally-imposed 
understandings of what it means to be feminine (i.e., to be assigned female and to be 
hairless, thin, able-bodied, and White) and by a rejection of femininity in the service of the 
male gaze (Hoskin, 2019). It is femininity defined and expressed by those who, by virtue of 
their bodies and/or desires, have been told they are not and never can be sufficiently 
feminine (Blair & Hoskin, 2015; Hoskin, 2017). Not all queer women or LGBT individuals 
who identify or present themselves as feminine, however, identify as femme, and even 
among those who do, restrictive understandings of femininity persist (Taylor, 2018). Further 
research is therefore needed to explore experiences and traits that predict whether, when, 
and to what extent non-heterosexual women develop narrow versus inclusive 
understandings of femininity, as well as the extent to which more expansive 






This dissertation expands research on gender stereotypicality threats by focusing on 
threats to women’s femininity within the domain of appearance. In doing so, it challenges 
the assumption that men are more constrained by the pressure to be masculine than women 
are by the pressure to be feminine—and provides a new perspective on how gender 
stereotypes harm women. 
 As detailed in this chapter, additional research is needed to answer several questions 
about femininity and femininity threats that remain unanswered, namely: why women are not 
distressed by psychological femininity threats; how women behaviorally respond to physical 
femininity threats; whether physical femininity threats indirectly reinforce stereotypes; 
whether women of different races and sexual orientations respond differently to physical 
femininity threats; and when and how women develop different understandings of what it 
does—and does not—mean to be feminine. Answering these questions will provide a more 
comprehensive and inclusive understanding of women’s experiences with hegemonic 
femininity, as well as alternative femininities. It will also pave the way for interventions that 
can support women in coping with threats to their femininity and potentially engaging in 
collection action to challenge harmful media messages. 
 Although this chapter laid out several recommendations for future research on 
femininity threat, it should not be interpreted as a comprehensive list of directions for future 
research on this topic. More than a call to answer specific questions about how women react 
when they are told they are not feminine, this dissertation should serve as a broader appeal 
to social scientists to prioritize research on femininity. The research here focused on one 
highly consequential aspect of physical femininity, facial femininity, which plays a central 




Todorov, 2008; Plemons, 2017; Walker & Wänke, 2017; Wild et al., 2000). However, future 
research might also consider other aspects of physical appearance, such as hair and body 
shape, that also inform gender categorization (Goshen-Gottstein & Ganel, 2000; Johnson & 
Tassinary, 2005; Macrae & Martin, 2007; Martin & Macrae, 2007) and influence women’s 
self-concepts (LaFrance, 2000; Overstreet et al., 2010; Webster & Tiggemann, 2003). 
Additionally, while the research here focused on one critical but underexamined domain of 
femininity, physical appearance, future research might consider other consequential domains 
that have yet to be sufficiently explored—particularly reproductive capacity and 
motherhood. 
In her commentary on the theory of precarious manhood, Chrisler (2013) asserted 
that womanhood, like manhood, is an achieved status and that this status is earned through 
both physical beauty and self-sacrificial motherhood. And indeed, decades of theorizing and 
qualitative research, particularly by sociologists, have lent support to the notion that 
womanhood and adult femininity are defined largely in terms of motherhood and fertility 
(Gillespie, 2000, 2003; Letherby, 1999; Wells & Heinsch, 2020). Infertility may be particularly 
distressing for women (compared to men) because women have relatively few domains other 
than motherhood in which they can “prove” their femininity or womanhood (Choi et al., 
2005; Ying et al., 2015). And women who experience infertility and possess physical features 
that are typically considered masculine (e.g., thick facial and body hair) have described 
feeling like “freaks” as a result (Kitzinger & Willmott, 2002). Some women who have not 
had children, however, express concerns that childbirth is inherently unfeminine (Malacrida 
& Boulton, 2012). Therefore, more research is needed to understand how physical 
appearance, fertility, and motherhood all factor into understandings of femininity and 




infertile or inadequately maternal. By prioritizing research on femininity more broadly, 
psychologists will be able to address the manifold ways in which gendered expectations and 
pressures shape women’s lives. 
 Finally, the work presented in this dissertation speaks to the question of what 
femininity and masculinity are—and what they are not. Over the course of the 20th century, 
the relative associations between feminine personality traits and women, compared to 
feminine personality traits and men, weakened (Bhatia & Bhatia, 2020). In recent decades, 
women have decreasingly reported possessing feminine personality traits and increasingly 
reported possessing masculine personality traits (Bem, 1974; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; 
Donnelly & Twenge, 2017; Twenge, 1997). And in a series of studies published twenty years 
ago, participants predicted that by the year 2050, women and men would possess 
comparable levels of masculine personality traits (Diekman & Eagly, 2000). Furthermore, in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, as in past work (Vandello et al., 2008), I found that women 
did not experience anxiety in response to threats to the femininity of their personalities. 
If women are decreasingly describing themselves in terms of feminine personality 
traits and increasingly describing themselves in terms of masculine personality traits, and if 
they are not bothered by information suggesting that they lack feminine personality traits 
and possess masculine personality traits, then in what sense are these traits really “feminine” 
and “masculine”? The most recent research suggests that women still describe their 
personalities as more feminine than masculine (Donnelly & Twenge, 2017) and that both 
descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes about women’s personalities endure (Prentice & 
Carranza, 2002; Eagly et al., 2020; Haines et al., 2016). However, given that perhaps the 
strongest prescriptive stereotypes about women focus on physical appearance (Parker et al., 




weakening (Bhatia & Bhatia, 2020), that the gap between women’s identification with 
feminine and masculine personality traits is shrinking (Donnelly & Twenge, 2017), and that 
women and men are expected to have comparable levels of masculine personality traits in 
thirty years (Diekman & Eagly, 2000), it may eventually be the case that using the terms 
“feminine” and “masculine” when referring to personality traits no longer makes sense. 
Women and men are still expected to look quite different in thirty years, however 
(Diekman & Eagly, 2000), and as this dissertation makes clear, the pressure on women to 
look feminine—and not look masculine—remains strong. Fully understanding the harm that 
gender stereotypes cause clearly requires attending to physical appearances. Men may be 
similarly impacted by threats to their physical and psychological gender stereotypicality, but 
women are not. If we are to understand the unique experiences of women, we must consider 
how they respond to and cope with the pressure to appear physically feminine. This 
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Study 1a Gender Identity Centrality Items Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Being a female is an important 
part of my self image --        
2. Being a female is unimportant 
to my sense of what kind of 
person I am (R)  .57*** --       
3. Being a female is an important 
reflection of who I am .85*** .56*** --      
4. Being a female has very little 
to do with how I feel about 
myself (R)  .57*** .71*** .52*** --     
5. Being feminine is an 
important part of my self image .68*** .44*** .67*** .48*** --    
6. Being feminine is unimportant 
to my sense of what kind of 
person I am (R)  .62*** .63*** .60*** .64*** .70*** --   
7. Being feminine is an 
important reflection of who I am .75*** .49*** .69*** .55*** .89*** .74*** --  
8. Being feminine has very little 
to do with how I feel about 
myself (R)  .56*** .50*** .48*** .59*** .64*** .68*** .68*** -- 







Study 1a Loadings of Gender Identity Centrality Items onto Factor Identified in Principal 





Being feminine is an important reflection of who I am 0.892 
Being feminine is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (R)  0.857 
Being a female is an important part of my self image 0.856 
Being feminine is an important part of my self image 0.847 
Being a female is an important reflection of who I am 0.822 
Being feminine has very little to do with how I feel about myself (R)  0.779 
Being a female has very little to do with how I feel about myself (R)  0.762 
Being a female is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (R) 0.736 
 
Supplemental Measures 
Self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. We measured self-perceived sexual 
attractiveness and attractiveness of personality for exploratory purposes. Both forms 
attractiveness were measured using single-item, 7-point measures. Participants rated their 
sexual attractiveness on scales ranging from “I am not very sexually attractive” to “I am very 
sexually attractive” (Wade, 2000) and the attractiveness of their personality on a scale ranging 
from “My personality is not very appealing” to “My personality is very appealing.”  
Results 
Supplemental Primary Analyses 
Because the plurality of participants (n=48; 22.22% of the sample) reported no 
anxiety and thus the distribution of state anxiety was positively-skewed, we also transformed 
state anxiety into a binary variable with 0=anxiety absent and 1=anxiety present. We then 
ran a binary logistic regression to determine whether physical femininity feedback had an 
effect on whether participants reported any state anxiety. We dummy coded physical 
femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback with affirmation as the reference 




condition were more likely to report any state anxiety (87.18%) than those in the physical 
femininity affirmation condition (67.44%), B = 1.19, SE = 0.41, p = .004, OR = 3.28 [1.47, 
7.34]. In other words, the odds of reporting any anxiety (probably of reporting 
anxiety/probably of reporting no anxiety) were 3.28 times greater among those in the 
physical femininity threat condition (6.80 odds) than those in the physical femininity 
affirmation condition (2.07 odds). Participants in the physical femininity control condition 
were not more likely to report any state anxiety (80.77% or 4.20 odds) than those in the 
physical femininity affirmation condition, B = 0.71, SE = 0.42, p = .095, OR = 2.03 [0.88, 
4.64]. Physical attractiveness feedback had no effect on likelihood of reporting any state 
anxiety, B = 0.01, SE = 0.34, p = .988, OR = 1.01 [0.52, 1.95]. There were no interactions 
between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback (ps > .70). 
Supplemental Exploratory Analyses 
Self-perceived attractiveness. For exploratory purposes, we examined whether the manipulations 
affected self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. Neither 
physical femininity feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback—nor the interaction 
between these two variables—affected self-perceived sexual attractiveness or attractiveness 




Self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. We measured sexual attractiveness 





Desire to change photograph. Participants indicated whether, if given the opportunity, they would 
want to replace the photograph they uploaded with a different one.  
Results 
Supplemental Primary Analyses 
Because the modal state anxiety score was 1 (n=30; 12.20% of the sample), 
indicating no anxiety, and the distribution of state anxiety was positively-skewed, we also 
transformed state anxiety into a binary variable with 1=anxiety present and 0=anxiety 
absent. We then ran a pre-registered binary logistic regression, as pre-registered, to determine 
whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on whether participants reported any 
state anxiety. We dummy coded physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness 
feedback with affirmation as the reference group for both variables. None of the dummy 
variables, nor the interactions among them, predicted likelihood of reporting any state 
anxiety, ps>.20. 
Supplemental Exploratory Analyses 
Self-perceived attractiveness. For exploratory purposes, we examined whether the manipulations 
affected self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. Neither 
physical femininity feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback—nor the interaction 
between them—affected self-perceived sexual attractiveness, ps > .30. 
Neither physical femininity feedback nor physical attractiveness feedback affected 
self-perceived attractiveness of personality, ps > .45. Surprisingly, there was a significant 
interactive effect between physical femininity feedback and physical attractiveness feedback 
on self-perceived attractiveness of personality, F(2, 240) = 3.05, p = .049, f = 0.16. When we 
broke down this interaction, however, we found that there was not a significant effect of 




physical attractiveness affirmation condition, F(1, 110) = 0.74, p = .480, f = 0.12, or the 
physical attractiveness control condition, F(1, 130) = 2.70, p = .071, f = 0.20. 
Desire to change photograph. We sought to determine whether participants whose physical 
femininity (or attractiveness) was threatened would be more likely than those whose physical 
femininity (or attractiveness) was affirmed to want to replace the photograph they had 
uploaded with a new one. We dummy coded physical femininity feedback and physical 
attractiveness feedback with affirmation as the reference group for both variables and then 
ran a binary logistic regression with these dummy-coded variables and the interactions 
between them as predictors. This analysis revealed a main effect of physical attractiveness 
feedback, B = -0.76, SE = 0.29, p = .008, OR = 0.47 [0.27, 0.82], such that the percent of 
participants who would want to replace their photograph was smaller among those who 
physical attractiveness was affirmed (24.78%) than those who did not receive feedback on 
their physical attractiveness (40.60%).  The odds of wanting to replace one’s photograph 
among participants whose physical attractiveness was affirmed (0.33) were about half the 
odds of wanting to replace one’s photograph among participants who did not receive 
feedback on their physical appearance (0.68). 
There was no effect of physical femininity feedback on participants’ desire to replace 
their photograph (threat vs. affirmation: B = -0.22, SE = 0.32, p = .486, OR = .80 [0.43, 








Self-perceived sexual attractiveness and attractiveness of personality. We measured self-perceived sexual 
attractiveness and attractiveness of personality using the single-item, 7-point measures used 
in Studies 1a and 1b.  
Desire to change photograph. As in Study 1b, participants indicated whether, if given the 
opportunity, they would want to replace the photograph they uploaded with a different one.  
Results 
Supplemental Primary Analyses 
Because the modal state anxiety score was 1 (n = 65; 14.19% of the sample) and the 
distribution of state anxiety was positively-skewed, we also transformed state anxiety into a 
binary variable with 1=anxiety present and 0=anxiety absent. We then ran a pre-registered 
binary logistic regression to determine whether physical femininity feedback had an effect on 
whether participants reported any state anxiety. We dummy coded physical femininity 
feedback, with affirmation as the reference group, and lists of physical features, with absence 
of these lists as the reference group. We found that participants in the physical femininity 
threat condition were more likely to report any state anxiety (90.99%) than those in the 
physical femininity affirmation condition were (80.93%), B = 0.87, SE = 0.29, p = .003, OR 
= 2.38 [1.35, 4.19]. In other words, the odds of reporting any anxiety were 2.38 times greater 
among those in the physical femininity threat condition (10.10 odds) than those in the 
physical femininity affirmation condition (4.24 odds). There was no effect of listing physical 




an interaction between listing physical features and physical femininity feedback, B = -0.33, 
SE = 0.57, p = .564, OR = 0.72 [0.23, 2.21].   
Supplemental Exploratory Analyses 
Self-perceived attractiveness. For exploratory purposes, we examined whether the manipulations 
affected self-perceived physical attractiveness, sexual attractiveness, and attractiveness of 
personality with three 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVAs with physical femininity feedback 
and lists of physical features as the independent variables. There was an effect of listing 
physical features on self-perceived sexual attractiveness, F(1, 454) = 6.86, p = .009, f = 0.12, 
such that those in the lists present condition perceived themselves as more sexually attractive 
(M = 4.32, SD = 1.48) than those in the features absent condition (M = 3.94, SD = 1.64). 
There were no other main or interactive effects on any of the measures of self-perceived 
attractiveness, ps ≥ .10. 
Desire to change photograph. As in Study 1b, we considered whether participants whose physical 
femininity was threatened would want to replace the photograph they had uploaded with a 
new one. We were also interested in whether this effect, if present, would be limited to 
participants who saw lists of physical features that supposedly contribute to overall 
assessments of facial masculinity/femininity. We dummy coded physical femininity feedback 
(with affirmation as the reference group) and lists of physical features (with absence of these 
lists as the reference group) and then ran a binary logistic regression with these dummy-
coded variables and the interaction between them as predictors. This analysis revealed a 
main effect of physical femininity feedback, B = 1.26, SE = 0.21, p < .001, OR = 3.53 [2.34, 
5.32], such that the percent of participants who would want to replace their photograph was 
smaller among those who physical femininity was affirmed (21.19%) than those whose 




photograph among participants whose physical femininity was threatened (0.96) were 3.53 
the odds of wanting to replace one’s photograph among participants whose physical 
femininity was affirmed (0.27). There was no effect of listing physical features on desire to 
change photograph, B = -0.25, SE = 0.21, p = .233, OR = 0.78 [0.52, 1.17], nor an 
interaction between physical femininity feedback and listing physical features, B = 0.40, SE 








Study 2 Loadings of Felt Identity Invalidation Items onto Factors Identified in Principal 


















I feel validated as a female [male] 
(R)  0.827 0.131 0.21 
I feel validated as a woman [man] 
(R) 0.825 0.16 0.202 
I feel validated as feminine 
[masculine] (R)  0.82 0.165 0.202 
I feel that my identity as a woman 
[man] is recognized by others (R)  0.736 0.294 0.231 
I feel that my identity as feminine 
[masculine] is recognized by 
others (R)  0.73 0.285 0.239 
I feel that my identity as a female 
[male] is recognized by others (R)  0.727 0.308 0.202 
I am concerned that others do not 
recognize my womanhood 
[manhood] 0.236 0.843 0.165 
I am concerned that others do not 
recognize my femininity 
[masculinity] 0.205 0.833 0.169 
I am concerned that others do not 
recognize my “femaleness” 
["maleness"] 0.287 0.815 0.147 
Other people’s sense of who I am 
aligns with who I feel I am (R)  0.244 0.027 0.811 
I do not feel that other people see 
me for who I really am 0.046 0.285 0.786 
I feel that my identity is 
recognized by others (R) 0.437 0.128 0.694 
I feel like the results I received are 
consistent with my beliefs about 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Self-perceived attractiveness. We measured self-perceived physical attractiveness, sexual 
attractiveness, and attractiveness of personality using the single-item, 7-point measures used 
in Studies 1a-c.  
Results 
Supplemental Primary Analyses 
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with participant gender, domain, and feedback as the 
independent variables and state anxiety as the dependent variable revealed a main effect of 
participant gender, F(1, 1566) = 16.98, p < .001, f = 0.10, such that female participants 
reported higher levels of state anxiety (M = 1.93, SD = 0.67) than male participants (M = 
1.79, SD = 0.63). It also revealed a main effect of domain, F(1, 1566) = 3.10, p = .079, f = 
0.04, such that participants who received feedback on their appearance reported higher levels 
of anxiety (M = 1.89, SD = 0.66) than those who received feedback on their personality (M 
= 1.83, SD = 0.65). Additionally, we observed a main effect of feedback, F(1, 1566) = 30.63, 
p < .001, f = 0.14, such that participants whose gender stereotypicality was threatened 
reported higher levels of anxiety (M = 1.95, SD = 0.66) than those whose gender 
stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 1.77, SD = 0.63). 
These main effects were qualified by two two-way interactions—one between 
participant gender and domain, F(1, 1566) = 5.67, p = .017, f = 0.06, and one between 
domain and feedback, F(1, 1566) = 8.24, p = .004, f = 0.07. 
Among female participants, there was a significant effect of domain, F(1, 820) = 
8.96, p = .003, f = 0.10, such that those who received feedback on their appearance reported 




personality (M = 1.85, SD = 0.66). Among male participants, there was no effect of domain, 
F(1, 750) = 0.19, p = .664, f = 0.02. 
Furthermore, among participants who received feedback on their appearance, there 
was a significant effect of feedback, F(1, 816) = 38.09, p < .001, f = 0.22, such that those 
whose gender stereotypicality was threatened reported higher levels of anxiety (M = 2.03, SD 
= 0.66) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 1.75, SD = 0.62). 
Among participants who received feedback on their personality, the effect of feedback on 
anxiety was not significant, though it was trending in the same direction, F(1, 754) = 3.13, p 
= .078, f = 0.06, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened reported 
marginally higher levels of anxiety (M = 1.87, SD = 0.65) than those whose gender 
stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 1.79, SD = 0.65). 
There was no participant gender x feedback interaction, F(1, 1566) = 0.07, p = .790, f 
= 0.01. 
Because as in Studies 1a-c the modal anxiety score was 1 (n = 192; 12.20% of 
sample), indicating no anxiety, and the distribution of anxiety scores was positively-skewed, 
we transformed state anxiety into a binary variable with 1=anxiety present and 0=anxiety 
absent and ran two binary logistic regressions, one for female participants and one for male 
participants, to examine whether domain, feedback, and/or the interaction between these 
variables influenced the likelihood that participants would report any state anxiety. 
The binary logistic regression for female participants revealed a marginally significant 
effect of domain (appearance = 1; personality = 0), B = 0.43, SE = 0.22, p = .058, OR = 
1.53 [0.99, 2.37], no significant effect of feedback (threat = 1; affirmation = 0), B = 0.27, SE 
= 0.22, p = .224, OR = 1.31 [0.85, 2.03], and a significant domain x feedback interaction, B = 




their appearance, there was a significant effect of feedback, B = 0.95, SE = 0.36, p = .009, 
OR = 2.57 [1.27, 5.23], such that those whose physical femininity was threatened were more 
likely (94.52%) than those who physical femininity was affirmed (87.02%) to report any 
anxiety. In other words, the odds of reporting any anxiety were 2.57 times greater among 
those in the physical femininity threat condition (17.25 odds) than those in the physical 
femininity affirmation condition (6.70 odds). Among those who received feedback on their 
personality, there was no effect of feedback, B = -0.22, SE = 0.30, p = .460, OR = 0.80 
[0.45, 1.44]. 
The binary logistic regression for male participants revealed no effect of domain B = 
-0.05, SE = 0.22, p = .828, OR = 0.95 [0.62, 1.46], a significant effect of feedback, B = 0.72, 
SE = 0.22, p = .001, OR = 2.05 [1.32, 3.18], and no interaction between domain and 
feedback, B = 0.72, SE = 0.45, p = .111, OR = 2.06 [0.85, 5.00]. Those whose masculinity 
was threatened were more likely (90.72%) than those whose masculinity was affirmed 
(82.67%) to report any state anxiety. In other words, the odds of reporting any anxiety were 
2.06 times greater among those in the masculinity threat condition (9.78 odds) than those in 
the masculinity affirmation condition (4.77 odds). 
Supplemental Exploratory Analyses 
State self-esteem. Another 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA examining the effects of participant gender, 
domain, feedback, and the interactions among these variables on state self-esteem revealed a 
main effect of participant gender, F(1, 1565) = 14.85, p < .001, f = 0.10, such that female 
participants reported lower levels of state self-esteem (M = 4.06, SD = 0.96) than male 
participants (M = 4.25, SD = 0.92). It also revealed a main effect of feedback, F(1, 1565) = 
9.40, p = .002, f = 0.08, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened 




stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 4.23, SD = 0.92). There was no effect of domain on state 
self-esteem, F(1, 1565) = 2.03, p = .154, f = 0.04. 
The main effects of participant gender and feedback were qualified by two two-way 
interactions—one between participant gender and domain, F(1, 1565) = 6.33, p = .012, f = 
0.06, and one between domain and feedback, F(1, 1565) = 8.65, p = .003, f = 0.07. There 
was no participant gender x feedback interaction, F(1, 1565) = 1.06, p = .304, f = 0.03. 
A pair of one-way ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of domain on state self-
esteem among female participants, F(1, 820) = 8.11, p = .005, f = 0.10, but not male 
participants, F(1, 749) = 0.58, p = .446, f = 0.03. Among female participants, those who 
received feedback on their appearance reported lower levels of state self-esteem (M = 3.97, 
SD = 0.98) than those who received feedback on their personality (M = 4.16, SD = 0.93). 
Another pair of one-way ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of feedback on state 
self-esteem within the appearance condition, F(1, 815) = 19.32, p < .001, f = 0.15, but not 
the personality condition, F(1, 754) = 0.001, p = .980, f = 0.001. Within the appearance 
condition, those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened reported lower levels of state 
self-esteem (M = 3.97, SD = 0.98) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed (M 
= 4.26, SD = 0.93). 
Self-perceived attractiveness. We conduced three 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVAs to examine the effects of 
participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these variables—on 
self-perceived physical attractiveness, sexual attractiveness, and attractiveness of personality. 
No significant effects emerged (ps > .06). However, we broke down the sample by 
participant gender to examine potential two-way interactions. The only significant two-way 




physical attractiveness among female participants, F(1, 818) = 4.37, p = .037, f = 0.07 (all 
other interaction ps > .15). 
Surprisingly, follow-up one-way ANOVAs revealed an effect of feedback on self-
perceived physical attractiveness among female participants who received feedback on the 
femininity of their personality, F(1, 393) = 5.56, p = .019, f = 0.12, but not female 
participants who received feedback on the femininity of their appearance, F(1, 425) = 0.37, p 
= .545, f = 0.03. Among female participants who received feedback on the femininity of 
their personality, those whose femininity was threatened reported that they were more 
physically attractive (M = 4.61, SD = 1.34) than those whose femininity was affirmed (M = 
4.27, SD = 1.45). 
Supplemental Potential Mediators 
Felt gender identity invalidation.  A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA examining the potential effects of 
participant gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these variables—on 
felt gender identity invalidation revealed a main effect of participant gender, F(1, 1565) = 
8.92, p = .003, f = 0.07, such that female participants reported lower levels of felt gender 
identity invalidation (M = 2.25, SD = 1.17) than male participants (M = 2.41, SD = 1.10). 
There was no effect of domain, F(1, 1565) = 0.72, p = .396, f = 0.02, nor interactions 
between participant gender and feedback, F(1, 1565) = 3.35, p = .068, f = 0.05, or domain 
and feedback, F(1, 1565) = 0.94, p = .333, f = 0.02. 
There was, however, a participant gender x domain interaction, F(1, 1565) = 4.95, p 
= .026, f = 0.06. Among male participants, a one-way ANOVA revealed an effect of domain, 
F(1, 749) = 4.77, p = .029, f = 0.08, such that those in the personality condition reported 




appearance condition (M = 2.33, SD = 1.07). Among female participants, there was no 
effect of domain, F(1, 820) = 1.22, p = .270, f = 0.04. 
Results-identity discrepancy. The 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA examining the potential effects of participant 
gender, domain, and feedback—and the interactions among these variables—on results-
identity discrepancy revealed a main effect of feedback, F(1, 1566) = 427.72, p < .001, f = 
0.50, such that those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater discrepancy 
between their results and identity (M = 4.22, SD = 1.81) than those whose gender 
stereotypicality was affirmed (M = 2.50, SD = 1.48). It also revealed a main effect of domain, 
F(1, 1566) = 8.37, p = .004, f = 0.06, such that those who received feedback on their 
appearance felt a greater discrepancy between their results and identity (M = 3.49, SD = 
1.91) than those who received feedback on their personality (M = 3.22, SD = 1.79). There 
was no main effect of participant gender, F(1, 1566) = 2.11, p = .146, f =0.03. 
The main effect of domain was qualified by two two-way interactions—a participant 
gender x domain interaction, F(1, 1566) =4.67, p = .031, f =0.05, and a domain x feedback 
interaction, F(1, 1566) = 65.77, p < .001, f = 0.18. There was no participant gender x 
feedback interaction, F(1, 1566) =1.18, p = .278, f =0.02. 
To probe the first interaction, we broke the sample down by participant gender and 
conducted a one-way ANOVA with domain as the independent variable. Among female 
participants, there was an effect of domain, F(1, 820) = 12.41, p < .001, f = 0.12, such that 
those who received feedback on their appearance felt a greater discrepancy between their 
results and identity (M = 3.53, SD = 1.96) than those who received feedback on their 
personality (M = 3.07, SD = 1.77). Among male participants, there was no effect of domain, 




We then broke down the sample by domain and conducted another one-way 
ANOVA with feedback as the independent variable. Among those in the personality 
condition, there was an effect of feedback, F(1, 754) = 66.14, p < .001, f =0.30, such that 
those whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater discrepancy between their 
results and identity (M = 3.74, SD = 1.84) than those whose gender stereotypicality was 
affirmed (M =  2.72, SD = 1.60). Among those in the appearance condition, there was an 
even stronger effect of feedback, F(1, 816) = 498.11, p < .001, f = 0.78, such that those 
whose gender stereotypicality was threatened felt a greater discrepancy between their results 
and identity (M = 4.65, SD = 1.66) than those whose gender stereotypicality was affirmed 
(M = 2.29, SD = 1.33).  
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